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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation is composed of three papers and is motivated by the 2007 subprime 
mortgage crisis and the 2008 financial crisis that followed afterwards. In particular, the first two 
papers (chapters 2 and 3) are motivated by the literature findings on the subprime crisis that lending 
standards had been relaxed. The first two papers examine changing characteristics of lending under 
relaxed lending standards. The lending characteristics in 1998 are compared to 2007. The period 
1998 is the period when subprime lending was popular but before lending standards were relaxed. 
The period 2007 is the period after relaxed lending standards had been in effect for some time. 
Different than the existing literature on the subprime crisis, the first paper jointly analyzes 
households’ credit quality and home purchase behaviors, and the second paper analyzes the gap 
between households’ desired and outstanding debt levels. The focus of the first two papers is 
households because households were greatly affected by the crisis. They experienced high 
unemployment rates and major declines in their wealth, and many lost their homes. Additionally, 
different than most of the existing literature on the subprime crisis, the first two papers use household 
survey data, Survey of Consumer Finances data from the Federal Reserve Board, to examine 
changing lending characteristics. Overall, the findings suggest changes in the home purchase 
behaviors and increases in the gap between households’ desired and outstanding debt levels, for both 
low income and high income households. In the future, financial regulators (including the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) can use these results as a 
sign for changing characteristics of lending under easy credit conditions and can take preventive 
measures before stability of the U.S. financial system is threatened and households are negatively 
affected by bad lending practices. 
The focus of the third paper (chapter 4) is the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system. The 
FHLB system is an important source for small banks to finance their customer loans demands. 
During the 2008 financial crisis, the FHLB system played a critical role in funding its member 
financial institutions and in improving their liquidity. Due to the significance of the FHLB system in 
the financial sector and the critical role it played during the crisis, this dissertation finds it worthwhile 
to study the loans that the FHLB system grants to small banks. In particular, the third paper examines 
the characteristics of banks that utilize the system advances and the determinants of advance use 
levels by using the Call Report data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and Summary of 
Deposits data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Overall, the findings suggest that the 
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probability of advance use and the level of advance use were higher for small banks with low core 
deposits, high liquidity risks, high interest rate risks, and high cost of funds, and for small banks that 
are located in rural counties. Knowing the characteristics of the banks utilizing advances can inform 
regulators about the FHLB lending practices and risk profiles of the banks that utilize FHLB 
advances. Under high risk profiles, the regulators can set new capital standards for the banks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation is motivated by the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis and the 2008 financial 
crisis that followed afterwards. Following the crisis, households experienced high unemployment 
rates and significant declines in their wealth, and many lost their homes. Due to the significant 
impacts of the crisis on households, the first two papers (chapters 2 and 3) focus on households. In 
particular, the first paper focuses on households’ credit quality and home purchase behaviors. The 
second paper focuses on the gap between households’ desired and outstanding debt levels. The goal 
of the two papers is to examine how characteristics of lending have changed from 1998, before 
lending standards were relaxed, to 2007, after relaxed lending standards had been in effect for some 
time. Due to the significance of the FHLB system in the financial sector and the significant role it 
played in improving liquidity of its members during the crisis, the third paper (chapter 4) examines 
characteristics of small banks that utilize the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances and the 
determinants of advance use levels.  
The goal of the first paper (chapter 2) is to analyze the changing characteristics of lending to 
subprime households, under relaxed lending standards, by using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
data from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Different than the literature on the subprime 
crisis, this paper uses household survey data, and jointly studies households’ credit characteristics 
and home purchase behaviors to understand changing lending characteristics. As evidence of 
changing lending characteristics under relaxed lending standards, two households with the same 
credit characteristics but that are observed in different time periods are compared. Since the SCF data 
does not provide information on households’ credit scores, households are split into three groups 
based on their income quantiles and subprime households are proxied by households within the 
lowest income group. For comparison purposes, three hypotheses are tested for each of the three 
income groups that are created. Hypothesis (2.H1): in 2007, households with lower credit quality 
were able to get similar loan-to-value ratios and had similar home purchase behavior as households 
with higher credit quality; that is, mortgage types and credit quality characteristics were less 
significant in 2007 than in 1998 in explaining households’ home financing ratios, home purchase 
decisions, and the dollar amount households paid on their home purchases; hypothesis (2.H2): home 
financing ratios and home purchase rates were greater in 2007 than in 1998; hypothesis (2.H3): 
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households paid more on their home purchases in 2007 than in 1998. The findings for households 
within the lowest income group support hypothesis (2.H1). In 2007, the mortgage types and credit 
quality characteristics did not explain as strongly as they did in 1998 the home financing ratio, home 
purchase decision, and dollar amount paid on home purchases. That is, in 2007, the distinction 
between low credit quality and high credit quality households declined. With respect to hypothesis 
(2.H2), the findings display no significant changes in home financing ratios, but reveal that 
households with the lowest income levels were more likely to purchase homes in 2007. The findings 
with respect to hypothesis (2.H3), show no support for an increase in the dollar amount paid on home 
purchases. In addition, for the high income group, the results support hypothesis (2.H1) and reveal 
that the distinction between households with low credit quality and households with high credit 
quality was reduced.  
The second paper (chapter 3) uses the SCF data and examines the changing characteristics of 
lending under easy credit conditions and compares the levels of household debt from 1998 to 2007. 
In particular, this paper studies the gap between households’ desired and outstanding debt levels and 
how this gap has changed from 1998 to 2007. This paper is the first, among the existing literature on 
the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, to look into this gap. The hypothesis is that the gap will decline 
given that credit constrained households have more access to credit and borrow a greater portion of 
their desired debt levels under relaxed lending standards. The gap is calculated in three steps. 1) 
Estimate desired debt levels for unconstrained households through three-equation-generalized-Tobit, 
by using the households’ outstanding debt levels which are observed in the data; 2) Predict desired 
debt levels for constrained households by using the estimated coefficient values from step 1; 
3)Measure the gap between the predicted debt levels and the observed debt levels. For study 
purposes, permanent income is constructed by earnings equation estimation and net worth is 
instrumented. Different than the previous literature on household debt, the sample includes high 
income households and the oversampling of high income households has been adjusted by using the 
sampling weights that are provided by the SCF data. Additionally, the standard errors are 
bootstrapped. The findings show a declining gap for households with income levels between $30,000 
and $60,000 and for households with income levels above $345,000. The findings also display a 
declining gap for households with household heads less than or equal to 34 years old and household 
heads between 54 and 65 years old.  
In the future, if the distinction between low credit quality and high credit quality households 
declines, home purchase rates increase, and the gap between desired and outstanding debt levels 
declines, these attributes can be taken to be a warning for changing lending characteristics under easy 
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credit conditions. Based on these attributes, financial regulators (including the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) can take preventive measures and 
enforce regulations before stability of the U.S. financial system is threatened and households are 
negatively affected by bad lending practices.  
In the third paper (chapter 4), the goal is to study the FHLB advances and characteristics of 
banks that utilize system advances. Using Call Report data from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago and Summary of Deposits data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for the years 
2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, this study identifies the determinants of the advance use decision and 
the level of use of advances. This study is the first to look at determinants of advance use levels and 
periods after the enactment of the 1999 GLB Act, which made membership in and borrowing from 
the FHLB system easier, but before the 2008 crisis. The findings support that the probability of 
advance use and the level of advance use were higher for small banks with low deposits, high 
liquidity risks, high interest rate risks, and high cost of funds. The small banks that were located in 
rural counties had greater probability of advance use and utilized greater advance amounts than 
banks that were not located in rural counties.  Knowing the characteristics of the banks utilizing 
advances can inform regulators about the FHLB lending practices and risk profiles of the banks that 
utilize FHLB advances. Under high risk taking, the regulators can set new capital standards for the 
banks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE 2007 SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS: CHANGING 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LENDING TO SUBPRIME HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this paper, the objective is to examine changes in characteristics of lending to subprime 
households by using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data from the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors.1 This question is motivated by the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis and relaxed lending 
standards. In particular, the goal is to analyze the lending characteristics in the U.S mortgage market 
before and after the lending standards were relaxed and how the characteristics of lending to 
subprime households changed under relaxed lending standards.  
Following the subprime crisis, the literature identified decline in lending standards in the U.S. 
mortgage market as one of the contributors to the crisis (Ariccia et al. 2008; Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert 2009; Foote et al. 2008; Mian and Sufi 2009a; Keys et al. 2009; Keys et al. 2010; 
Purnanandam 2011; Loutskina and Strahan 2011; Goetzmann et al. 2009). What were the factors that 
contributed to this decline in lending standards? In the years leading up to the crisis, especially 2002 
to 2004, foreign nations invested heavily in U.S. treasury bonds and a significant amount of foreign 
money flowed into the U.S. Due to the 2001 recession, which resulted from the burst of the dot-com 
bubble and the September 11 terrorist attack, the Federal Reserve Bank lowered interest rates and the 
low interest rates were in effect until 2006. This inflow of funds along with low interest rates 
contributed to relaxed lending standards in the U.S. mortgage industry.  
An additional factor that contributed to the decline in lending standards was the practices that 
took place in the mortgage market. Traditionally, when lenders give mortgage loans to households, 
they keep these loans on their balance sheets until they are paid off. However, in the years leading up 
to the crisis, mortgage lenders sold their mortgage loans (including subprime mortgages) to Wall 
Street dealers or to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Then, Wall Street dealers, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac gathered the mortgages into a pool, created securities backed by the mortgages’ monthly 
                                                          
1
 Borrowers are served by the subprime market if they have experienced judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or 
non-payment of a loan in the past 48 months, or experienced bankruptcy in the last 7 years, or have a FICO score 
below 620.   
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payments (mortgage backed securities-MBS), and sold these MBS to investors around the world. 
MBS were in great demand in 2005 by investors because they paid higher interest rates than U.S. 
Treasuries and they had a triple-A rating from credit rating agencies even though these securities 
were risky.2 As the demand for MBS increased, lenders were able to sell their subprime loans to Wall 
Street dealers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at a quicker rate. Thus, lenders would not bear any 
losses if mortgages, specifically subprime mortgages, defaulted. Due to this practice, lenders had 
strong incentive to give out more subprime mortgages at the expense of loan quality, resulting in 
relaxed lending standards.  
The relaxation in lending standards encouraged borrowers to take on unprecedented debt 
loads. The amount of subprime loans peaked during 2004 to 2006. According to John Lonski, 
Moody’s Investors’ chief economist, only 9 percent of all mortgage originations were subprime 
during the years 1996 to 2004. But, this origination rate increased to 21 percent between 2004 and 
2006, accounting for more than one-fifth of the U.S. total mortgage market. Due to increased 
subprime mortgage lending, homeownership rates and demand for housing increased, leading to a 
housing bubble and rising housing prices. Many institutions and investors invested in the U.S. 
housing market through mortgage backed securities and this resulted in an increase in the volume of 
mortgage backed securities. 
Even though the subprime mortgage market was experiencing growth, it entered into 
depression in 2007. Due to increasing house prices, many houses were being built and a surplus of 
unsold houses occurred, which eventually led to a decline in housing prices. As house prices 
declined, home values were worth less than the originated mortgage loans and thus, borrowers could 
not refinance their mortgages at favorable terms. In addition, interest rates increased and adjustable 
rate mortgages (ARM) were reset at higher rates resulting in stricter mortgage terms. These series of 
events precipitated credit defaults and increases in subprime mortgage foreclosures. Lenders could 
also not cover their losses from increased mortgage foreclosures because homes were worth less than 
the originated mortgage loans. This event resulted in many subprime mortgage lenders filing for 
bankruptcy. Financial institutions, which had invested in securities backed with subprime mortgages, 
also faced significant losses because as housing prices dropped and subprime borrowers defaulted on 
their loan payments, these securities lost most of their value.   
                                                          
2
 Credit rating agencies would rate subprime mortgages as triple-A even though they were risky because the rating 
agencies were paid by the MBS issuers and this resulted in a conflict of interest. For instance, if the rating agency 
didn’t provide a good rating for the MBS, the issuer would take its business to another agency. Thus, the credit 
rating agencies felt pressure to put a higher rating on the MBS even though they were risky. 
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According to the 2007 Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey, 
subprime ARMs accounted for 43 percent of mortgage foreclosures which started during the third 
quarter of 2007. Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), stated that 
approximately 16 percent of the subprime ARMs, roughly triple the rate of mid-2005, were 
delinquent in August 2007 (Bernanke 2007). Bernanke also reported that this default rate rose to 21 
percent by January 2008 and 25 percent by May 2008 (Bernanke 2008a; Bernanke 2008b). Based on 
the 2007 U.S. Foreclosure Market Report by RealtyTrac, lenders foreclosed on 1,285,873 homes 
during 2007, a 75 percent increase from 2006. According to the 2008 U.S. Foreclosure Market 
Report by RealtyTrac, this number had increased still further to 2.3 million homes in 2008, an 81 
percent increase over 2007. Based on the 2008 Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency 
Survey, as of 2008, 9.2 percent of all outstanding mortgages were delinquent or in foreclosure.  
This study adds to the existing literature on the 2007 crisis and relaxed lending standards, and 
examines evidence of changing characteristics of lending to subprime households, under relaxed 
lending standards. In order to understand the changing characteristics of lending, this paper uses the 
SCF data and studies households, their credit characteristics, and their home purchase behaviors 
before and after lending standards were relaxed. The focus is on households but not on macro factors 
or the lender perspective. This study finds it worthwhile to focus on households because following 
the crisis, households were greatly affected. They experienced high unemployment rates and saw 
major declines in their wealth. Also, any future policy changes with respect to lending practices may 
have a significant impact on households.  
In order to understand the changing characteristics of lending to subprime households, two 
households with the same credit characteristics but that are observed in different time periods, 1998 
and 2007, are compared. The year 1998 reflects the time period when subprime lending was popular 
but before lending standards were relaxed and 2007 reflects the time period after relaxed lending 
standards had been in effect for some time. The households are categorized into three groups based 
on income quantiles and the subprime households are proxied by households from the lowest income 
group because the SCF data do not provide credit score information for households and thus, 
subprime households are not directly observed in the SCF data. 
The comparison focuses on households’ home financing ratios, home purchase rates, and the 
dollar amount households paid on their home purchases. Under relaxed lending standards, I would 
expect to see changes in lending characteristics because lenders will make riskier loans, and 
households will have easier access to mortgage loans and receive more financing. Thus, as evidence 
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of the changing characteristics of lending, this study tests three hypotheses for each of the three 
income groups: 
(2.H1): In 2007, households with lower credit quality were able to get similar loan-to-value ratios 
and had similar home purchase behavior as households with higher credit quality; that is, mortgage 
types and credit quality characteristics were less significant in 2007 than in 1998 in explaining 
households’ home financing ratios, home purchase decisions, and the dollar amount households paid 
on their home purchases. 3  (2.H2): Home financing ratios and home purchase rates were greater in 
2007 than in 1998. (2.H3): Households paid more on their home purchases in 2007 than in 1998.   
 In order to test the null hypotheses, three separate regressions are run to explain home 
financing ratio, home purchase rate, and dollar amount households paid on their home purchases. 
Each of the three regressions pools households from the 1998 and 2007 SCF data and includes 
mortgage types, credit characteristics, time dummies, and income groups as explanatory variables. In 
order to test for the validity of null hypothesis (2.H1), this study hopes to show that the coefficient 
for mortgage types and credit quality characteristics became insignificant in 2007, or were 
insignificant in 1998 but became significant in 2007 with a coefficient sign supporting greater credit 
access by poor credit quality households, or had smaller magnitude effect in explaining home 
financing ratio, home purchase rate, and dollar amount households paid on their home purchases. As 
a test for validity of null hypotheses 2.H2 and 2.H3, the focus is on magnitudes of dependent 
variables in each of the three regressions and this study expects to find a greater home financing 
ratio, home purchase probability, and dollar amount paid on home purchases in 2007. 
With a decline in lending standards, higher default rates and higher numbers of mortgage 
loan foreclosures are expected. Increased mortgage loan foreclosures may result in greater 
bankruptcy rates for mortgage lenders. The increased bankruptcy rates may affect the entire 
economy. These consequences were actually seen in the “2007 Subprime Mortgage Financial Crisis”. 
The crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Several financial 
institutions faced lower profits, went bankrupt, were taken over by other companies or were bailed 
out by the U.S government. Profits of depository institutions insured by FDIC declined. World 
financial markets became unstable and U.S. stocks suffered huge losses. Unemployment rates 
increased and Americans saw a major decline in their wealth.  
If findings of this study support the three hypotheses, it indicates that the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs which were aimed at increasing homeownership 
                                                          
3
 The home financing ratio is measured by mortgage loan-to-home value (LTV) ratio. 
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to lower income households led to bad lending practices and increased risky loans, and households 
were given more mortgage loans than they could repay or households that could not purchase homes 
were more likely to purchase or households purchased pricier homes than they could afford. The 
regulators can take these three hypotheses as a warning mechanism for regulations and lending 
practices that have gone badly. Under this case, it is critical to monitor how the regulations are 
applied, whether lending practices meet minimum standards, and whether there are any threats to 
financial stability. For instance, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which was established 
after the 2007 subprime crisis to identify and respond to systemic risks, should use the results from 
the three hypothesis as a warning to threats to the financial stability of the U.S. and should take 
preventive measures and make recommendations to the Federal Reserve Board before the financial 
system collapses. Additionally, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which was established 
after the 2007 subprime crisis, should enforce regulations to protect households from bad lending 
practices.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
Most of the existing literature on the 2007 subprime crisis has looked at factors that 
contributed to the crisis. Several of them focused on the lender perspective and identified relaxed 
lending standards, securitization, moral hazard, and decline in housing prices as contributors to the 
crisis (Ariccia et al. 2008; Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2009; Foote et al. 2008; Mian and Sufi 2009a; 
Keys et al. 2009; Keys et al. 2010; Purnanandam 2011; Loutskina and Strahan 2011; Sanders 2008; 
Goetzmann et al. 2009). On the other hand, Mian and Sufi (2009b; 2010) focused on the household 
perspective and identified increases in household debt as contributors to the crisis.  
To study relaxed lending standards, Ariccia et al. (2008) focused on loan denial rates and 
loan-to-income ratios in subprime mortgage markets. Their findings show a decline in lending 
standards in areas with high mortgage securitization rates, large numbers of competitors, and in areas 
with housing booms. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) focused on quality of subprime mortgage 
loans to analyze relaxed lending standards and used first time delinquency rates to measure the loan 
quality. Their findings show a decline in subprime rate spreads and quality of subprime mortgage 
loans during the 2001-2007 periods, and an increase in the loan-to-value ratios and fraction of low 
documentation loans. Findings by Foote et al. (2008), Sanders (2008), and Keys et al. (2009) also 
confirm relaxed lending standards and increases in LTV ratios and fraction of low documentation 
loans in addition to increases in debt-to-income ratios. Another finding by Foote et al. (2008) and 
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Keys et al. (2009) was that some of the high FICO score borrowers were inappropriately steered into 
the subprime market and they benefited from relaxed lending standards.  
Other studies focused on securitization as causes of relaxed lending standards and 
contributors to the crisis. Their conclusion was that securitization led to a moral hazard problem, 
giving rise to relaxed lending standards (Mian and Sufi 2009a; Keys et al. 2009; Keys et al. 2010; 
Purnanandam 2011). Findings by Mian and Sufi (2009a) suggest that lending standards were relaxed 
from 2001 to 2005. They attributed the cause of the deteriorating lending standards to a shift in the 
mortgage industry towards securitization, an expansion in the supply of mortgage loans, and also to a 
reduction in mortgage denial rates in zip codes with large numbers of high-risk borrowers, and 
negative income and employment growth. Findings by Keys et al. (2009), Keys et al. (2010), and 
Purnanandam (2011) suggest that loan quality declined due to moral hazard problems caused by 
securitization. There was a decline in monitoring and screening by lenders who securitized their 
loans. Keys et al. (2009) suggested that in order to reduce moral hazard problems, future policies 
may require loan originators to hold some risk and boost competition among participants in the 
originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. In addition, findings by Loutskina and Strahan (2011) reveal a 
decline in monitoring and screening by diversified lenders. They attributed this decline to lower 
investment in private information by diversified lenders, who operated in geographically diverse 
markets, than concentrated lenders, who concentrated in a few markets.  
Some of the recent literature has also focused on housing prices and their role in relaxed 
lending standards and the crisis. Sanders (2008) argued that declining house prices had greatly 
contributed to the crisis because borrowers, who were more likely to default, could no longer sell 
their properties or refinance when they had problems with their loan payments. Goetzmann et al. 
(2009) studied housing price indexes before 2006, forecasted future long term price growth, and 
found that expected appreciation in housing values increased mortgage applications and approvals, 
leverage of borrowers, and prices of purchased homes. Their argument is that the forecasted increase 
in home collateral values, due to forecasted appreciation in housing values, increased both the 
demand for and supply of subprime mortgage loans and caused a decline in underwriting standards.  
Mian and Sufi (2009b) identified the increase in household debt from 2002 to 2006 as 
contributors to the crisis. Their findings showed that the recession was severe in counties with high 
credit card utilization rates and growth rates in household debt. Since the 4th quarter of 2006, these 
counties had greater household default rates, greater decline in house prices, greater decline in 
durable consumption, greater decline in residential housing investment, and greater increase in 
unemployment rates. Mian and Sufi (2010) attributed this increase in household debt from 2002 to 
 10 
2006 to appreciation in home values and homeowners borrowing against increases in home equity. 
Their findings showed that homeowners who borrowed against increases in home equity accounted 
for at least 39% of defaults from 2006 to 2008. Furthermore, their findings showed that from 2002 to 
2006, younger households and households with low credit scores and high credit card utilization rates 
were more likely to borrow against appreciation in home values.  
This paper adds to the existing literature on relaxed lending standards and examines changing 
characteristics of lending to subprime households under relaxed lending standards. This study does 
not attempt to study the macro or lender perspective but instead the focus is on households. Different 
from the existing literature, this paper is the first to jointly study households, their credit 
characteristics, and their home purchase behaviors to understand changing characteristics of lending. 
Also different than the previous literature (Ariccia et al. 2008; Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2009; 
Mian and Sufi 2009a; Mian and Sufi 2009b; Keys et al. 2009; Goetzmann et al. 2009; Mian and Sufi 
2010), this study uses household survey data, the SCF data. 
 
2.3 Model 
 
The analysis is based on comparison of households that have the same credit characteristics 
but are observed in different time periods, 1998 and 2007. The year 1998 reflects a time period when 
subprime lending was popular but, before lending standards were relaxed; and the year 2007 reflects 
a time period after relaxed lending standards had been in effect for some time. The purpose of this 
study is to understand the changing characteristics of lending from 1998 to 2007.  
The comparison focuses on households’ home financing ratios, home purchase decisions, and 
the dollar amount households paid on their home purchases. Under relaxed lending standards, I 
would expect to see changes in characteristics of lending because lenders will make riskier loans, and 
households will have easier access to mortgage loans and receive more financing. Thus, as evidence 
of the changing characteristics of lending, this study tests three hypotheses. 
(2.H1): In 2007, households with lower credit quality were able to get similar loan-to-value ratios 
and had similar home purchase behavior as households with higher credit quality; that is, mortgage 
types and credit quality characteristics were less significant in 2007 than in 1998 in explaining 
households’ home financing ratios, home purchase decisions, and the dollar amount households paid 
on their home purchases  
(2.H2): Home financing ratios and home purchase rates were greater in 2007 than in 1998  
(2.H3): Households paid more on their home purchases in 2007 than in 1998 
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In order to test the null hypotheses, three models are applied and for each model two methods are 
used.  
Three models are described later and are named as follows. 
(A) Home financing ratio model 
(B) Home purchase decision model 
(C) Dollar amount paid on home purchase model 
Two methods are used to specify the models and are as follows (described in more detail later): 
(1) The first method includes interaction terms with time and income groups  
(2) The second method includes just a time dummy 
Each of the three models has different samples. For the home financing ratio model, the 
sample includes households that received mortgage loans in 1997 or 1998, or households that 
received mortgage loans in 2006 or 2007.4 The sample of households used these mortgages to 
purchase principal residences or refinance previous mortgage loans. For the home purchase decision 
model, the sample includes households that purchased principal residences in 1998/1997 or were 
renting in 1998, or households that purchased principal residences in 2007/2006 or were renting in 
2007.5  This sample is limited to households that have applied for credit or a loan within the last 5 
years because this paper is interested in lending characteristics. Since the 1998 SCF does not identify 
whether homeowners are first time purchasers, observations in the sample may include households 
that have previously purchased homes and are not first time home owners. For the dollar amount paid 
on home purchase model, the sample consists of households that purchased principal residences in 
1997 or 1998, or households that purchased principal residences in 2006 or 2007.6 This sample is 
also limited to households that have applied for credit or a loan within the last 5 years. 
In specifying the home financing ratio model, exogenous variables, which affect desired and 
granted mortgage loan amounts, are used because the mortgage loan amount that households demand 
(the demand side) and the maximum loan amount that is granted by a mortgage lender (the supply 
side) jointly determine the financing that households receive. On the demand side, the variable “level 
of financial risk household is willing to take in his investments and savings” defines whether a 
household is risk averse in his savings and investments. If a household is risk averse, he may be 
                                                          
4
 There are few observations if households that received mortgage loans in 1998 are compared to households that 
received mortgage loans in 2007.  Therefore, households that received mortgage loans in 1997 or 1998 are compared 
to those in 2006 or 2007.  
5
 There are few observations if only households that purchased principal residences in 1998 or 2007 are considered. 
Therefore, households that purchased residences in 1997 or 2006 are also kept in the sample. 
6
 There are few observations if the sample is picked from households that purchased their principal residences in 
1998 for the 1998 SCF and in 2007 for the 2007 SCF.  
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reluctant to borrow large loan amounts. On the supply side, the mortgage loan types and households’ 
credit characteristics define the risk of a loan and thus, affect loan amounts that are granted by 
mortgage lenders. 
Given that households borrow to purchase homes, mortgage loan types and households’ 
credit characteristics can also determine a household’s home purchase decision and the dollar amount 
a household paid on a home purchase. In specifying the home purchase decision model, explanatory 
variables that signal a household’s credit characteristics are used.7 Considering credit characteristics 
as determinants of the home purchase decision is also consistent with the previous literature findings 
on homeownership (Barakova et al. 2003; Linneman and Wachter 1989; Maki 1993; Haurin et al. 
1997).   
In specifying the dollar amount paid on home purchase model, exogenous variables that 
explain the dollar amount households can afford to pay on their home purchases and their desired 
home values are used. Values of homes that households can actually afford to buy may be different 
than what they desire to buy. If a household is not financially constrained and has good credit quality, 
they can get mortgage loans with the desired loan levels and hence, can afford to buy their desired 
homes. However, if households have poor credit quality, they will have difficulty obtaining desired 
mortgage loan amounts and thus, will purchase cheaper homes than they desire. Thus, credit 
characteristics and mortgage types are used as exogenous variables that define the dollar amount 
households can afford to pay on their home purchases. Level of financial risk that a household is 
willing to take in his savings and investments is used as an exogenous variable that explains the 
desired home value.  
The goal of this paper is to examine the changing characteristics of lending to subprime 
households. For the analysis, the SCF data are used. However, the SCF data does not have 
information on households’ credit scores and thus, it is not possible to directly observe which 
households are subprime or not. In order to differentiate subprime households from the rest, 
households are classified into three income groups based on income quantiles. The findings by Bostic 
et al. (2004) support that populations with low income levels have worse credit quality than other 
                                                          
7
 Mortgage types are not included in the regression because they predict the home purchase decision perfectly.  
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population subgroups.8 Income levels referred to in this study are all inflation adjusted and reported 
in 2007 dollar values.9   
For both the “home financing ratio” and “dollar amount paid on home purchase” models, 
income group 1 (IG1) is the lowest income quantile (with income levels less than or equal to 
$52,000) and proxies for the subprime households. Income group 2 (IG2) is between the 25
th and 50th 
income percentile (with income levels greater than $52,000 but less than or equal to $87,000). 
Income group 3 (IG3) is the top 50
th percentile (with income levels above $87,000) and proxies for 
households with good credit scores. However, for the “home purchase decision” model, income 
levels used in creating the sub-groups are $30,000 and $60,000 (instead of $52,000 and $87,000). 
The reason for using different income levels for the home purchase decision model is that the sample 
of households in the home purchase decision model includes renters who have very low income 
levels and apparently, a greater percentage, 60 percent, of households would be observed in IG1 if 
$52,000 was kept as the boundary for IG1. In order to limit households observed in IG1 to households 
with low income distributions, one third of the sample is grouped under IG1, another one third is 
grouped under IG2, and the other one third is grouped under IG3.  
 
2.3.1 Method 1: Interaction terms with time and income groups 
 
This method is applied to test null hypothesis (2.H1), that in 2007, households with lower 
credit quality were able to get similar loan-to-value ratios and had similar home purchase behavior as 
households with higher credit quality; that is mortgage types and credit quality characteristics were 
less significant in 2007 than in 1998 in explaining home financing ratios, home purchase decisions, 
and dollar amount paid on home purchases. This hypothesis is tested for each of the three income 
groups but the focus is households that are grouped under IG1, which proxies for subprime 
households. Equation (2.1) defines the regression and is run for each of the three models. For the 
home financing ratio model, the dependent variable is the LTV ratio (ratio of mortgage loan amount 
to current home value).10 For the home purchase decision model, the dependent variable is 1 if 
households purchased a principal residence and 0 if they rent.11 For the dollar amount paid on home 
                                                          
8
 Findings by Bostic et al. (2004) display median credit scores and percentage of their sample that is credit 
constrained in 2001. For the lowest income quantile, the median credit score is 688.3 and for the highest income 
quantile, it is 753.5. In the lowest income quantile, 38.7 percent, and in the highest income quantile, 2.8 percent of 
the sample was credit constrained and had credit scores below 660.  
9
 Inflation calculator from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website has been used.  
10
 The mortgage loan amount is for first mortgages. 
11
 The sample excludes households that inherited their principal residences. 
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purchase model, the dependent variable is the dollar amount households paid when they purchased 
their principal residences.12 
In equation (2.1), observations from the 1998 SCF and the 2007 SCF are pooled as one 
dataset. T refers to time dummy and is equal to 1 if observations belong to the 2007 survey and 0 if 
they belong to the 1998 survey. IGk refers to income groups 1 or 2. Income group 3 is the basis and 
thus, omitted in equation (2.1). An interactive term, (IGk*T), controls for changing characteristics in 
income groups over time. C is a vector of control variables.13 X is a vector of mortgage types and 
explanatory variables that signal credit quality. The list of variables and their definitions are available 
in Table 2.1. Interaction of credit quality variables and mortgage types, X, with time dummy, T, 
income groups, IGk, and time and income group interactions, IGk*T, are also included in equation 
(2.1) and these interactions allow for credit quality and mortgage types to differ over time and across 
income groups14. In order to adjust for the survey nature, weighted regression is run using the 
weights that are already provided in the SCF data.15  
 
Eq (2.1) 
 
 
 
One concern for the dollar amount paid on home purchase and the home financing ratio 
models is endogenous sample selection. The sample for the “dollar amount paid on home purchase” 
model excludes households that rent principal residences. This sample is endogenously determined 
because households choose to rent or purchase homes depending on the renting price versus home 
purchase price. The sample for the “home financing ratio” model excludes households that rent. This 
sample may also have been endogenously determined given that households obtain mortgage loans to 
purchase homes. For households with low net-worth levels and who are at the border of purchasing a 
home versus renting, a limit on the maximum loan-to-value ratio for which a lender grants a loan can 
                                                          
12
 The purchase price information is for households that live in mobile homes or houses. Since mobile home 
purchase is also like a real estate purchase, purchase price for mobile homes includes both site and mobile home 
prices if households bought both the mobile home and the site. The households that live on farms or ranches are 
excluded from this study because in the SCF, there is no data defining how much households have paid for farms or 
ranches.  
13
 It is possible that high house prices are observed in certain regions. However, in “dollar amount paid on home 
purchase” model, regions are not controlled for because region information is not available in the publicly provided 
data.  
14
 In the home purchase decision model, the explanatory variables do not include mortgage types and mortgage 
amount that is borrowed because they predict the purchase decision perfectly.  
15 
The weights are constructed by the post-stratification technique. Kennickell, et al. (1996) give detailed 
information on construction of the weights.  
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constrain households’ ability to purchase homes and households’ choices of rent versus home 
purchase.  
In order to test whether the endogenous sample selection creates a bias, home financing ratio 
and home purchase decision models are jointly estimated through Heckman MLE. Likewise, dollar 
amount paid on home purchase and home purchase decision models are jointly estimated. In applying 
Heckman MLE, both of the outcome regressions (home financing ratio and dollar amount paid on 
home purchase models) are defined as strict subsets of the selection equation, which is the home 
purchase decision model.  Given fixed costs of moving, the variable “chance of staying at the current 
address for the next two years” is used as an identifier for the selection equation. Heckman results 
support a rho = 0 confirming that sample selection does not result in bias in any of the outcome 
regressions. Therefore, for equation (2.1), running separate regressions for each model using the 
samples described above is not biased.  
After running equation (2.1), a t-test is applied to test for joint significances of the sum of 
coefficients of mortgage types and credit quality variables, X, and the interactive terms. The joint 
significances give information about coefficient values of mortgage types and credit quality variables 
and their significance levels for each period and income group.  
If credit quality variables and mortgage types became less significant in determining home 
financing ratios, home purchase decisions, and dollar amount paid on home purchases (that is, in 
2007, households with lower credit quality were able to get similar loan-to-value ratios and had 
similar home purchase behavior as households with higher credit quality), it is expected that: 
(1) Mortgage type and credit quality variables, that were significant in 1998 and had a coefficient 
sign that would support lower credit access for poor credit quality households than credit worthy 
households, will become statistically insignificant in 2007.  
(2) The variables that were insignificant in 1998 will gain statistical significance in 2007, but the 
coefficient sign will support greater credit access for poor credit quality households than credit 
worthy households.  
(3) If the explanatory variables were significant in both years, 1998 and 2007, then the coefficient 
magnitudes are expected to increase in 2007 in favor of poor credit quality households.  
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Hence, the null hypotheses are as follows and tested for each income group.16 
(2.a) 0: 30  kH  , (2.b) 0: 430  kkH  , (2.c) 0: 40  kH   
Expectation (1) is supported by a rejection of null hypothesis (2.a), which shows significance 
of the variables in 1998, and by the acceptance of null hypothesis (2.b), which shows insignificance 
in 2007. The coefficient sign for joint significance in (2.a) is expected to support lower mortgage 
financing or home purchase probability for less credit worthy households, or cheaper homes 
purchased by less credit worthy households compared to more credit worthy households.  
Expectation (2) is supported by an acceptance of null hypothesis (2.a) and a rejection of null 
hypothesis (2.b). The coefficient sign in (2.b) is expected to support higher mortgage financing or 
home purchase probability or greater dollar amount paid on home purchases for less credit worthy 
households compared to more credit worthy households.   
Expectation (3) is supported by a rejection of null hypothesis (2.c). The rejection would 
imply that there were significant magnitude changes from 1998 to 2007. The coefficient magnitude 
for joint significance in (2.c) is expected to be a positive sign for poor credit quality households.  
 
2.3.2 Method 2: Time dummy 
 
Method 2 tests hypotheses (2.H2) and (2.H3) and examines whether households financed a 
greater portion of their home values, were more likely to purchase homes, and purchased more 
expensive homes in 2007 than in 1998. These hypotheses are tested for each of the three income 
groups but the focus is households that are grouped under IG1, which proxies for subprime 
households. Equation (2.2) defines the regression and is run for each of the three models. Dependent 
variables for each model are the LTV ratios, a dummy of 1 if household purchased principal 
residence, and dollar amount that households paid when they purchased their principal residence. The 
focus is on magnitudes of the dependent variables and whether their magnitudes were greater in 2007 
than in 1998 for households that are grouped under IG1.  
As in equation (2.1), observations from the 1998 SCF and 2007 SCF are pooled into one 
dataset. T refers to time dummy and is equal to 1 if observations belong to the 2007 survey and 0 if 
they belong to the 1998 survey. IGk refers to income groups 1 or 2. Income group IG3, is the basis. 
Interactive terms between income groups and the time dummy, (IGk*T), lets the time dummy vary 
over income groups. C is a vector of control variables and X is a vector of mortgage types and 
                                                          
16
 For income group 1 (IG1): k=1, for income group 2 (IG2): k=2, for income group 3 (IG3): θk, λk =0.  
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explanatory variables that signal credit quality. The survey nature of the data has been adjusted with 
the weights that are already available in the SCF data and a weighted regression is run using these 
weights. 
Eq (2.2)   
 
As in section 2.3.1, sample selection bias has been checked for both the home financing ratio 
and dollar amount paid on home purchase models. For the home financing ratio model, the Heckman 
MLE results support no selection bias. However, the null hypothesis that rho = 0 is rejected for the 
dollar amount paid on home purchase model, and it is concluded that there is a significant selection 
bias. Therefore, while estimating the dollar amount paid on home purchase model, the selection bias 
has been corrected for by estimating the dollar amount paid on home purchase jointly with the home 
purchase decision.   
After running the regression on equation (2.2), a t-test is applied to test for joint significance 
of β1 and αk. The joint significance gives magnitude changes of the dependent variables for each 
income group. The null hypothesis is as follows. 17 
 (2.d) 0: 10  kH   
 A rejection of hypothesis (2.d) implies that there is a significant change in the home 
financing ratios, home purchase rates, and purchase prices. One would expect the sum of the time 
dummy coefficients, k 1 , to have a positive value especially for households grouped under IG1.  
 
2.4 Variables 
 
Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3, and 2.4.4 explain dependent variable, credit quality variables, 
variables that define mortgage types, and other control variables, respectively. 
 
2.4.1 Dependent variable 
 
As a measure of the financing ratio, mortgage loan amount-to-home value (LTV) ratio is 
used. The mortgage loan amount is defined as the dollar amount of the first mortgage loan received 
in 1997 or 1998 (2006 or 2007) and the home value is defined as current value of principal residence 
in 1998 (2007). The home purchase decision variable takes a value of 1 if the household purchased a 
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home in 1997 or 1998 (2006 or 2007) and equals 0 if the household was renting in 1998 (2007). In 
the dollar amount paid on home purchase model, the dependent variable is the dollar amount (in 2007 
values) households paid in 1997 or 1998 (2006 or 2007) to purchase their principal residences. 
 
2.4.2 Variables that signal credit quality 
 
Employment information signals a household’s financial stability and credit quality. A 
household head is considered to have a stable job if he is currently employed and has been working 
for his current employer for a while. Household heads with stable jobs are financially stable and thus, 
have better credit qualities.  
Households with high family income and net-worth can provide a higher down-payment and 
thus, finance with lower LTV ratios. On the other hand, higher income or net-worth households are 
more likely to purchase homes or can afford to purchase more expensive homes. The family income 
and net-worth are normalized by taking their natural logarithms to account for diminishing marginal 
effects of family income and net-worth. The natural logarithm values are constructed after the dollar 
values are adjusted for inflation. To differentiate between negative and positive values of net-worth, 
a dummy variable is used.  
In addition, a higher education level, college or graduate degree, signals higher future 
earnings and thus, signals better credit qualities. Households with better credit qualities are expected 
to finance with higher LTV ratios, are more likely to purchase homes, and can afford for more 
expensive homes. 
If a household has applied for credit within the last 5 years and when they applied they were 
turned down or couldn’t get as much credit as they applied for, it can be inferred that this household 
has poor credit quality and more difficulty in borrowing compared to a credit worthy household. 
Households with poor credit qualities are expected to receive loans with low LTV ratios, be less 
likely to purchase homes and purchase cheaper homes than households with better credit qualities.  
Households without any credit cards can signal poor credit quality. In the case where 
households have credit cards, it is possible that two households have the same maximum limit for 
their credit cards but they differ in the amount of limits they have used and owe. This characteristic is 
proxied by “unused percent of credit card limit”. Higher unused percent may signal a stronger credit 
quality, resulting in a higher LTV ratio, probability of home purchase decision, and more expensive 
homes purchased.  
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Also, previous loan payments (such as credit card payments, mortgage loan payments, and 
payments of other loan types) can signal a household’s credit history. If a household almost always 
or always pays off the balance on their credit cards, it shows that they are responsible with their 
payments. If a household member had any loan payments in the previous year and if he was never 
behind or never missed the loan payments (including mortgage loan payments), it is likely that he 
will make his future loan payments on time. Households with good payment histories will be in good 
credit standing and thus, have high LTV ratios, be more likely to purchase homes, and purchase more 
expensive homes. If a household had no loan payments in the previous year, then these households 
are controlled for with a “has no loan” variable.  
 
2.4.3 Variables that define mortgage types 
 
  Depending on mortgage types, lenders can incur more or less risk. For instance, federally 
guaranteed mortgage loans are generally given to households headed by individuals who are 
younger, less well-educated, and non-white and who have low income, a higher debt-to-asset ratio, 
and a higher loan-to-value ratio (Baeck and DeVaney 2003). These households probably cannot 
afford as high a down-payment as credit worthy households and will therefore demand to finance a 
higher percentage of their home values, resulting in high LTV ratios. Additionally, since these 
federally guaranteed mortgages are guaranteed or insured by government agencies such as the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA), lenders may feel less 
reluctant in giving out high loan amounts that result in high LTV ratios. Therefore, federally 
guaranteed mortgages are expected to have higher LTV ratios than non-guaranteed mortgages. 
However, since federally guaranteed mortgages are given to households with less financial stability, 
dollar amounts paid on home purchases are expected to be lower than what financially stable 
households can afford.  
Adjustable rate mortgages transfer part of the interest rate risk from the lender to the 
borrower. Thus, households with good credit quality are less likely to get into such loan types while 
risky households with poor credit qualities may prefer to hold these mortgage types. Therefore, 
lenders may consider adjustable rate mortgages to be risky due to the borrower type that receives this 
mortgage type and be hesitant to provide high LTV ratios for adjustable rate mortgages. Since poor 
credit quality households can afford less expensive homes than credit worthy households, a negative 
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relationship is expected between “mortgage received is adjustable rate mortgage” and dollar amount 
paid on home purchase.18 
 
2.4.4 Other control variables 
 
Household demographics (household head’s race, marital status, and age) are included in 
home financing, home purchase decision, and dollar amount paid on home purchase regressions as 
control variables. The chance that a household will be staying at the current address for the next two 
years is included in the home purchase decision model and is used as an identifier in the Heckman 
MLE econometric method that was applied for method 2 in section 2.3.2. Given fixed moving costs, 
if a household has a greater probability of living at the current address two years from now, they may 
choose to buy a home rather than rent because they can live in the house long enough that they would 
expect to get a return from their investment.  
 Mortgage amount is a control variable for the dollar amount paid on home purchase model. 
Level of financial risk a household head is willing to take in his investments and savings is another 
control variable used for both the home financing ratio model and dollar amount paid on home 
purchase models because the degree of risk a household head is willing to take may affect his desired 
loan amount and the amount of money he is willing to spend on his home.   
 
2.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The SCF data has been collected every three years since 1983 by the FRB, in cooperation 
with the SOI (Statistics of Income) Division of the Internal Revenue Service. The SCF asks 
households about their wealth and use of financial services. The survey specifically asks about 
households’ assets, liabilities, other financial characteristics, and the financial institutions that they 
use, their current and past employment histories, income, and demographic characteristics.  
The sample for the SCF is based on a dual-frame design. One part of the dual-frame design is 
a “national multi-stage area-probability” (AP) sample, which is selected by the NORC (National 
Opinion Research Center) at the University of Chicago. The other part is a “list” sample, which is 
selected from individual tax files (ITF) by the FRB. The AP sample represents behaviors of the 
general population whereas the list sample represents behaviors of wealthy families. In order to 
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 Mortgage type: “mortgage is federally guaranteed”, “mortgage is an adjustable rate mortgage” are not included in 
the home purchase decision regression because they predict the home purchase decision perfectly.  
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adjust for the survey nature of the data, SCF staff constructed weights by using the post-stratification 
technique and these weights are provided in the data. Kennickell, et al. (1996) give detailed 
information on how these weights are constructed.   
The SCF staff imputed the missing data in the data by using the multiple imputation 
technique. The SCF staff applies the multiple imputation technique through six iterations. The sixth 
iteration produces the five implicates published in the data. For analysis purposes, implicate 2 is 
picked because it provides consistent results with the other implicates.19 Also, inconsistencies and 
errors have already been checked in the original (raw) data and in case of inconsistencies and errors, 
adjustments have been made by the SCF staff to the original data either by overriding the existing 
values or setting them to missing values and then imputing them.  
 
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Appendix B (Table B.1) displays descriptive statistics for the entire sample without grouping 
households into income groups and time periods. Descriptive statistics displayed in Tables 2.2, 2.3, 
and 2.4 are computed across each of the income groups and time periods. In Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, 
the first rows corresponding to the explanatory variables are the sample means and the second rows 
that are represented in parentheses are the standard errors. In Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, the third 
column in each income group shows differences in the mean values with respect to 1998 and 2007 
and whether the differences are statistically significant. Descriptive statistics displayed in Appendix 
B (Table B.1), Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are all adjusted for weights provided in the data. 
 
Model (A): Home financing ratio 
 
 Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the home financing ratio sample. In income group 
IG1 households financed 75.8 percent of their home values in 1998 and 79.0 percent of their home 
values in 2007. On average, 83.1 percent of household heads were employed in 1998 but in 2007, it 
was 86.0 percent. Average family income was $33,021 in 1998 and $33,949 in 2007. Net-worth was 
$46,497 in 1998 and $58,922 in 2007. The increases in the financing ratio, percent of household 
heads that were employed, family income, and net-worth are statistically insignificant. Likewise, in 
income groups IG2 and IG3, changes in these mean values are statistically insignificant.  
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 More information about the sample, imputations and implicates are provided in Appendix A.  
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In income group IG1, 49.1 percent of households were turned down for credit or did not get 
as much credit as they applied for in 1998, and in 2007, it was 40.9 percent. This decline is 
statistically insignificant. However, in income group IG2, there was a significantly greater percent of 
households, 14.3 percent more, in 2007 that were turned down for credit or did not get as much credit 
as they applied for. In income group IG1, there was a significantly greater percent of households, by 
12.9 percent more, that did not have any credit cards in 2007. In income group IG1, 29.6 percent of 
households in 1998 and 20.3 percent in 2007 paid off their credit card balances, and 18.0 percent of 
households in 1998 and 27.4 percent in 2007 were behind or missed their payments. The changes in 
the percent of households are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, in income group IG2, there 
was a significant increase in 2007, by 15.7 percent, in the percent of households that paid off their 
credit card balances and a significant decline, by 13.3 percent, in the percent of households that had 
federally guaranteed mortgages. In income group IG1, there was a significantly greater percent of 
households, by 10.5 percent, in 2007 that had adjustable rate mortgages. In 1998, only 10 percent of 
households had adjustable rate mortgages and in 2007, 20.5 percent of households had adjustable rate 
mortgages.  
 
Model (B): Home purchase decision 
 
 Table 2.3 displays descriptive statistics for the home purchase decision sample. In income 
group IG1, 7.1 percent of households purchased homes in 1998 and it was 10.6 percent in 2007. In 
income group IG2, 19.3 percent of households in 1998 and 20.7 percent in 2007 purchased homes. In 
income group IG3, 48.4 percent of households in 1998 and 51 percent in 2007 purchased homes. 
However, in all income groups, increases in the home purchase rates are statistically insignificant. 
In income group IG1, there was a statistically lower percent of household heads, by 7.3 
percent, who were employed in 2007. Changes in family income and net-worth levels are statistically 
insignificant in income groups IG1 and IG2. In income group IG1, average family income was 
$17,230 in 1998 and $18,158 in 2007. Average net-worth was $11,840 in 1998 and $19,270 in 2007. 
However, in income group IG3, the family income and net-worth significantly increased by $25,850 
and $91,059, respectively, in 2007. Additionally, in income group IG2, there were 6.6 percent fewer 
households with positive net-worth levels in 2007.   
In income group IG1, there was a significant increase, by 7.9 percent, in the number of 
households without any credit cards. In income group IG1, 20.3 percent of households in 1998 and 
17.4 percent in 2007 paid off their credit card balances, but the decline in the percent of households 
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is statistically insignificant. However, in income group IG3, a significantly greater percent of 
households in 2007, by 10.5 percent, paid off their credit card balances. In addition, in 2007, there 
were 16.1 percent more households in income group IG1 and 10.1 percent more households in 
income group IG2 that were behind or missed their loan payments.  
 
Model (C): Dollar amount paid on home purchase 
 
Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics for the dollar amount paid on home purchase sample. 
For all income groups, the mean values reveal a significant increase in the dollar amount paid on 
home purchases. On average, households in income group IG1 paid $102,487 when they purchased 
their principal residences in 1998 and $157,700 in 2007. In income group IG2, households paid an 
additional $74,038 on their home purchases in 2007. Households in income group IG3 paid $177,280 
more in 2007 on their home purchases.  
In income group IG1, 82.9 percent of household heads were employed in 1998 and 76.7 
percent of household heads were employed in 2007. Households had an average family income of 
$32,846 in 1998 and $32,892 in 2007. Their net-worth was $25,825 in 1998 and $34,592 in 2007. 
The percent of households with positive net-worth was 83.6 percent in 1998 and 78.3 percent in 
2007. An average of 59.1 percent of households in 1998 and 46.4 percent in 2007 were turned down 
for credit or did not get as much credit as they applied for. An average of 37.0 percent of households 
in 1998 paid off their balances on credit cards but it was only 27 percent in 2007. However, the 
changes in these mean values are statistically insignificant. In income group IG2, there was a 
significant increase, by 20.7 percent, in the number of households that paid off their credit card 
balances.  
In income group IG1, the percent of households that were behind in their payments was 22.7 
percent in 1998 and 30.7 percent in 2007. However, the increase in the percent of households that 
were behind in their payments is statistically insignificant. Likewise, in income group IG2 and IG3 
the change in the percent of households that were behind in their payments is statistically 
insignificant. In income group IG2, there were 15.2 percent fewer households in 2007 with federally 
guaranteed mortgage loans. Additionally, in income group IG1, there was a significant increase, by 
14.8 percent, in percent of households that had adjustable rate mortgages.  
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2.6 Results 
 
This section summarizes results for each of the methods described in section 2.3. The results 
presented in this section are specifically for implicate 2. Note that results do not vary over implicates 
and each implicate displays similar conclusions. The results for different implicates are available 
upon request.  
 
2.6.1 Method 1: Interaction terms with time and income groups 
 
Table 2.5 displays the regression findings for the home financing ratio model, Table 2.6 for 
the home purchase decision model, and Table 2.7 for the dollar amount paid on home purchase 
model. The displayed coefficient values and their standard errors in 1998 are obtained through testing 
for null hypothesis (2.a) in section 2.3.1. The coefficient values and their standard errors in 2007 are 
obtained through testing for null hypothesis (2.b) in section 2.3.1. The differences in coefficient 
values from 1998 to 2007 are calculated through testing for null hypothesis (2.c) in section 2.3.1. The 
full regression results, corresponding to equation (2.1) in section 2.3.1, are available upon request. 
 
2.6.1.1 Home financing ratio 
 
The results shown in Table 2.5 suggest that in 2007 credit characteristics did not explain 
financing (loan-to-value) ratios as strongly as they did in 1998, especially for households in income 
group IG1. That is, in 2007, households with lower credit quality were able to get similar loan-to-
value ratios as households with higher credit quality. The credit characteristics that were significant 
in 1998 and had coefficient signs in support of greater financing for credit quality households became 
insignificant in 2007, or the credit characteristics that were insignificant in 1998 gained significance 
in 2007 but the coefficient sign would support greater financing for poor credit quality households, or 
there was a significant increase in coefficient magnitudes from 1998 to 2007 in favor of poor credit 
quality households.  
For households with income levels less than or equal to $52,000 (IG1), net-worth was a 
significant determinant of LTV ratio in 1998. For each additional $10,000 increase in households’ 
net-worth levels, households financed 1.34 percent less of their home values through mortgage 
loans.20 However, in 2007 net-worth was insignificant in explaining the LTV ratio. That is, in 2007, 
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 For a $10,000 increase in net-worth, the change in LTV ratio is calculated as:  
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the distinction between households with different net-worth levels disappeared. It is possible that due 
to relaxed lending standards, mortgage terms were more attractive in 2007 and high net-worth 
households preferred to make a lower down-payment and thus, used greater financing on their home 
purchases.  
In income group IG1, households with positive net-worth levels financed greater portions of 
their home values, by 22.6 percent, in 1998. However, in 2007 there was no distinction between 
households with negative net-worth levels and positive net-worth levels. Households with negative 
net-worth levels received the same financing levels as households that had positive net-worth levels. 
Also, households with negative net-worth levels had a significant increase in their financing levels, 
by 26.2 percent, from 1998 to 2007. 
In 1998, households in income group IG2 that were turned down in their previous credit 
applications had financed 12.5 percent less of their home values than households that were not turned 
down. However, in 2007, this distinction disappeared. Households that were turned down in their 
previous credit applications financed the same portion of home values as credit worthy households 
that were not denied in their previous credit applications.  
In income group IG1, households financed 1.65 percent more of their home values for each 
additional 10 percent increase in unused percent of credit card limit. However, in 2007 this variable 
was insignificant, implying that the distinction between households with large and small remaining 
balances in credit card limits disappeared. Additionally, in income group IG1, the variable 
“almost/always pay off balance on credit cards” was insignificant in 1998, but in 2007, households 
that failed to pay off the balance on their credit cards received higher mortgage loans, by 14.4 
percent, than households that almost always or always paid off their credit card balances. 
Furthermore, in income group IG1, even though variable “behind/missed payments” did not 
significantly explain LTV ratio in 1998 or 2007, households that were behind or missed loan 
payments had a significant increase in their financing levels from 1998 to 2007.   
While the above credit characteristics became less significant in explaining LTV ratios and 
support higher levels of financing by poor credit quality households, some characteristics remained 
significant in explaining LTV ratios without any significant changes in their coefficient magnitudes. 
For households in income group IG1, an example of these characteristics is households that were 
turned down in their previous credit applications. For households in income group IG2 , examples are 
job stability (number of years household head worked for current employer) and whether household 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(ln $40,000 – ln $30,000)*(-4.652)=  - 1.34 
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has federally guaranteed mortgages. For households in income group IG3, examples are net-worth, 
whether household has credit card or not, and unused percent of credit card limit. The coefficient 
signs for job stability, being turned down in previous credit applications, and unused percent of credit 
card limit support higher levels of financing for poor credit quality households and this may be 
attributed to the popularity of subprime practices during the late 1990s. 
On the other hand, significance of some credit characteristics increased and support higher 
levels of financing by credit quality households. For instance, in income group IG3, households with 
employed household heads in 1998 financed lower percentages of their home values, probably due to 
subprime lending practices that took place in the late 1990s. However, the insignificance of the 
variable “household head employed” in 2007 implies that the financing ratio was the same for 
households with or without employed household heads. In income group IG1, the financing ratio is 
significantly greater in 2007 than in 1998 for households with greater job stability, even though the 
variable for job stability was statistically insignificant in explaining LTV ratio in both years. In 
income group IG2, the net-worth coefficient supports lower financing by high net-worth households 
in 2007 than low net-worth households and households with positive net-worth levels had 
significantly higher levels of financing in 2007 than in 1998, by 20.1 percent. In income group IG1, 
education became significant in 2007 and highly educated households had significantly higher LTV 
ratios, 13.8 percent, than in 1998. In income group IG2, households without any credit cards financed 
greater portions of their homes than households with credit cards in 1998, and this is probably due to 
subprime lending practices that took place in the late 1990s. However, the insignificance of this 
characteristic and the significant decline in the coefficient magnitude in 2007 may imply that 
households without any credit cards financed lower portions of their home values compared to 1998. 
In income group IG1, households with federally guaranteed mortgages had significantly higher LTV 
ratios than households without federally guaranteed mortgages in 2007.  
In summary, Table 2.5 results suggest that in 2007, some of the credit characteristics did not 
explain financing ratios as strongly as they did in 1998 and the distinction between low credit quality 
and high credit quality households declined, especially for households in income group IG1. In 
particular, these credit characteristics are; net-worth levels, whether household has positive net-worth 
or negative net-worth, the unused percent of credit card limit, whether households always or almost 
always pays off balance on credit cards, and whether household was ever behind or missed loan 
payments. On the other hand, some of the credit characteristics were still important in 2007 for 
determining LTV ratios and did not have any significant change in their coefficient magnitudes. Few 
of the credit characteristics for income group IG1 display increased importance in 2007.  
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2.6.1.2 Home purchase decision 
 
The results presented in Table 2.6 are the marginal effects. In general, Table 2.6 displays a 
decline in the significance of credit characteristic variables in explaining the home purchase decision. 
That is, in 2007, households with lower credit quality were as likely as households with higher credit 
quality to purchase homes. The credit characteristics that were significant in 1998 and supported 
greater home purchase probability for credit worthy households became insignificant in 2007, or 
credit characteristics that were insignificant in 1998 became significant in 2007 but the coefficient 
signs would support greater home purchase probability for poor credit quality households, or the 
coefficient magnitudes increased in 2007 in favor of poor credit quality households.  
In 1998, households with income levels less than or equal to $30,000 (IG1) were more likely 
to purchase homes, 0.7 percent more for each additional year worked for the current employer. 
However, in 2007, this distinction disappeared and households with less job stability were as likely to 
purchase homes as households with more job stability. For households with income levels greater 
than $30,000 but less than or equal to $60,000 (IG2), in 2007, households with less job stability were 
more likely to purchase homes than households with more stable jobs. 
In income group IG1, the findings support a greater home purchase probability in 2007 for 
low income households than high income households, 1.24 percent greater for every $10,000 decline 
in family income. The purchase probability was greater, by 2.36 percent for each $10,000 decline in 
family income, in 2007 than in 1998.21 In income groups IG1 and IG3 for 2007, households with 
negative net-worth levels were on average 15 percent more likely to purchase homes than positive 
net-worth households. In income group IG2 for 1998, households with positive net-worth level were 
more likely to purchase homes, by 12.1 percent, but this distinction between positive versus negative 
net-worth households did not exist in 2007. In income group IG1, households with education levels 
lower than college degree were more likely to purchase homes, by 8.8 percent, in 2007 and the 
purchase probability significantly increased from 1998 to 2007 for the uneducated households.  
The findings for income group IG3 show that the distinction between poor credit quality 
households that have been rejected in their previous credit applications, and good credit quality 
households that have not been turned down, disappeared in 2007. In income group IG2, the 
distinction between households without any credit cards and with credit cards disappeared in 2007. In 
addition, even though credit card payment history (the variable “almost always/always pay off 
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 For $10,000 decline in income, the change in probability is calculated as:  
(ln $30,000 – ln $40,000)*(-0.043) = 0.0124 
(ln $30,000 – ln $40,000)*(-0.082) = 0.0236 
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balance on credit cards”) was insignificant in both years, there was a significant decline in the 
coefficient magnitude for this credit characteristic. In income group IG1, households that were behind 
or missed loan payments were 6.9 percent less likely to purchase homes than households that were 
timely on their loan payments. However, in 2007 this distinction no longer existed.  
While importance of most of the credit characteristics declined in the home purchase decision 
model, there are a few credit variables that show increased importance. For instance, in 2007 home 
purchase probability was lower for lower income households in income group IG2 , lower net-worth 
households in all income groups, and households in income group IG2 that were behind in their loan 
payments.   
In summary, results in Table 2.6 show that in 2007, some of the credit characteristics did not 
explain the home purchase probability as strongly as they did in 1998 and the distinction between 
low credit quality and high credit quality households declined., especially for households in income 
group IG1, where households have income levels less than or equal to $30,000. In particular, these 
credit characteristics are; number of years worked for current employer, family income, whether 
household has positive or negative net-worth levels, education level, and whether household was ever 
behind or missed loan payments in the previous year. It is also observed that the significance of some 
of the credit characteristics declined for households in income groups IG2 and IG3 and this result 
supports the findings of Foote et al. (2008) and Keys et al. (2009) that some high FICO score 
borrowers were steered into the subprime market and benefited from relaxed lending standards. 
 
2.6.1.3 Dollar amount paid on home purchase 
 
Results in Table 2.7 display a decline in the significance of credit quality variables in 
explaining the dollar amount paid on home purchase, in particular for income groups IG1 and IG3; 
that is, in 2007, households with lower credit quality were able to purchase as expensive homes as 
households with higher credit quality. In income group IG1, households with employed household 
heads purchased more expensive homes in 1998 than households without employed household heads. 
However, the findings in 2007 suggest that poor credit quality households had more financing 
options and afforded more expensive homes and paid an additional $43,679 for their home purchases 
than households with employed household heads. In addition, the significant decline in the 
coefficient magnitude suggests that households without employed household heads paid more on 
their home purchases in 2007 than in 1998. Furthermore, in income group IG1, high net-worth 
households purchased more expensive homes in 1998, but in 2007 this distinction between high and 
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low net-worth households disappeared and low net-worth households paid significantly more on their 
home purchases in 2007 compared to 1998.  
In income group IG3 for 2007, households with negative net-worth levels paid an additional 
$144,231 on their home purchases than positive net-worth households suggesting more financing 
options for negative net-worth households. Highly educated households in income group IG3 paid in 
1998 an additional $77,033 on their home purchases compared to less educated households. 
However, the insignificance in 2007 and the significant decline in the coefficient magnitude imply 
that households with different education levels afforded the same homes and there were more 
financing options for less educated households in 2007 than in 1998. In income groups IG1 and IG3, 
households without any credit cards paid less on their home purchases compared to households with 
credit cards. However, this distinction disappeared in 2007, suggesting that households with and 
without any credit cards had the same financing opportunities and paid the same amounts on their 
home purchases. Additionally, for income group IG3, households without any credit cards spent more 
on their home purchases, by $127,992, in 2007 than in 1998.  
In income group IG1, households that almost always or always paid off their credit card 
balances purchased more expensive homes and paid an additional $43,359 on their home purchases 
compared to poor credit households that did not pay off their credit card balances. However, this 
distinction disappeared in 2007. Additionally, in income group IG1, the coefficient magnitude for 
“behind/missed payments” and “federally guaranteed mortgage loans” significantly increased in 
2007, suggesting that less credit quality households had more financing options and afforded more 
expensive homes. In income group IG2, households with federally guaranteed mortgage loans were 
considered risky and purchased cheaper homes in 1998 than households without any federally 
guaranteed loans. However, this distinction did not exist in 2007. In income groups IG1 and IG3, 
households with adjustable rate mortgages paid less on their home purchases in 1998 suggesting that 
adjustable rate mortgages were perceived to be risky in 1998. However, the findings suggest that this 
distinction did not exist in 2007 and suggest a decline in perceived riskiness of adjustable rate 
mortgages in 2007.  
While the importance of most of the credit characteristics weakened in 2007, a few of the 
credit characteristics continued to be as significant as they were in 1998. Among those credit 
characteristics were; in particular for income group IG1, whether a household has negative or 
positive net-worth level and whether household was turned down in their previous credit 
applications. On the other hand, some credit characteristics gained significance in determining home 
purchase prices. For instance, in income groups IG1 and IG3 for 1998, households with less job 
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stability purchased more expensive homes than households with more job stability and this result can 
be attributed to the popularity of subprime lending practices. However, in 2007 this distinction did 
not exist suggesting that households with more job stability afforded more expensive homes in 2007. 
In addition, in income group IG3, high income households afforded more expensive homes in 2007 
than in 1998. The findings with respect to unused percent of credit card limit in income group IG1 
and federally guaranteed mortgages in income group IG3 , imply a decline in the dollar amount paid 
on home purchases by poor credit quality households.  
In conclusion, the results in Table 2.7 show that in 2007, most of the credit characteristics did 
not explain the dollar amount paid on home purchases as strongly as they did in 1998 and the 
distinction between low credit quality and high credit quality households declined., in particular for 
households in income groups IG1 and IG3. This finding for the highest income group, IG3, is 
consistent with the findings of Foote et al. (2008) and Keys et al. (2009) that some high FICO score 
borrowers benefited from relaxed lending standards. For households in income group IG1, the 
following credit characteristics became less important; whether household head is employed or not, 
net-worth, whether households has credit card or not, whether household almost always/always paid 
off the credit card balance, and whether household was timely or behind in their loan payments. 
Furthermore, adjustable rate mortgages were considered to be less risky in income group IG1.  
 
2.6.2 Method 2: Time dummy 
 
Method 2, using a time dummy, examines whether the financing ratio, home purchase rate, 
and dollar amount paid on home purchase increased in magnitude from 1998 to 2007. The t-test 
results for hypothesis (2.d) in section 2.3.2 are displayed in Table 2.8 for the financing ratio model, 
in Table 2.9 for the home purchase decision model and in Table 2.10 for the dollar amount paid on 
home purchase model. The full regression results, corresponding to equation (2.2) in section 2.3.2, 
are displayed in Appendix B (Tables B.2, B.3, and B.4).  
Table 2.8 shows insignificant time dummies and the findings display no significant changes 
in LTV ratios from 1998 to 2007 in any of the income groups. Table 2.9 shows a significant and 
positive time dummy for the lowest income group, IG1, for the purchase decision model and reveals 
that households in the lowest income group, IG1, were more likely to purchase homes. The increase 
in home purchase probability for the lowest income group, IG1, shows some evidence of changing 
characteristics of lending to subprime households. The findings in Table 2.10 do not support an 
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increase in the dollar amount paid on home purchases from 1998 to 2007 in any of the income 
groups22. 
 
2.7 Robustness 
 
The results in section 2.6 are checked for robustness. 
 
2.7.1 Different income levels used in classifying households into groups: 
 
In order to check for robustness, households are classified into income groups using 
alternative income levels and the regressions in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 are rerun for each 
classification. For both the LTV ratio and dollar amount paid on home purchase models, two 
alternative income levels are used. 
(1) IG1: household’s income level is less than or equal to $56,000; IG2: household’s income level is 
greater than $56,000 but less than or equal to $109,000; IG3: household’s income level is greater than 
$109,000 
(2) IG1: household’s income level is less than or equal to $45,000; IG2: household’s income level is 
greater than $45,000 but less than or equal to $70,000; IG3: household’s income level is greater than 
$70,000 
For the home purchase decision model, the following two income levels are used  
(3) IG1: household’s income level is less than or equal to $35,000; IG2: household’s income level is 
greater than $35,000 but less than or equal to $70,000; IG3: household’s income level is greater than 
$70,000 
(4) IG1: household’s income level is less than or equal to $27,000; IG2: household’s income level is 
greater than $27,000 but less than or equal to $55,000; IG3: household’s income level is greater than 
$55,000 
 
2.7.1.1 Method 1 (Interaction terms with time and income groups) 
 
When the regression in section 2.3.1 is rerun for both the LTV ratio and dollar amount paid 
on home purchase models using classifications (1) and (2), the results do not vary that much from the 
results that are displayed in Tables 2.5 and 2.7. The credit characteristics, which showed a declining 
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 The results in Table 2.10, when sample selection is corrected for, are the same as the results under OLS, when 
selection is not corrected for. The results are available upon request.   
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effect in Tables 2.5 and 2.7, display similar declining effects for the alternative income levels 
described above.  
When the regression in section 2.3.1 is rerun for the purchase decision model using 
classifications (3) and (4), the results stay robust to the results displayed in Table 2.6. The credit 
characteristics, which showed declining effects in Table 2.6, consistently show declining effects 
under classifications (3) and (4). Thus, the results in Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 are not sensitive to 
changes in income levels used in creating income groups. The results are available upon request.  
 
2.7.1.2 Method 2 (Time dummy) 
 
When the above classifications, (1) and (2), are used and the regression in section 2.3.2 is re-
run for LTV ratio, the results are similar to the results in Table 2.8. Under classification (1), there are 
no significant changes in LTV ratios for households in income groups IG1 and IG3. However, 
different than the results presented in Table 2.8, there is a significant increase (at the 10 percent 
significance level) in LTV ratio for households in income group IG2. Under classification (2), the 
results stay robust to Table 2.8 and do not show any significant changes in LTV ratios for any of the 
income groups.  
For the home purchase decision model, under both of the classifications, the results are the 
same as the results in Table 2.9. Households in income group IG1, are more likely to purchase homes 
in 2007 than in 1998. When “dollar amount paid on home purchases” is re-estimated using Heckman 
MLE, the results stay similar to the results presented in Table 2.10. Under classification (1), different 
than the results in Table 2.10, the dollar paid on home prices is significantly greater in 2007 than in 
1998 for households in the highest income group, IG3. However, the significance is only at the 10 
percent level. Under classification (2), the results are robust to Table 2.10 and the dollar amount paid 
on home purchases is not significantly different in 2007 compared to 1998 for any of the income 
groups. In summary, the results in Tables 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 are not that sensitive to changes in 
income levels used in creating income groups. The results are available upon request.  
 
2.7.2 Credit characteristics are allowed to vary over income groups in method 2 
 
An additional robustness check is made for method 2, using a time dummy, in section 2.3.2 
by allowing credit characteristics to change over income groups. The same income levels as for 
section 2.3 are used in categorizing households into income groups. The below weighted OLS 
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regression is run separately for LTV ratio, home purchase decision, and dollar amount paid on home 
purchase models23: 
 
Eq (2.3) 
 
For the home financing ratio model, the results corresponding to equation (2.3) are robust 
with the results presented in Table 2.8 and display no significant changes in LTV ratio from 1998 to 
2007. For the purchase decision model, the results are similar to the results displayed in Table 2.9. 
Different than the results in Table 2.9, the results do not show any significant increase in home 
purchase probability in 2007 than in 1998 for households in income group IG1. For the dollar amount 
paid on home purchase, the results show a slight change from the results in Table 2.10. The dollar 
amount paid on home purchase is significantly greater, at the 5 percent significance level, in 2007 
than in 1998 for households in income group IG3. This result is supportive of previous studies, which 
have revealed that high income groups as well benefited from relaxed lending standards.  The results 
are available upon request.  
 
2.8 Conclusions 
 
Several papers on the 2007 subprime crisis focused on causes of the subprime crisis. They 
have identified relaxed lending standards as one of the contributors to the crisis. This study adds to 
the existing literature on relaxed lending standards and attempts to show the changing characteristics 
of lending to subprime households, under relaxed lending standards. In this paper, households are 
categorized into three income groups, and subprime households are proxied by households within the 
lowest income group.  
Using the Survey of Consumer Finances data, this study compares two households that have 
the same credit characteristics but are observed in different time periods, 1998 and 2007. The year 
1998 reflects a time period when subprime lending was popular, but before lending standards were 
relaxed; and the year 2007 reflects a time period after relaxed lending standards had been in effect for 
some time. The comparison focuses on households’ home financing ratios, home purchase rates, and 
dollar amount households paid on their home purchases. Under relaxed lending standards, I would 
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expect to see changes in lending characteristics because lenders will make riskier loans, and 
households will have easier access to mortgage loans and receive more financing. Thus, as evidence 
of the changing characteristics of lending to subprime households under relaxed lending standards, 
this study tests three hypotheses. (2.H1): In 2007, households with lower credit quality were able to 
get similar loan-to-value ratios and had similar home purchase behavior as households with higher 
credit quality; that is, mortgage types and credit quality characteristics were less significant in 2007 
than in 1998 in explaining households’ home financing ratios, home purchase decisions, and the 
dollar amount households paid on their home purchases, (2.H2): Home financing ratios and home 
purchase rates were greater in 2007 than in 1998, (2.H3): Households paid more on their home 
purchases in 2007 than in 1998. During the analysis, these three hypotheses are tested for each of the 
three income groups that are created.  
The results suggest that in 2007 some of the credit characteristics did not explain financing 
ratios and the home purchase decision as strongly as they did in 1998; that is, in 2007, households 
with lower credit quality were able to get similar loan-to-value ratios and had similar home purchase 
probability as households with higher credit quality, especially for households in income group IG1. 
For home financing, these credit characteristics are; net-worth levels, whether household has positive 
or negative net-worth, the unused percent of credit card limit, whether households almost 
always/always pays off balance on credit cards, and whether household was ever behind or missed 
loan payments. For the home purchase decision, these credit characteristics are; number of years 
worked for current employer, family income, whether household has positive or negative net-worth, 
education level, and whether household was ever behind or missed loan payments in the previous 
year. In addition for high income households in 2007, some of the credit characteristics did not 
explain the home purchase probability as strongly as they did in 1998 and this finding is supportive 
of the previous studies, which have revealed that high income households as well benefited from 
relaxed lending standards.  
Likewise, in 2007 some of the credit characteristics did not explain the dollar amount 
households paid on home purchases as strongly as they did in 1998, in particular for households in 
income groups IG1 and IG3. That is, in 2007, the distinction between low credit quality and high 
credit quality households declined and households with lower credit quality purchased as expensive 
homes as households with higher credit quality. For households in income group IG1, the following 
credit characteristics became less important; employment, net-worth, whether household has credit 
card or not, whether household almost always/always paid off the credit card balance, and whether 
household was timely or behind in their loan payments. Furthermore, adjustable rate mortgages were 
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considered to be less risky in income group IG1. The finding for the highest income group IG3, is also 
supportive of the previous studies.  
However, the findings display no significant changes in the financing ratio or the dollar 
amount paid on home purchases from 1998 to 2007 in any of the income groups. But, the results 
reveal that households in income group IG1 were more likely to purchase homes in 2007 than in 
1998.  
In the future, if the distinction between low credit quality and high credit quality households 
declines and home purchase rates increase for low income households, they would signal that the 
HUD programs which were aimed at increasing homeownership to lower income households led to 
bad lending practices and increased risky loans, and households received mortgage loans that they 
could not repay or households that previously could not purchase homes were able to purchase 
homes or households purchased pricier homes that they could not afford. The regulators can take 
these attributes as a warning mechanism for regulations and lending practices that have gone badly. 
Under this case, it is critical to monitor how the regulations are applied, whether lending practices 
meet minimum standards, and whether there are any threats to financial stability. For instance, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council, which was established after the 2007 subprime crisis to 
identify and respond to systemic risks, should use the results from these findings as a warning to 
threats to the financial stability of the U.S. and should take preventive measures and make 
recommendations to the Federal Reserve Board before the financial system collapses. Additionally, 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which was established after the 2007 subprime crisis, 
should enforce regulations to protect households from bad lending practices.  
In future research, the financing ratio, home purchase probability, and dollar amount paid on 
home purchases can be estimated for 1998 and these estimated coefficient values can be used to 
predict the financing ratio, purchase probability, and the dollar amount paid on home purchases in 
2007. Then, these predicted values in 2007 can be compared to the observed values in 2007 to 
investigate whether in 2007 households financed greater percentages of their home values, were 
more likely to purchase homes, and purchased more expensive homes. Similarly, the analysis can be 
extended to the years 2001 and 2004 and the analysis can help to understand when the relaxation in 
lending standards peaked.  
In additional future research, this paper can be extended to include households’ credit scores. 
The effect of credit scores on financing ratios, home purchase rates, and dollar amount paid on home 
purchases and how these effects have changed over time can be examined. Since the SCF data does 
not provide credit score information on households, credit scores can be imputed by using an 
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alternative dataset which contains credit scores on a nationally representative sample. Using the 
alternative dataset, a credit scoring model can be derived and this model can be used to compute 
credit scores for each household in the SCF data. 
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2.10 Tables 
 
Table 2.1. Variable Definitions 
 Variable Definitions  
Financing 
Ratio 
 
Purchase 
Decision  
 
Dollar 
Amount Paid  
Dependent Variables         
Loan-to-value ratio (%) First mortgage amount borrowed / current value of principal residence  ●     
Purchased principal residence Dummy=1 if purchased principal residence    ●   
Dollar amount paid on home purchase 
(in 2007 dollars, in thousands) 
Price paid to purchase principal residence      ● 
Credit Characteristics        
Household head employed 
Dummy=1 if household head is currently working/self-employed; job 
accepted and waiting to start work 
 ●  ●  ● 
Number of years worked for current 
employer 
Number of years worked for current employer  ●  ●  ● 
Family income (in 2007 dollars, in 
thousands) 
Last year's total family income from all sources  ●  ●  ● 
Net-worth (in 2007 dollars, in 
thousands) 
Assets: pension account, IRA/KEOGH account, savings/money 
market accounts, annuities, trusts & managed investment accounts, 
checking account, CD's, mutual funds, savings bonds, bonds other 
than savings bonds, publicly traded stock, call money accounts/cash 
at stock brokerage, insurance policies, any other assets, value of 
business interests, value of vehicles 
 ●  ●  ● 
 
Liabilities: loans from pension accounts, margin loans at stock 
brokerage, loans from insurance policies, vehicle loans, balance owed 
on credit cards/store cards/charge or revolving charge accounts, loans 
from lines of credit, any money owed to business, education loans, 
other consumer loans, any other liability not recorded previously 
 ●  ●  ● 
Has positive net-worth Dummy=1 if household has positive net-worth  ●  ●  ● 
College and higher degree 
Dummy=1 if household head has completed 4 years of college or 
graduate school 
 ●  ●  ● 
Turn down for credit/didn't get as 
much credit as applied for 
Dummy=1 if in the past 5 years, household head or spouse have ever 
been rejected a loan request or not been given as much credit as they 
requested for 
  ●   ●   ● 
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Table 2.1. Variable Definitions (Continued) 
 Variable Definitions  
Financin
g Ratio 
 
Purchase 
Decision  
 
Dollar 
Amount 
Paid  
Has no credit card Dummy=1 if household head or anyone in the family has no credit card  ●  ●  ● 
Unused percent of credit card limit Percent of credit card limit that is unused  ●  ●  ● 
Almost/always pay off balance on 
credit  cards 
Dummy=1 if always/almost always pays off total balance owed on 
credit cards each month 
 ●  ●  ● 
Behind/missed payments 
Dummy=1 during the last year all loan or mortgage payments were 
made later or missed  
 ●  ●  ● 
Mortgage Characteristics        
Main mortgage is federally 
guaranteed 
Dummy=1 if the mortgage is a FHA, VA, or other federally guaranteed 
mortgage 
 ●    ● 
Adjustable rate mortgage 
Dummy=1 if the mortgage is an adjustable rate mortgage;  
Dummy=0 if the mortgage is a fixed rate mortgage  
 ●    ● 
Other Household Characteristics        
Household head non-minority  Dummy=1 if household head is white; caucasian  ●  ●  ● 
Household head married  Dummy=1 if household head's current legal marital status is married  ●  ●  ● 
Household head's age  Household head's age  ●  ●  ● 
Chance of staying (%) 
Chances of living at the current address two years from now (any 
number from zero to 100) 
   ●   
Mortgage amount  (in 2007 dollars, 
in thousands) 
Original mortgage amount received      ● 
Level of financial risk willing to 
take 
The amount of financial risk household head and his spouse are willing 
to take when they save or make investments 
      
Substantial risk 
Dummy=1 if they take substantial financial risk expecting to earn 
substantial return 
 ●    ● 
Above average risk 
Dummy=1 if they take above average financial risk expecting to earn 
above average returns 
 ●    ● 
Average Risk 
Dummy=1 if they take average financial risk expecting to earn average 
returns 
 ●    ● 
No financial risk Dummy=1 if they are not willing to take any financial risk  ●    ● 
Has no loan 
Dummy=1 if household head did not have any type of loan during the 
previous year 
      ●   ● 
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics for Home Financing Ratio Model 
 
Income Group 1  Income Group 2  Income Group 3 
$0-$52,000  $52,000-$87,000  $87,000-up 
Dependent Variable 1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
 
1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
 
1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
 
Loan to Value ratio (%) 
 
75.822 79.030 3.208  76.993 80.402 3.409  66.694 68.767 2.073 
(2.689) (2.677) (3.795)  (2.267) (2.141) (3.119)  (2.238) (2.062) (3.043) 
 
Credit Characteristics 
           
Household head 
employed 
 
0.831 0.860 0.029  0.961 0.922 -0.039  0.942 0.928 -0.015 
(0.05) (0.041) (0.065)  (0.022) (0.032) (0.039)  (0.026) (0.023) (0.034) 
 
Number of years worked 
for current employer 
 
6.238 4.375 -1.862  7.769 6.167 -1.602  9.349 7.849 -1.500 
(0.908) (0.697) (1.145)  (0.850) (0.847) (1.200)  (0.870) (0.759) (1.155) 
 
Family Income ($ in 
thousands) 
 
33.021 33.949 0.928  68.145 67.523 -0.622  195.707 205.904 10.197 
(1.544) (1.600) (2.223)  (0.951) (1.057) (1.422)  (13.273) (13.757) (19.116) 
 
Net-worth ($ in 
thousands) 
 
46.497 58.922 12.425  92.809 88.455 -4.354  721.256 689.351 -31.906 
(10.167) (30.542) (32.19)  (13.961) (17.201) (22.154)  (92.353) (91.505) (130.009) 
 
Has positive net-worth 
 
0.862 0.855 -0.007  0.905 0.847 -0.058  0.987 0.923 -0.064
**
 
(0.046) (0.043) (0.063)  (0.034) (0.042) (0.054)  (0.012) (0.029) (0.031) 
 
College and Higher 
Degree 
 
0.216 0.201 -0.015  0.379 0.473 0.095  0.707 0.633 -0.074 
(0.055) (0.05) (0.074)  (0.053) (0.058) (0.078)  (0.049) (0.049) (0.069) 
 
Turn down for 
credit/didn't get as much 
credit as applied for 
 
0.491 0.409 -0.082  0.253 0.396 0.143
*
  0.157 0.183 0.026 
(0.066) (0.058) (0.088)   (0.048) (0.057) (0.075)   (0.039) (0.042) (0.057) 
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics for Home Financing Ratio Model (Continued) 
 
Income Group 1  Income Group 2  Income Group 3 
$0-$52,000  $52,000-$87,000  $87,000-up 
 1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
  
1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
  
1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
Has no credit card 0.203 0.333 0.129
*
  0.107 0.089 -0.018  0.031 0.078 0.047 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.078)  (0.037) (0.034) (0.05)  (0.019) (0.028) (0.034) 
 
Unused percent of credit card 
limit 
 
54.223 45.935 -8.288  64.994 62.717 -2.278  79.853 73.004 -6.849 
(5.993) (4.887) (7.733)  (3.999) (4.139) (5.755)  (3.568) (3.458) (4.969) 
 
Almost/always pay off balance 
on credit cards 
 
0.296 0.203 -0.093  0.283 0.440 0.157
**
  0.593 0.601 0.008 
(0.059) (0.048) (0.076)  (0.047) (0.057) (0.074)  (0.054) (0.049) (0.073) 
 
Behind/missed payments 
 
0.180 0.274 0.094  0.065 0.104 0.039  0.114 0.048 -0.066 
(0.054) (0.052) (0.075)  (0.026) (0.034) (0.043)  (0.038) (0.023) (0.045) 
 
Mortgage Characteristics 
           
 
Main mortgage is federally 
guaranteed 
 
0.306 0.257 -0.049  0.399 0.266 -0.133
*
  0.122 0.205 0.083 
(0.062) (0.051) (0.08)  (0.053) (0.052) (0.074)  (0.036) (0.042) (0.055) 
 
Adjustable rate mortgage 
 
0.100 0.205 0.105
*
  0.122 0.203 0.080  0.135 0.168 0.033 
(0.04) (0.048) (0.062)   (0.034) (0.046) (0.057)   (0.034) (0.034) (0.048) 
Number of observations 62 77   95 83   222 177  
Total sample 716     716     716   
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.       
All dollar values are adjusted for 2007 dollar values.       
In order to test for the differences of coefficient values, t-test is applied. The null hypothesis is that "differences in coefficient values across years=0" 
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics for Home Purchase Decision Model 
 Income Group 1   Income Group 2   Income Group 3 
 $0-$30,000  $30,000-$60,000  $60,000-up 
Dependent Variable 1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
  1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
  1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
Purchased principal 
residence 
0.071 0.106 0.035  0.193 0.207 0.013  0.484 0.510 0.027 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.028)  (0.027) (0.026) (0.038)  (0.036) (0.034) (0.050) 
 
Credit Characteristics 
           
Household head 
employed 
0.707 0.634 -0.073
*
  0.878 0.844 -0.033  0.933 0.914 -0.018 
(0.027) (0.031) (0.041)  (0.020) (0.022) (0.030)  (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) 
 
Number of years worked 
for current employer 
 
2.392 
 
2.635 
 
0.244 
 
 
4.314 
 
4.052 
 
-0.262 
 
 
6.639 
 
6.379 
 
-0.260 
(0.241) (0.314) (0.396)  (0.370) (0.384) (0.533)  (0.535) (0.508) (0.738) 
 
Family income ($ in 
thousands) 
 
17.230 
 
18.158 
 
0.928 
 
 
43.729 
 
43.463 
 
-0.266 
 
 
106.249 
 
132.098 
 
25.850
***
 
(0.481) (0.500) (0.694)  (0.554) (0.545) (0.777)  (4.164) (7.973) (8.995) 
 
Net-worth ($ in 
thousands) 
 
11.840 
 
19.270 
 
7.430 
 
 
26.558 
 
24.091 
 
-2.467 
 
 
250.260 
 
341.319 
 
91.059
*
 
(3.755) (10.952) (11.578)  (3.471) (4.124) (5.390)  (30.247) (45.186) (54.376) 
 
Has positive net-worth 
 
0.622 
 
0.605 
 
-0.018 
 
 
0.786 
 
0.720 
 
-0.066
*
 
 
 
0.884 
 
0.853 
 
-0.031 
(0.029) (0.031) (0.043)  (0.025) (0.027) (0.037)  (0.024) (0.025) (0.034) 
 
College and higher degree 
 
0.205 
 
0.173 
 
-0.032 
 
 
0.307 
 
0.251 
 
-0.056 
 
 
0.534 
 
0.566 
 
0.032 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.034)   (0.029) (0.027) (0.039)   (0.036) (0.034) (0.049) 
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics for Home Purchase Decision Model (Continued) 
 Income Group 1   Income Group 2   Income Group 3 
 $0-$30,000  $30,000-$60,000  $60,000-up 
 1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
  1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
  1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
 
Turn down for credit/didn't get 
as much credit as applied for 
 
0.540 
 
0.530 
 
-0.010 
 
 
0.535 
 
0.520 
 
-0.014 
 
 
0.390 
 
0.353 
 
-0.036 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.044)  (0.031) (0.031) (0.044)  (0.035) (0.033) (0.048) 
 
Has no credit card 
 
0.396 
 
0.475 
 
0.079
*
 
 
 
0.277 
 
0.288 
 
0.011 
 
 
0.081 
 
0.131 
 
0.050 
(0.029) (0.032) (0.043)  (0.028) (0.028) (0.039)  (0.021) (0.024) (0.032) 
 
Unused percent of credit card 
limit 
 
28.062 
 
24.666 
 
-3.396 
 
 
46.428 
 
42.313 
 
-4.115 
 
 
59.463 
 
62.852 
 
3.389 
(7.600) (2.398) (7.969)  (2.695) (2.609) (3.751)  (5.802) (2.638) (6.374) 
 
Almost/always pay off balance 
on credit cards 
 
0.203 
 
0.174 
 
-0.029 
 
 
0.232 
 
0.297 
 
0.064 
 
 
0.378 
 
0.483 
 
0.105
**
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.035)  (0.027) (0.028) (0.039)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.048) 
Behind/missed payments 
 
0.283 
 
0.444 
 
0.161
***
 
 
 
0.256 
 
0.357 
 
0.101
**
 
 
 
0.162 
 
0.167 
 
0.005 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.042)   (0.027) (0.029) (0.040)   (0.026) (0.025) (0.036) 
Number of observations 307 255   271 281   289 291  
Total sample 1,694     1,694     1,694   
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.       
All dollar values are adjusted for 2007 dollar values.           
In order to test for the differences of coefficient values, t-test is applied. The null hypothesis is that "differences in coefficient values across years=0" 
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Table 2.4. Descriptive Statistics for Dollar Amount Paid on Home Purchases 
 Income Group 1   Income Group 2   Income Group 3 
 $0-$52,000  $52,000-$87,000  $87,000-up 
Dependent Variable 1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
Dollar amount paid on home 
purchases (in thousands) 
102.487 157.700 55.213
***
  150.653 224.690 74.038
***
  279.429 456.709 177.280
***
 
(12.718) (13.758) (18.736)  (8.789) (16.572) (18.759)  (24.289) (33.881) (41.688) 
 
Credit Characteristics 
           
 
Household head employed 
 
0.829 
 
0.767 
 
-0.062 
 
 
0.918 
 
0.930 
 
0.012 
 
 
0.927 
 
0.920 
 
-0.007 
(0.062) (0.059) (0.085)  (0.036) (0.037) (0.052)  (0.037) (0.029) (0.047) 
 
Number of years worked for 
current employer 
 
4.175 
 
4.592 
 
0.417 
 
 
6.135 
 
4.474 
 
-1.661 
 
 
8.746 
 
6.863 
 
-1.884 
(0.772) (0.901) (1.187)  (0.926) (0.766) (1.202)  (1.518) (0.947) (1.789) 
 
Family Income ($ in 
thousands) 
 
32.846 
 
32.892 
 
0.047 
 
 
68.726 
 
67.792 
 
-0.935 
 
 
200.307 
 
208.827 
 
8.520 
(1.798) (1.987) (2.680)  (1.114) (1.248) (1.673)  (19.340) (18.844) (27.002) 
 
Net-worth ($ in thousands)  
 
25.825 
 
34.592 
 
8.767 
 
 
82.431 
 
80.537 
 
-1.894 
 
 
828.770 
 
738.744 
 
-90.026 
(5.942) (9.149) (10.909)  (16.416) (16.454) (23.242)  (149.802) (122.753) (193.672) 
 
Has positive net-worth 
 
0.836 
 
0.783 
 
-0.054 
 
 
0.857 
 
0.865 
 
0.008 
 
 
0.974 
 
0.922 
 
-0.052 
(0.062) (0.056) (0.084)  (0.047) (0.048) (0.067)  (0.026) (0.035) (0.044) 
 
College and Higher Degree 
 
0.295 
 
0.176 
 
-0.119 
 
 
0.400 
 
0.527 
 
0.127 
 
 
0.710 
 
0.656 
 
-0.054 
(0.075) (0.055) (0.093)  (0.062) (0.068) (0.092)  (0.073) (0.060) (0.095) 
Turn down for credit/didn't 
get as much credit as applied 
for 
 
0.591 
 
0.464 
 
-0.127 
 
 
0.302 
 
0.394 
 
0.092 
 
 
0.238 
 
0.184 
 
-0.054 
(0.078) (0.069) (0.105)   (0.060) (0.067) (0.090)   (0.068) (0.052) (0.085) 
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Table 2.4. Descriptive Statistics for Dollar Amount Paid on Home Purchases (Continued) 
 Income Group 1   Income Group 2   Income Group 3 
 $0-$52,000  $52,000-$87,000  $87,000-up 
 1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two 
period 
coefficients=0 
1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two 
period 
coefficients=0 
1998 2007 
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
 
Has no credit card 
 
0.184 
 
0.252 
 
0.068 
 
 
0.131 
 
0.108 
 
-0.023 
 
 
0.029 
 
0.069 
 
0.040 
(0.064) (0.059) (0.087)  (0.047) (0.044) (0.064)  (0.024) (0.034) (0.041) 
 
Unused percent of credit card 
limit 
 
53.508 
 
49.692 
 
-3.816 
 
 
65.062 
 
64.826 
 
-0.237 
 
 
79.265 
 
73.897 
 
-5.368 
(7.075) (5.302) (8.841)  (4.959) (4.895) (6.968)  (5.038) (4.150) (6.527) 
 
Almost/always pay off balance 
on credit cards 
 
0.370 
 
0.270 
 
-0.100 
 
 
0.283 
 
0.490 
 
0.207
**
 
 
 
0.586 
 
0.678 
 
0.092 
(0.077) (0.063) (0.099)  (0.055) (0.068) (0.088)  (0.081) (0.059) (0.100) 
 
Behind/missed payments 
 
0.227 
 
0.307 
 
0.080 
 
 
0.041 
 
0.058 
 
0.017 
 
 
0.107 
 
0.059 
 
-0.048 
(0.070) (0.065) (0.096)  (0.023) (0.030) (0.038)  (0.052) (0.030) (0.061) 
 
Mortgage Characteristics 
           
 
Main mortgage is federally 
guaranteed 
 
0.301 
 
0.180 
 
-0.120 
 
 
0.416 
 
0.264 
 
-0.152
*
 
 
 
0.105 
 
0.199 
 
0.093 
(0.075) (0.052) (0.091)  (0.062) (0.061) (0.087)  (0.051) (0.051) (0.072) 
 
Adjustable rate mortgage 
 
0.048 
 
0.197 
 
0.148
**
 
 
 
0.125 
 
0.221 
 
0.096 
 
 
0.131 
 
0.195 
 
0.064 
(0.033) (0.056) (0.065)   (0.040) (0.056) (0.068)   (0.047) (0.045) (0.065) 
Number of observations 41 57   69 61   103 120  
Total sample 451     451     451   
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.       
All dollar values are adjusted for 2007 dollar values.           
In order to test for the differences of coefficient values, t-test is applied. The null hypothesis is that "differences in coefficient values across years=0" 
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Table 2.5. Regression Results for Home Financing Ratio (%) 
 1998 
(1)
  2007 
(2)
  
H0:Difference btw 
two period 
coefficients=0 
(3)
 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err. 
Credit Characteristics         
Household head employed         
$0-$52,000 (IG1) -5.980 (6.174)  5.747 (7.567)  11.727 (9.585) 
$52,000-$87,000 (IG2) 14.288 (9.338)  8.296 (7.371)  -5.992 (11.931) 
$87,000-up (IG3) -13.551
*
 (8.141)  0.633 (8.156)  14.184 (11.285) 
Number of years worked for 
current employer 
        
$0-$52,000 -0.583 (0.370)  0.276 (0.302)  0.859
*
 (0.480) 
$52,000-$87,000 -0.758
***
 (0.251)  -0.494
*
 (0.266)  0.265 (0.358) 
$87,000-up 0.055 (0.225)  -0.127 (0.280)  -0.182 (0.357) 
Ln of Family Income         
$0-$52,000 -3.371 (7.324)  3.035 (2.827)  6.405 (7.882) 
$52,000-$87,000 -10.318 (13.710)  16.880 (15.876)  27.198 (20.683) 
$87,000-up 3.526 (3.255)  0.038 (3.537)  -3.488 (4.797) 
Ln of Net-worth         
$0-$52,000 -4.652
**
 (2.190)  0.109 (2.327)  4.761 (3.210) 
$52,000-$87,000 -0.015 (1.927)  -2.508
*
 (1.415)  -2.493 (2.411) 
$87,000-up -3.646
***
 (1.162)  -3.019
*
 (1.597)  0.628 (1.967) 
Has positive net-worth         
$0-$52,000 22.589
**
 (9.078)  -3.643 (9.946)  -26.232
*
 (13.559) 
$52,000-$87,000 -15.382 (9.591)  4.763 (6.710)  20.145
*
 (11.737) 
$87,000-up -4.271 (9.069)  4.709 (9.289)  8.980 (12.642) 
College and Higher Degree         
$0-$52,000 -2.013 (5.758)  11.790
**
 (5.154)  13.803
*
 (7.686) 
$52,000-$87,000 1.349 (3.321)  5.373 (3.824)  4.024 (4.982) 
$87,000-up 0.301 (5.216)  5.856 (4.681)  5.555 (7.010) 
Turn down for credit/didn't get 
as much credit as applied for 
        
$0-$52,000 14.513
**
 (5.764)  10.323
**
 (4.077)  -4.190 (7.026) 
$52,000-$87,000 -12.540
**
 (6.270)  -1.257 (4.258)  11.283 (7.759) 
$87,000-up 1.063 (5.375)   -0.961 (4.465)   -2.024 (6.999) 
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Table 2.5. Regression Results for Home Financing Ratio (%) (Continued) 
 1998  2007  
H0:Difference btw 
two period 
coefficients=0 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err. 
Has no credit card         
$0-$52,000 9.855 (9.306)  -1.959 (8.855)  -11.814 (12.857) 
$52,000-$87,000 23.791
***
 (7.360)  -2.894 (7.044)  -26.685
**
 (10.489) 
$87,000-up -36.983
***
 (13.852)  -14.867
*
 (7.991)  22.115 (15.850) 
Unused percent of credit card limit         
$0-$52,000 0.165
*
 (0.097)  0.081 (0.104)  -0.083 (0.141) 
$52,000-$87,000 0.021 (0.077)  -0.085 (0.072)  -0.106 (0.108) 
$87,000-up -0.240
***
 (0.062)  -0.175
**
 (0.080)  0.065 (0.101) 
Almost/always pay off balance on 
credit cards 
        
$0-$52,000 -9.438 (6.851)  -14.368
**
 (6.366)  -4.930 (9.389) 
$52,000-$87,000 0.619 (4.717)  -4.082 (3.849)  -4.701 (6.120) 
$87,000-up -1.099 (4.524)  -5.830 (5.307)  -4.731 (6.989) 
Behind/missed payments         
$0-$52,000 -9.139 (6.710)  4.535 (4.329)  13.674
*
 (7.971) 
$52,000-$87,000 20.225 (14.407)  -4.897 (5.557)  -25.122 (15.437) 
$87,000-up -1.895 (6.364)  -4.227 (7.747)  -2.332 (10.065) 
Mortgage Characteristics         
Main mortgage is federally 
guaranteed  
        
$0-$52,000 6.518 (5.728)  10.650
*
 (5.481)  4.132 (7.988) 
$52,000-$87,000 9.955
**
 (3.962)  7.369
*
 (4.144)  -2.586 (5.744) 
$87,000-up 2.834 (4.820)  1.342 (4.768)  -1.493 (6.775) 
Adjustable rate mortgage         
$0-$52,000 1.189 (8.041)  -0.135 (4.473)  -1.325 (9.110) 
$52,000-$87,000 -1.395 (6.434)  0.985 (3.742)  2.380 (7.449) 
$87,000-up 6.075 (4.992)  6.189 (4.604)  0.113 (6.795) 
Other Household Characteristics         
Household head non-minority -3.776 (2.367)  -3.776 (2.367)  n/a n/a 
Household head married  -0.666 (2.009)  -0.666 (2.009)  n/a n/a 
Household head's age -0.424
***
 (0.093)  -0.424
***
 (0.093)  n/a n/a 
Level of financial risk willing to take         
Above average risk 5.100 (3.277)  5.100 (3.277)  n/a n/a 
Average Risk 7.333
**
 (3.300)  7.333
**
 (3.300)  n/a n/a 
No financial risk 3.194 (3.971)   3.194 (3.971)   n/a n/a 
Number of observations 716 
R-squared 0.3798 
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
(1) 
1998 coefficient values are determined by testing hypothesis (2.a) in section 2.3.1.     
(2)  
2007 coefficient values are determined by testing hypothesis (2.b) in section 2.3.1.     
(3) 
Differences in coefficient values are determined by testing hypothesis (2.c) in section 2.3.1.  
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Table 2.6. Marginal Effects for Home Purchase Decision Model 
 1998 
(1)
  2007
 (2)
  
Ho:Difference btw 
two period 
coefficients=0 
(3)
 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
Credit Characteristics         
Household head employed         
$0-$30,000 (IG1) -0.025 (0.052)  -0.007 (0.051)  0.018 (0.070) 
$30,000-$60,000 (IG2) -0.020 (0.088)  0.080 (0.050)  0.101 (0.101) 
$60,000-up (IG3) -0.019 (0.117)  0.114 (0.085)  0.132 (0.142) 
Number of years worked for 
current employer 
        
$0-$30,000 0.007
*
 (0.003)  0.005 (0.004)  -0.002 (0.005) 
$30,000-$60,000 -0.002 (0.003)  -0.007
*
 (0.004)  -0.006 (0.005) 
$60,000-up 0.001 (0.004)  -0.003 (0.004)  -0.004 (0.005) 
Ln of Family Income         
$0-$30,000 0.039 (0.037)  -0.043
**
 (0.022)  -0.082
*
 (0.043) 
$30,000-$60,000 0.104 (0.123)  0.193
*
 (0.100)  0.089 (0.157) 
$60,000-up 0.072 (0.083)  -0.0002 (0.059)  -0.073 (0.102) 
Ln of Net-worth         
$0-$30,000 0.019 (0.012)  0.064
***
 (0.020)  0.045
*
 (0.023) 
$30,000-$60,000 0.023 (0.015)  0.038
*
 (0.020)  0.015 (0.025) 
$60,000-up 0.014 (0.024)  0.045
**
 (0.020)  0.031 (0.031) 
Has positive net-worth         
$0-$30,000 -0.089 (0.054)  -0.150
**
 (0.074)  -0.061 (0.092) 
$30,000-$60,000 0.121
**
 (0.052)  0.032 (0.080)  -0.089 (0.096) 
$60,000-up -0.060 (0.106)  -0.151
*
 (0.087)  -0.091 (0.137) 
College and Higher Degree         
$0-$30,000 0.013 (0.047)  -0.088
***
 (0.034)  -0.101
*
 (0.058) 
$30,000-$60,000 0.014 (0.048)  0.002 (0.057)  -0.013 (0.074) 
$60,000-up 0.064 (0.057)  -0.023 (0.053)  -0.087 (0.078) 
Turn down for credit/didn't get 
as much credit as applied for 
        
$0-$30,000 0.019 (0.031)  0.023 (0.043)  0.004 (0.053) 
$30,000-$60,000 0.046 (0.050)  0.027 (0.048)  -0.019 (0.070) 
$60,000-up -0.124
**
 (0.061)   -0.007 (0.059)   0.117 (0.085) 
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Table 2.6. Marginal Effects for Home Purchase Decision Model (Continued) 
 1998 
(1)
  2007
 (2)
  
Ho:Difference 
btw two period 
coefficients=0 
(3)
 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Has no credit card         
$0-$30,000 -0.030 (0.031)  -0.063 (0.046)  -0.033 (0.056) 
$30,000-$60,000 -0.104
*
 (0.061)  -0.008 (0.071)  0.096 (0.094) 
$60,000-up 0.164 (0.109)  0.036 (0.117)  -0.128 (0.160) 
Unused percent of credit card 
limit 
        
$0-$30,000 -2.70E-05 (0.000049)  0.0003 (0.0005)  0.000 (0.0005) 
$30,000-$60,000 -3.25E-04 (0.00083)  0.0014 (0.0009)  0.002 (0.001) 
$60,000-up 3.33E-04 (0.00073)  0.0013 (0.0013)  0.001 (0.001) 
Almost/always pay off balance 
on credit cards 
        
$0-$30,000 -0.031 (0.038)  0.004 (0.044)  0.035 (0.058) 
$30,000-$60,000 0.094 (0.067)  -0.064 (0.058)  -0.159
*
 (0.089) 
$60,000-up 0.061 (0.063)  0.010 (0.072)  -0.051 (0.096) 
Behind/missed payments         
$0-$30,000 -0.069
**
 (0.028)  0.000 (0.033)  0.069 (0.043) 
$30,000-$60,000 -0.055 (0.053)  -0.142
***
 (0.045)  -0.086 (0.069) 
$60,000-up -0.188
***
 (0.071)  -0.234
***
 (0.082)  -0.045 (0.106) 
 
Other Household 
Characteristics 
        
Household head non-minority -0.007 (0.022)  -0.007 (0.022)  n/a n/a 
Household head married  0.082
***
 (0.019)  0.082
***
 (0.019)  n/a n/a 
Household head's age -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)  n/a n/a 
Chance of staying at the 
current address (%) 
0.003
***
 (0.0003)  0.003
***
 (0.0003)  n/a n/a 
Has no loan -0.201
***
 (0.024)   -0.201
***
 (0.024)   n/a n/a 
Number of observations 1,694 
Prob>F 0.0000 
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
(1) 
1998 coefficient values are determined by testing hypothesis (2.a) in section 2.3.1. 
(2)  
2007 coefficient values are determined by testing hypothesis (2.b) in section 2.3.1. 
(3) 
Differences in coefficient values are determined by testing hypothesis (2.c) in section 2.3.1.  
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Table 2.7. Regression Results for Dollar (in thousands) Amount Paid on Home Purchases Model 
 1998
 (1)
  2007 
(2)
  
Ho:Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
(3)
 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err. 
Credit Characteristics         
Household head employed         
$0-$52,000 (IG1) 78.090
***
 (27.628)  -43.679
**
 (21.944)  -121.769
***
 (34.799) 
$52,000-$87,000 (IG2) -6.762 (17.430)  -54.909 (40.060)  -48.147 (43.938) 
$87,000-up (IG3) -9.751 (30.789)  -68.072 (65.940)  -58.321 (71.733) 
Number of years worked 
for current employer 
        
$0-$52,000 -4.386
*
 (2.553)  -0.371 (0.885)  4.015 (2.717) 
$52,000-$87,000 1.652 (1.029)  0.919 (1.449)  -0.734 (1.782) 
$87,000-up -2.390
**
 (0.967)  0.921 (1.905)  3.310 (2.123) 
Ln of Family Income         
$0-$52,000 19.780 (28.445)  5.053 (9.146)  -14.727 (29.768) 
$52,000-$87,000 4.663 (49.051)  -24.579 (59.355)  -29.242 (76.652) 
$87,000-up 45.379
**
 (22.713)  129.272
***
 (39.125)  83.892
*
 (43.745) 
Ln of Net-worth         
$0-$52,000 32.308
***
 (9.205)  6.487 (6.593)  -25.821
**
 (11.154) 
$52,000-$87,000 4.229 (5.555)  10.797 (6.581)  6.568 (8.613) 
$87,000-up 33.100
***
 (6.756)  19.618
**
 (9.411)  -13.482 (11.529) 
Has positive net-worth         
$0-$52,000 -90.985
**
 (37.312)  -64.883
*
 (37.003)  26.103 (50.149) 
$52,000-$87,000 12.065 (26.007)  4.487 (23.734)  -7.578 (36.330) 
$87,000-up -62.488 (53.475)  -144.231** (60.555)  -81.743 (78.754) 
College and Higher Degree         
$0-$52,000 -18.470 (22.564)  -2.709 (23.732)  15.761 (32.426) 
$52,000-$87,000 19.095 (13.526)  -7.568 (14.915)  -26.663 (20.133) 
$87,000-up 77.033
***
 (16.779)  -19.004 (32.087)  -96.037
***
 (36.365) 
Turn down for credit/didn't 
get as much credit as 
applied for 
        
$0-$52,000 -49.904
*
 (26.378)  -62.257
**
 (31.352)  -12.353 (41.061) 
$52,000-$87,000 5.583 (11.333)  -0.267 (15.830)  -5.850 (19.186) 
$87,000-up -32.521 (21.440)  1.827 (26.168)  34.347 (34.201) 
Has no credit card         
$0-$52,000 -61.682
*
 (32.359)  -62.011 (60.276)  -0.329 (69.801) 
$52,000-$87,000 -30.249 (20.254)  -11.772 (21.256)  18.477 (30.992) 
$87,000-up -119.038
**
 (51.274)   8.954 (46.023)   127.992
*
 (68.468) 
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Table 2.7. Regression Results for Dollar (in thousands) Amount Paid on Home Purchases Model (Cont.) 
 1998
 (1)
  2007 
(2)
  
Ho:Difference btw 
two period 
coefficients=0 
(3)
 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err. 
Unused percent of credit card 
limit 
        
$0-$52,000 -1.150
**
 (0.505)  -0.797 (0.877)  0.353 (1.016) 
$52,000-$87,000 0.086 (0.230)  -0.109 (0.259)  -0.196 (0.355) 
$87,000-up 0.022 (0.512)  0.668 (0.573)  0.646 (0.778) 
Almost/always pay off balance on credit cards       
$0-$52,000 43.359
**
 (21.532)  49.706 (33.453)  6.347 (40.358) 
$52,000-$87,000 -7.116 (16.628)  20.342 (16.929)  27.458 (23.903) 
$87,000-up 29.651 (34.774)  -3.632 (35.648)  -33.284 (49.477) 
Behind/missed payments         
$0-$52,000 -38.094 (26.638)  40.647 (26.027)  78.741
**
 (37.535) 
$52,000-$87,000 46.106 (40.856)  -33.868 (31.179)  -79.974 (49.600) 
$87,000-up 9.821 (25.877)  5.371 (39.652)  -4.450 (46.830) 
Mortgage Characteristics         
Main mortgage is federally guaranteed       
$0-$52,000 -25.475 (17.428)  24.578 (20.195)  50.053
*
 (26.817) 
$52,000-$87,000 -19.565
*
 (11.712)  -25.858 (18.571)  -6.293 (22.417) 
$87,000-up 71.976
*
 (43.512)  17.445 (30.235)  -54.531 (53.511) 
Adjustable rate mortgage         
$0-$52,000 -74.019
***
 (24.457)  6.290 (18.767)  80.309
***
 (29.892) 
$52,000-$87,000 7.054 (12.783)  18.850 (26.745)  11.797 (29.766) 
$87,000-up -63.381
*
 (32.625)  -51.083 (33.338)  12.299 (45.829) 
 
Other Household 
Characteristics 
        
Household head non-minority -8.425 (10.860)  -8.425 (10.860)  n/a n/a 
Household head married  23.882
***
 (8.468)  23.882
***
 (8.468)  n/a n/a 
Household head's age 1.018
***
 (0.383)  1.018
***
 (0.383)  n/a n/a 
Mortg. amount received to 
purchase principal residence 
($ in thousands) 
1.078
***
 (0.044)  1.078
***
 (0.044)  n/a n/a 
Level of financial risk willing to take     
Above average risk -38.162
**
 (16.108)  -38.162
**
 (16.108)  n/a n/a 
Average Risk -1.859 (16.892)  -1.859 (16.892)  n/a n/a 
No financial risk 1.975 (21.761)  1.975 (21.761)  n/a n/a 
Has no loan 74.094
**
 (32.611)   74.094
**
 (32.611)   n/a n/a 
Number of observations 451 
R-squared 0.8810 
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
(1) 
1998 coefficient values are determined by testing hypothesis (2.a) in section 2.3.1. 
(2)  
2007 coefficient values are determined by testing hypothesis (2.b) in section 2.3.1.     
(3) 
Differences in coefficient values are determined by testing hypothesis (2.c) in section 2.3.1    
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Table 2.8. T-Test Results for Home Financing Ratio (%) 
$0-$52,000 (IG1) 
 Coef. Std.Err. P-value 
(H0= Time dummy + IG1*2007=0) 2.377 (3.456) 0.492 
$52,000-$87,000 (IG2) 
 Coef. Std.Err. P-value 
(H0=Time dummy+IG2*2007=0) 1.993 (2.882) 0.490 
$87,000-up (IG3) 
 Coef. Std.Err. P-value 
(H0=Time dummy=0 ) 0.202 (2.779) 0.942 
Time dummy is defined as 1 if year=2007. Each null hypothesis (H0) tests   
whether the time dummy is significantly different than zero under each income group. 
 
Table 2.9. T-Test Result for Home Purchase Decision Model 
$0-$30,000 (IG1) 
 Marginal Eff. Linearized Std.Err. P-value 
(H0= Time dummy + IG1*2007=0) 0.049 (0.027) 0.063 
$30,000-$60,000 (IG2) 
  Marginal Eff. Linearized Std.Err. P-value 
(H0=Time dummy+IG2*2007=0) 0.020 (0.031) 0.515 
$60,000-up (IG3) 
  Marginal Eff. Linearized Std.Err. P-value 
(H0=Time dummy=0 ) -0.032 (0.038) 0.404 
Time dummy is defined as 1 if year=2007. Each null hypothesis (H0) tests   
whether the time dummy is significantly different than zero under each income group. 
 
Table 2.10. T-Test Result for Dollar Amount Paid on Home Purchases Model 
$0-$52,000 (IG1) 
 Coef. Std.Err. P-value 
(H0= Time dummy + IG1*2007=0) -0.152 (13.162) 0.991 
$52,000-$87,000 (IG2) 
 Coef. Std.Err. P-value 
(H0=Time dummy+IG2*2007=0) -5.203 (9.443) 0.582 
$87,000-up (IG3) 
  Coef. Std.Err. P-value 
(H0=Time dummy=0 ) 25.866 (16.304) 0.113 
Time dummy is defined as 1 if year=2007. Each null hypothesis (H0) tests  
whether the time dummy is significantly different than zero under each income group. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
RELAXED LENDING STANDARDS AND THE 2007 MORTGAGE 
CRISIS: GAP BETWEEN HOUSEHOLD DESIRED AND ACTUAL 
STOCK OF DEBT  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  
This paper is motivated by the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis and the relaxed lending 
standards that appeared to occur before this crisis. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
data from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, this study aims to show evidence of changing 
characteristics of lending under easy credit conditions. As evidence, this study examines households’ 
debt levels and in particular, the gap between households’ desired and outstanding debt levels.  
In the years leading up to the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, there have been easy credit 
conditions in the U.S. mortgage industry. From 2002 to 2004, a significant amount of foreign money 
flowed into the U.S. Due to the 2001 recession, which resulted from the burst of the dot-com bubble 
and the September 11 terrorist attack, the Federal Reserve Bank lowered interest rates and the low 
interest rates were in effect until 2006. This inflow of funds along with low interest rates contributed 
to the easy credit conditions. The amount of subprime mortgage loans peaked during 2004 to 2006 
and demand for housing increased, leading to a rise in housing prices. Many institutions and 
investors invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities in the U.S.  
 However, the subprime mortgage market entered into a crisis in 2007. House prices declined 
and interest rates increased. The borrowers could not refinance their mortgages at favorable terms 
and adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) were reset at higher rates. This series of events created credit 
defaults and increases in subprime mortgage foreclosures. Meanwhile, lenders could not cover their 
losses from increased mortgage foreclosures because homes were worth less than the outstanding 
balance and many subprime mortgage lenders filed for bankruptcy. In addition, financial institutions, 
which had invested in securities backed with subprime mortgages, faced significant losses because as 
housing prices dropped, these securities lost much of their value. The 2007 crisis spread as well to 
other parts of economy and a financial crisis followed in 2008. Several financial institutions faced 
lower profits, some went bankrupt, and some were taken over by other companies or were bailed out 
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by the U.S government. U.S. stocks suffered huge losses, unemployment rates increased, and 
Americans saw a major decline in their wealth. World financial markets also became unstable.  
Due to adverse effects of the 2007 crisis on the entire economy, a great number of papers 
have looked into factors that may have contributed to this crisis (Ariccia et al. 2008; Demyanyk and 
Van Hemert 2009; Foote et al. 2008; Mian and Sufi 2009a; Keys et al. 2009; Keys et al. 2010; 
Purnanandam 2011). They have used loan level data and identified relaxed lending standards as a 
contributor to the crisis. The relaxed lending standards were in particular seen in areas with high 
mortgage securitization rates, large numbers of competitors, and in areas with housing booms 
(Ariccia et al. 2008). There was a decline in subprime rate spreads and quality of subprime mortgage 
loans during the 2001-2007 periods, and an increase in the loan-to-value ratios and fraction of low 
documentation loans (Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2009; Foote et al. 2008; Sanders 2008; and Keys 
et al. 2009). The moral hazard problem caused by subprime practices also led to relaxed lending 
standards (Mian and Sufi 2009a; Keys et al. 2009; Keys et al. 2010; Purnanandam 2011).  
This paper adds to the existing literature on the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis and the 
relaxed lending standards. Different than the other papers on the subprime crisis, this study uses 
household survey data, the SCF data. The focus is on households and household debt. The previous 
studies by Mian and Sufi (2009b; 2010) examined, as well, household debt and identified increases in 
household borrowing as contributors to the crisis. Their findings also suggest that from 2002 to 2006, 
younger homeowners, homeowners with high credit card utilization rates and low credit scores had 
borrowed more against increases in their home equity (Mian and Sufi 2009b). Different than Mian 
and Sufi, this paper examines households’ desired and outstanding debt levels.  
This paper is the first, among the existing literature on the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, to 
look into the gap between desired and actual stock of household debt. Even though the literature on 
the subprime crisis has not looked into the gap between households’ desired and actual stock of debt, 
this gap has previously been investigated in the literature. These studies have commonly used the 
SCF data because this data provides extensive information about households’ outstanding debt levels, 
and financial and non-financial assets (Jappelli 1990; Cox and Jappelli 1990; Fissell and Jappelli 
1990; Cox and Jappelli 1993; Duca and Rosenthal 1993; Crook 1996; Gropp et al. 1997; Crook 2001; 
Lyons 2003; Crook and Hochguertel 2006).  
 In particular, this paper analyzes the gap between households’ desired and actual stock of 
debt and how it has changed from 1998 to 2007. The year 1998 reflects the period when subprime 
lending was popular but before relaxed lending standards and 2007 reflects the period after which 
relaxed lending standards had been in effect for some time. This study focuses on households and 
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their debt levels because households were greatly affected by the crisis and any future policy changes 
with respect to lending practices will have a significant impact on households and their borrowings.  
Given that some households have borrowing constraints and cannot receive the entire amount 
of credit they demand, under easy credit conditions, their access to credit will improve because 
interest rates, fees, and down-payments on a loan will decline. Therefore, under relaxed lending 
standards, credit constrained households will obtain more of their desired loan levels and the gap 
between actual and desired stock of debt will decline. Thus, as evidence of the changing 
characteristics of lending, this study tests the following null hypothesis: The gap between desired and 
actual stock of debt was lower in 2007 than in 1998. 
One difficulty with testing the null hypothesis is estimating the desired stocks of debt. The 
actual stock of debt, outstanding debt level at the time of the survey, is observed in the SCF data. 
However, the desired debt is not observed. For unconstrained households, their desired stock of debt 
can be taken to be the same value as their outstanding debt levels because unconstrained households 
can obtain the full loan amount they desire. However, for households with borrowing constraints, 
their outstanding debt levels will not be equal to their desired stock of debt because these households 
can obtain only part of the loan amount that they desire. Thus, the desired stock of debt needs to be 
estimated for the constrained households. 
The gap measure is constructed in three steps following Cox and Jappelli (1993). The first 
step is to select the sample of unconstrained households that desires positive debt. Once this sample 
is selected, their desired stock of debt is estimated by using their outstanding debt levels that are 
observed in the data. For this process, a three-equation-generalized-Tobit is applied. The second step 
is to compute the desired stock of debt for constrained households by using the estimated coefficients 
from the first step. The third step is to calculate the gap by measuring the difference between the 
predicted debt and the observed debt levels.  
One other difficulty with this study is that it is hard to observe constrained households. In the 
previous literature, this difficulty has been overcome by using self-reported constraint indicators 
specifically from the SCF dataset. The self-reported indicators include: whether household has ever 
been denied for any credit or has not been given as much credit as it applied for, and whether 
household was discouraged from applying for credit (Jappelli 1990; Cox and Jappelli 1990; Cox and 
Jappelli 1993; Crook 1996; Crook 2001; Lyons 2003). In order to differentiate constrained 
households from unconstrained households, this study uses the self-reported indicators that have been 
widely used in the literature. In addition, because these self-reported constraint indicators are for any 
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loan type and do not explicitly state whether they are for mortgage loan applications, this paper 
focuses on consumer loans in addition to mortgage loans.  
Different than the existing literature on household debt, the sample includes high income 
households. In order to adjust for the oversampling of wealthy households in the SCF data, the 
sampling weights, which are provided in the data, are used. One other difference from most of the 
existing literature is that permanent income is constructed following Cox and Jappelli (1993) and 
King and Dicks-Mireaux (1981) and the regressions control for permanent income. In addition, the 
standard errors are bootstrapped to generate correct standard errors because the regressions include 
estimated variables such as permanent income. Additionally, net worth is instrumented in this paper.    
A decline in the gap levels indicates that constrained households borrowed more of their 
desired debt levels and this can signal greater loan opportunities for constrained households and an 
increase in risky loans during the period before the 2007 subprime crisis emerged. Thus, the 
regulators can take the decline in the gap levels as a warning mechanism for changing lending 
characteristics under relaxed lending standards. Specifically, Financial Stability Oversight Council 
can consider decline in the gap as a warning for systemic risk because following the 2007 crisis there 
was a collapse in the U.S. financial system. The Financial Stability Oversight Council can take 
preventive measures and make recommendations to the Federal Reserve Board before the U.S. 
financial stability is threatened. The financial regulators (including the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau) should enforce regulations to protect consumers from the changing lending 
practices and make sure consumers are protected from any bad lending practices.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
In the literature, a great number of papers have studied determinants of households being 
credit constrained and commonly used the SCF data to group households as credit constrained or 
unconstrained. Some of these papers used an indirect measure such as asset levels, wealth-to-income 
ratios, and savings rates, and some used a more direct measure such as the self-reported constraint 
indicators from the SCF data. 
The findings of the papers that used indirect measures have been ambiguous. Some of them 
concluded that approximately 20 percent of United States families had credit constraints and were 
behaving in a manner that was inconsistent with the life-cycle-permanent-income hypothesis 
(LCPIH) (Hall and Mishkin 1982; Hayashi 1985; Hubbard and Judd 1986; Mariger 1987; Zeldes 
1989). Other studies concluded that households did not have any credit constraints (Altonji and Siow 
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1987; Runkle 1991; Attanasio and Weber 1995; Dejuan and Seater 1999). Lyons (2003) suggested 
that the ambiguity of these findings was probably due to the fact that these studies did not use a more 
direct measure to define households with credit constraints.  
Studies that used more direct measures defined credit constrained households by using self-
reported survey questions from the SCF data (Jappelli 1990; Cox and Jappelli 1990; Fissell and 
Jappelli 1990; Cox and Jappelli 1993; Duca and Rosenthal 1993; Crook 1996; Gropp et al. 1997; 
Crook 2001; Lyons 2003; Crook and Hochguertel 2006). Findings by Jappelli (1990) suggest that the 
probability of being credit constrained is positively related to family size and being non-white, but it 
is negatively related to income, wealth, age, region of residence, and whether a household saves. 
Findings by Cox and Jappelli (1993) are similar to Jappelli (1990) and show that the probability of 
being credit constrained has a positive relation with being black and family size, but a negative 
relation with net worth, region, and concentration of financial institutions in the area of residence. 
They also find a negative effect of permanent income and age on the probability of being credit 
constrained at the 10 percent significance level.  
The results by Duca and Rosenthal (1993) indicate that race, having bad credit history, and 
being in receipt of welfare payments have positive effects on the probability of being credit 
constrained. On the other hand, their findings suggest that having a checking account and owning the 
family home have negative effects on the probability of being credit constrained. Also, at the 10 
percent significance level, married couples have a negative effect and household size has a positive 
effect on the probability of being credit constrained. The findings by Crook (1996) show that the 
probability of being credit constrained has a positive relation with being non-white and age, but a 
negative relation with years at current address, home ownership, income, years of schooling, age 
squared, and households that save.  
Findings by Gropp et al. (1997) suggest that bankruptcy exemption, level of Herfindahl index 
for financial institutions in the area, whether there are multi-bank holding companies in the state, 
family size, income, household head’s age, race and marital status, and years household head has 
been working for his current employer are all significant determinants of having credit constraints. 
Crook (2001) concluded that the probability of being credit constrained is positively affected by 
household head being black, number of people in the primary economic unit, and whether the 
household foresees a major expenditure in the near future, but is negatively affected by number of 
debit, credit, and charge cards, income, net worth, household owning its own home, household 
heads’ being above 54 years old, and years at current work.  
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Crook and Hochguertel (2006) compared determinants of being credit constrained across the 
U.S., Spain, Italy, and Netherlands. Different than prior work, they computed permanent income 
following King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982). One of their findings is that in the U.S., the greater the 
amount by which current income exceeds permanent income, the probability of the household having 
a credit constraint increases. Their findings also display a negative effect of wealth, income, age, 
being unemployed, not having any paid job, being female, and being single on probability of being 
credit constrained. However, education, number of kids, and being self-employed have positive 
effects on the probability of being credit constrained.  
Some of the above papers derived determinants of being credit constrained as a step in 
estimating the desired debt amounts (Cox and Jappelli 1993; Duca and Rosenthal 1993; Gropp et al. 
1997; Crook 2001; Crook and Hochguertel 2006; Magri 2007). Following the work of Cox and 
Jappelli (1993), these papers conditioned their estimations of desired debt amounts on households 
that have positive demand for debt and are not credit constrained. Some papers also examined 
household debt outside the U.S. and compared determinants of households being credit constrained, 
demand for debt, and desired debt amounts to the literature findings in the U.S. (Manrique and Ojah 
2004; Magri 2007).   
Findings by Cox and Jappelli (1993) suggest that desired debt levels have a positive relation 
with permanent earnings and net worth, but a negative relation with current income, and that desired 
debt levels decline after a threshold age. The findings by Duca and Rosenthal (1993) suggest that 
desired debt levels by young households is positively related to wealth, income, willingness to 
borrow to finance luxury items, and household size, but negatively related to the household head 
being unemployed and income squared. Findings by Gropp et al. (1997) suggest that younger 
households under age 24 demand higher levels of debt. They also find the desired amount to be 
positively related to education, income (but at a decreasing rate), assets, and family size but to be 
negatively related to concentration of the financial market, living in certain regions, number of years 
household head has been working at current employer, and the older age group (between 34 and 65 
years old).  
The findings by Crook (2001) suggest that desired debt levels have a positive relation with 
current income, education, number of people in the primary economic unit, owning home, household 
head currently working, and whether household expects to have large expenses in the near future, but 
a negative relation with age for household heads aged above 54 years old, income squared, net worth, 
and risk aversion. Expectations about future interest rates and household head’s gender or race were 
not found to be significant determinants of desired debt levels. Crook and Hochguertel (2006) 
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suggest that in the U.S, a reduction in current income below permanent income positively affects the 
amount of debt that is demanded. Age (until 30 years old), current income, and having kids also have 
positive effects on desired debt levels but desired debt levels decline after age 65 and desired debt 
levels are negatively affected by education and being female.  
This study differs from the literature in that the sample includes wealthy households. 
Oversampling of wealthy households is adjusted through sampling weights, which are provided in 
the data, to reflect the U.S. population. However, the previous papers excluded wealthy households 
from the SCF data and did not use the sampling weights (Cox and Jappelli 1993; Duca and Rosenthal 
1993; Gropp et al. 1997; Crook 2001). Even though Crook (2001) did not use sampling weights in 
estimating the desired debt levels, he did use the weights in estimating the credit constrained 
households. Also, he did use them on the sample that had wealthy households removed. By 
excluding the wealthy households, the previous literature did not consider the entire distribution of 
net wealth that was provided with the SCF data. This study fills this gap.  
This study uses more recent data, the 2007 SCF, in addition to the 1998 SCF data. Net worth 
is instrumented following Cox and Jappelli (1993) and Duca and Rosenthal (1993) because there is 
simultaneity between net worth and desired debt, and between net worth and being credit 
constrained. 24 However, in the previous literature, it is not obvious whether this simultaneity has 
been corrected for (Crook 2001; Manrique and Ojah 2004; Crook and Hochguertel 2006). In 
addition, few studies computed permanent income and controlled for permanent income in estimating 
the desired debt levels (Cox and Jappelli 1993; Lyons 2003; Crook and Hochguertel 2006). Crook 
(2005) suggests using permanent income while determining debt demand functions. This study fills 
this gap and constructs permanent income and the regressions control for permanent income. In 
addition, the standard errors are bootstrapped to generate correct standard errors because regressions 
include estimated variables such as permanent income.   
 
3.3 Theory 
 
Based on the LCPIH, households smooth their consumption over their lifetime. Given the 
ability to borrow, if households anticipate an increase in their expected future incomes, they increase 
their current consumption levels without having to wait for the additional income increase to take 
                                                          
24
 As a robustness check in estimating desired debt amount, Magri (2007) took into consideration the fact that net 
wealth can be affected by simultaneity problems and instrumented net wealth with lag of net wealth. However, she 
did not correct for simultaneity in determining the probability of being unconstrained and the demand for debt.    
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effect. However, the existence of borrowing constraints leads to failure of the LCPIH. Without the 
ability to borrow, households’ current consumption levels are limited to their current income levels 
because they must wait until their income increase is actually realized to increase their current 
consumption levels.  
Following Zeldes (1989), the LCPIH model under a borrowing constraint is applied to two 
periods. It is assumed that a consumer lives in periods 1 and 2, and dies at the end of period 2 without 
any debts and bequests. Thus, at the end of period 2, the consumer spends all his income, both labor 
income and financial wealth. It is also assumed that the consumer starts period 1 with some financial 
wealth holdings (A1), receives labor income at the beginning of each period, and then chooses a 
consumption level. In this setting, the consumer solves for the problem given below to determine her 
optimal consumption level that will maximize her total utility.  Depending on her desired 
consumption level, she will determine whether she has demand for debt and how much debt she 
desires to hold, 
*
1D , in period 1.  
   (   )         (  )   (  )         
subject to 
1)    (        )(   ) 
2)          
3)              
4)         
Utility (U) refers to a one period utility function and is assumed to be a constant relative risk 
aversion utility function and is defined as   ( )  
      
   
 . C1 and C2 are consumption in each of the 
two periods, Y1 and Y2 are labor income received in each of the two periods, A1 and A2 are financial 
wealth at the beginning of each of the two periods (before labor income and consumption), r is 
interest rate earned on holding over funds from period 1 to period 2, and BC is borrowing constraint, 
a limit in the amount that the consumer can borrow in period 1. The above problem can be reduced to 
the following maximization problem.25 
 
                                                          
25
 In Eq (3.1), combination of constraints (4), (2), and (1) gives:    (   )(        )       Solve for 
C1. This gives:          
  
   
 
Constraint (3) is the same as:              
Combination of the above two inequalities for C1 gives:             (   
  
   
 ) 
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   (   )      (  )   (  )    (   )(        )      
subject to 
 )             (   
  
   
 ) 
 )      
If there is no boundary solution, the solution to this maximization problem is: 
   
  
(   )    (   (   )(     ))
  (   )
  
 
 
 .  
If there is a boundary solution,   
           (   
  
   
 ) 
Appendix C shows the solution to this maximization problem. Based on the desired 
consumption level (  
 ) and the resources that are available (     ), the consumer determines the 
amount of loan she would like to borrow and thus, the stock of debt she desires to hold,   
 .   
 
3.4 Model 
 
As evidence of the changing characteristics of lending under relaxed lending standards, this 
study tests the null hypothesis: The gap between desired and actual stock of debt was lower in 2007 
than in 1998. The actual stock of debt, outstanding debt level at the time of the survey, is observed in 
the SCF data. However, the desired debt is not observed. In order to find the gap between desired and 
actual stock of debt, the desired stock of debt needs to be estimated. For unconstrained households, 
their desired stock of debt (   
 ) can be taken as being the same value as their actual stock of debt 
levels (   ) because unconstrained households can obtain the full loan amount they desire. However, 
for households with borrowing constraints, their actual stock of debt (   ), outstanding debt levels, 
will not be equal to their desired stock of debt (   
 ) because these households can obtain only part of 
the loan amount that they desire. Thus, the desired debt needs to be estimated for the constrained 
households.   
The gap measure is constructed in three steps following Cox and Jappelli (1993). The first 
step is to estimate the desired debt equation using the outstanding debt levels conditional on that the 
sample of households do not have any borrowing constraints and that they desire positive debt. For 
this process, a three-equation-generalized-Tobit is applied. The second step is to compute the desired 
stock of debt for the constrained households by using the estimated coefficients from the first step. 
The third step is to calculate the gap by measuring the difference between the predicted debt and the 
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outstanding debt levels. This process is done for each year, 1998 and 2007 and then, the gap levels in 
2007 are compared to the gap levels in 1998. 
The first step, estimating desired stock of debt for unconstrained households with the desire 
to borrow, consists of three equations, the three-equation-generalized-Tobit model. The main goal is 
to predict equation (3.3), household’s desired stock of debt conditional on household demanding debt 
and not having any borrowing constraint.  
   (   )     
                        
where the dependent variable, 
*
1D , is the desired stock of debt but 
*
1D is observable when 
*
1D equals 
the actual amount of debt that is outstanding. This equality is true only when the household demands 
debt and does not have any borrowing constraints. Therefore, 
*
1D  is the outstanding debt level for 
unconstrained households, which is observed in the SCF data.    is a vector of variables that would 
determine the desired consumption levels and the resources that are available for paying for 
consumption. Following Jappelli (1990), Cox and Jappelli (1993), Duca and Rosenthal (1993), Crook 
(1996), and Crook (2001), the vector of    includes net worth, family income, permanent income 
which is constructed, homeownership, future expenses, attitudes towards debt, and demographics.   
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) are the selection equations needed for Equation (3.3). Equation 
(3.4) defines the probability of demand for debt and Equation (3.5) defines the probability of not 
having any borrowing constraints.  
   (   )                 
where    is an unobserved or latent variable and the observed variable, B, is defined by the following 
equation.  
if    > 0   B = 1 and household desires positive debt 
if    < 0   B = 0 and household does not desire positive debt 
    is a vector of variables that determine whether a household has demand for debt or not. 
Following Duca and Rosenthal (1993) and Crook (2001), the same variables determine the demand 
for debt and the level of desired debt. Thus, the vector of    is the same as the vector of   .  
   (   )               
where    is an unobserved or latent variable and represents excess supply of credit. The observed 
variable, C, is defined by the following equation.  
if    > 0   C = 1 and household does not have a borrowing constraint 
if    < 0   C= 0  and household has a borrowing constraint 
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Households will have borrowing constraints only when they demand more debt than lenders will 
grant them, that is when they have excess demand for debt. Thus, following the literature (Jappelli 
1990; Cox and Jappelli 1993; Duca and Rosenthal 1993; Crook 1996; Crook 2001),    consists of 
variables that determine whether a household has demand for debt or not (the demand side) and 
additional borrower characteristics which affect lenders’ decisions on how much loan to grant and 
which are used in credit scoring models (the supply side). In particular,     consists of    and 
additional variables that proxy for past credit history. 26  
Following the literature, the error terms are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution 
and     is assumed to be zero (Cox and Jappelli 1993; Duca and Rosenthal 1993; Gropp et al. 1997; 
Crook 2001; Lyons 2003; Crook and Hochguertel 2006).  
   ~ N(0,  
 ) ;     ~ N(0,1) ;    ~ N(0,1) ;   
corr (   ,   )=     ; corr (   ,   )=     ; corr (   ,   )=       
In order to estimate equation (3.3), the desired stock of debt, a two-step procedure is applied. 
First, equations (3.4) and (3.5) are estimated and conditional on this estimation, equation (3.3) is 
estimated. Following Duca and Rosenthal (1993), when      , the two-step procedure is as 
follows: 
1- Estimate    and    by running a univariate probit on equations (3.4) and (3.5) 
2- Then compute the inverse Mills ratios (λ1 and λ2) and evaluate inverse Mills ratios at      
and       respectively.
27 
3- Finally, include λ1 and λ2 in equation (3.3) as additional explanatory variables and run an 
OLS on this regression for a sample of unconstrained households that hold positive debt.  
Following the argument by Duca and Rosenthal (1993), consistent estimates of    will be 
obtained from this procedure. However, standard errors will not be correct. In order to generate 
correct standard errors, resampling is applied and standard errors are bootstrapped. For 
bootstrapping, the replicate weights that are provided in the SCF data are used.  
A similar issue arises with permanent income. Permanent income, which is one of the 
explanatory variables, is constructed following Cox and Jappelli (1993) and King and Dicks-Mireaux 
(1981). Due to the fact that this variable is not observed but instead estimated, there is measurement 
                                                          
26
 While some of the previous literature (Cox and Jappelli 1993; Gropp et al. 1997) uses regional dummies to control 
for different regulations and characteristics of credit markets, this study does not control for such affects because 
this information is not provided in the publicly available SCF dataset. 
27
 Inverse Mills ratio for selection equation (3.4), the probability of demand for debt is:  
 (    )
 (    )
 where f( ) is the 
probability density function and F( ) is the cumulative distribution function.  
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error involved with this variable. One main concern with measurement error with an independent 
variable is that it can raise endogeneity and OLS estimates can be inconsistent. Since, the existing 
literature on household debt did not raise any endogeneity issue for this constructed permanent 
income, this paper assumes that this constructed permanent income variable is exogenous (Cox and 
Jappelli, 1993; Lyons, 2003; Crook and Hochguertel, 2006). Based on Wooldridge (2002, page 74), 
in this case OLS estimation will produce consistent estimates but will have inflated error variance 
and thus, inflated variance for the parameter estimates. Therefore, in order to generate correct 
standard errors, bootstrapping is used.    
An additional issue is the simultaneity between net worth and debt. Following the argument 
by Duca and Rosenthal (1993), borrowing to finance nondurable consumption immediately lowers 
net wealth and thus, there is a simultaneous relationship between net worth and demand for debt, and 
between net worth and desired debt level. In addition, the observed level of net worth is sensitive to 
whether the household is credit constrained or not. Therefore, following Duca and Rosenthal (1993) 
and Cox and Jappelli (1993), net worth in equations (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) are all instrumented.  
Net worth is instrumented by variables that are correlated with net worth but have no direct 
effect on demand for debt, outstanding debt levels, and probability of being credit constrained and 
are not correlated to error terms in equations (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5). The instruments used in this study 
are from the literature: spouse’s years of education, whether household head or spouse received a 
large inheritance in the past or expects to receive an inheritance in the future, and the natural log of 
value of expected inheritance (Cox and Jappelli, 1993; Duca and Rosenthal, 1993).28 Both the years 
of education and inheritance information can proxy for a family’s socio- economic status and thus, 
can be good candidates in proxying net worth. Also, the inheritances are concentrated among those 
households that are at the top of the wealth distribution and they can differentiate between 
households with high net worth versus low net worth levels. Table 3.1 gives a detailed description of 
variables that are considered in the vector of   ,   ,      as well as the variables used in 
instrumenting net worth. 
As the second step, the estimated coefficients from equation (3.3) are used to predict the 
desired stock of debt for the constrained households (   
 ).  As the third step, the gap between 
desired stock of debt and actual stock of debt are calculated for each year, as in equation (3.6), and 
the gap measure in 2007 is compared to the one in 1998.  
 
                                                          
28
 Lag of net worth is not used as an instrument because data is cross section data.  
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    (   )         (
  ̅̅̅̅
    
 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (   )   
 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
   ̅̅ ̅ is the average of the outstanding debt that is observed in the SCF data.    
 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average 
of the desired stock of debt for unconstrained households. Given that unconstrained households 
borrow their desired debt levels,    
 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = average of outstanding debt levels for unconstrained 
households.    
 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average of the desired stock of debt for constrained households.   is the 
probability of being unconstrained and (   ) is the probability of being credit constrained.  
 
3.5 Variables 
 
The sample of households with borrowing constraints include households that were denied 
credit or could not get as much credit as they applied for, or  were discouraged from applying for 
credit. Specifically, a household is considered to have a borrowing constraint if it answered yes to 
any of the following questions: 
- In the past five years, has a particular lender or creditor turned down any request you made for 
credit or not given you as much credit as you applied for? 
- Was there any time in the past five years that you thought of applying for credit at a particular 
place, but changed your mind because you thought you might be turned down? 
The previously denied households that reapplied for credit and were able to receive the full amount 
they requested, are not included in the sample of constrained households.   
The discouraged households are included in the sample of constrained households because 
the findings by Jappelli (1990) suggest that characteristics of individuals that are turned down for 
their credit applications and individuals that are discouraged from applying for credit are similar and 
that discouraged individuals would have been rejected if they had applied for credit.  
The variable net worth that is used in estimating desired debt and the probability of having 
borrowing constraints, is defined in Appendix D. The effect of net worth on desired debt levels is 
ambiguous. Households with high net worth levels can have less need to borrow against their future 
income to smooth their consumption and thus, the amount of debt they demand can be low. On the 
other hand, with increasing net worth, if a household would like to upgrade their homes, they will 
demand more debt. On the supply side, the effect of net worth on debt ceiling is positive. Any lender 
would predict a household with high net worth levels as less risky and will grant more or higher 
loans to those households. Due to the ambiguous effect of net worth on desired debt, the effect of net 
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worth on excess demand for debt and the probability of being unconstrained are predicted to be 
ambiguous.  
Under the assumption that households get mortgage loans to buy homes, homeowners can be 
a proxy for individuals with good credit history and the debt ceiling is expected to be higher for 
homeowners. From the demand side, it is possible that individuals purchased their homes because 
they were willing to take on larger debt. Homeowners can also choose to upgrade their homes if they 
are willing to take on larger debt. Therefore, the effect of homeownership on desired debt is 
predicted to be positive. An increase in the desired debt and the debt ceiling will have an ambiguous 
effect on the excess demand for debt and the probability of being unconstrained.  
As current income increases, a household’s demand for durables can increase, resulting in an 
increase in demand for debt. On the other hand, the same household’s need to borrow to finance 
current consumption can decline which would lower the demand for debt. On the supply side, lenders 
will anticipate greater ability of households to repay their loans and will increase the debt ceiling and 
grant larger amounts of loans. The ambiguous effect on the demand for debt and an increase in the 
debt ceiling will have an ambiguous effect on excess demand for debt and the probability of being 
unconstrained.  
The construction of permanent income is based on Cox and Jappelli (1993) and King and 
Dicks-Mireaux (1981) and is available in Appendix E. Following the life cycle hypothesis, an 
increase in permanent income raises desired consumption (including durable goods) and thus, desired 
borrowing levels. In anticipation of greater ability of households to repay their loans, lenders will 
increase the debt ceiling, resulting in an ambiguous effect on the excess demand for debt and the 
probability of being unconstrained.  
Highly educated households are expected to have greater future income. Thus, the demand 
for debt and debt ceiling are expected to be greater for highly educated households. Thus, the 
relationship of the probability of being unconstrained with education level is ambiguous. On the 
other hand, being unemployed proxies for low expected future income, resulting in a decline in 
desired consumption, desired debt, and debt ceiling. Likewise, the relation of the probability of being 
unconstrained with being unemployed is ambiguous.  
Following the literature, age is defined by a spline function. According to LCPIH, individuals 
have the highest level of desired stock of debt during their middle-ages and a spline function for age 
captures the life cycle features of desired debt. Based on Cox and Jappelli (1993), the spline function 
is defined as: 
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Age(1) = Age if age ≤ 24, Age(1) = 24 otherwise, 
Age(2) = Min (Age – 24, 10) if age > 24, Age(2) = 0 otherwise, 
Age(3) = Min (Age – 34, 10) if age > 34, Age(3) = 0 otherwise, 
Age(4) = Min (Age – 44, 10) if age > 44, Age(4) = 0 otherwise, 
Age(5) = Min (Age – 54, 10) if age > 54, Age(5) = 0 otherwise, 
Age(6) = Age – 64 if age > 64, Age(6) = 0 otherwise. 
Following Jappelli (1990) and Crook (1996), age has an ambiguous relationship with the 
probability of being unconstrained. Debt ceiling is likely to increase as the household head ages 
because the probability of default declines as the individual ages. On the demand side, there are two 
effects. If young household heads expect their income in future periods to be much greater than their 
current income, they will demand more debt compared to older household heads. If the rate of time 
preference is low relative to the real rate of interest, the household will delay consumption and the 
desired consumption and debt will increase with age. Due to the ambiguous effect of age on demand 
for debt, the net effect of age on the probability of being unconstrained is ambiguous.  
Following Jappelli (1990)’s argument, married households can have lower desired 
consumption because of economies of scale in the consumption of durables. On the other hand, they 
may demand more debt especially if the spouse is not working and the household head needs to take 
care of both him and his spouse. From the supply side, lenders will increase the debt ceiling and 
grant greater loan amounts because married couples are less mobile and both the husband and wife 
can be responsible for repaying the loan. Therefore, excess demand for debt and probability of being 
unconstrained are ambiguous for married couples.   
The effect of race and gender on the probability of being unconstrained is ambiguous. Non-
whites and females may have lower desired borrowing and may be granted lower amounts of loan 
due to lower expected future income, resulting in an ambiguous effect on excess demand for loans. 
As family size increases, desired consumption increases and so does the desired debt level. Findings 
by Crook et al. (1992) show that the probability of default rises with the number of children and thus, 
the debt ceiling is predicted to decline, resulting in a greater excess demand for debt and lower 
probability of being unconstrained. Crook (1996) argues that households with foreseeable large 
expenses in the next 5 to 10 years are credit constrained and would desire higher debt to pay for those 
expenses. The excess demand for debt is predicted to be higher and thus a negative relation with the 
probability of being unconstrained is expected.   
Households’ preferences for holding debt are proxied based on how they feel towards 
borrowing and whether they are risk averse. Households that are willing to borrow to finance 
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educational and living expenses, expenses of a vacation, and purchase of luxury items will hold more 
debt and from the supply side, lenders will be unwilling to grant them high amounts of loans. So, the 
excess amount of desired debt will increase and the probability of being unconstrained will decline. 
On the other hand, risk averse households will be willing to hold less debt or save more and wait to 
consume at later stages in their lives when they are financially more secure. So, it is expected that 
risk averse households will desire less debt.  From the supply side, the debt ceiling will be higher for 
risk averse households because lenders will perceive risk averse households to be less likely to 
default. The excess demand for debt will decline and the probability of being unconstrained is 
expected to be greater for risk-averse households.  
Expectations about interest rates 5 years from now can also affect the willingness of 
households to consume today and to borrow. If households expect interest rates to be lower in the 
next 5 years, they will probably prefer to save and invest today, and wait to borrow and consume. 
Thus, their desired debt is expected to be low. From the supply side, lenders would prefer to grant 
loans at higher interest rates today so current debt ceilings are expected to be high. The excess 
demand for debt is expected to decline. 
All of the variables above are included as regressors in determining both the desired stock of 
debt and the probability of being unconstrained. Additional regressors, which are generally requested 
in loan application forms, are considered in determining the probability of being unconstrained. 
These regressors are number of credit cards, whether household has checking account, whether 
household received public assistance, time at current job, time at current address, and whether 
household had any problems making previous loan payments. The time at current job and time at 
current address proxy for household’s mobility and can be important factors in lenders’ decisions on 
whether to grant loans or not.    
 
3.6 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The SCF data is collected every three years by the Federal Reserve Board and gives detailed 
information about households’ wealth, income, use of financial services, past and current 
employment histories, retirement plans associated with their previous and current jobs, and 
demographics. The sample in the SCF data is based on a dual-frame design and due to this structure 
of the survey, the SCF data oversamples wealthy households. In order to adjust for the oversampling 
of wealthy households, SCF staff constructed sampling weights by using the post-stratification 
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technique and these sampling weights are provided in the dataset. Kennickell, et al. (1996) give 
detailed information on sampling and how these weights are constructed.   
The SCF staff imputed the missing data in the dataset by using the multiple imputation 
technique. The SCF staff applies the multiple imputation technique through six iterations. The sixth 
iteration produces the five implicates published in the dataset. Kennickell (1991) gives detailed 
information on multiple imputations.  
The analysis throughout the paper takes into consideration the sampling weights. In addition, 
the analysis is based on implicate 1 because replicate weights, that are used in bootstrapping, are 
provided by the SCF staff for only implicate 1.  Observations with missing permanent income and 
negative family income are deleted and all dollar values are expressed in 2007 dollars. The 
distributions for total debt, net worth, income, permanent income, and inheritance value that 
household expects to receive are highly skewed. Thus, a log transformation has been applied to these 
variables in order to normalize them. 29   
 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the descriptive statistics for 1998 and 2007 and these statistics are 
adjusted for population by using the sampling weights that are provided by the SCF staff. In both 
tables, the first two columns show the statistics for the whole population and the other columns 
display the statistics for the debt holders, non-debt holders, unconstrained households, and 
constrained households. The difference columns show t-test results for the differences between debt 
holders and non-debt holders, and the differences between unconstrained households and constrained 
households.  
Table 3.2 statistics show that in 1998, 78.6 percent of households were in debt and 82.3 
percent of them did not have any borrowing constraints. The average natural log of total debt was 
8.233, of net worth was 10.684, of income was 10.728, and of permanent income was 9.462. In 
addition, 72.2 percent of households owned their principal residences. Only 3 percent of household 
heads were unemployed and were looking for work, and 8.5 percent of household heads were black. 
Fifty-three percent of households had foreseeable large expenses such as educational expenses or 
purchases of a new home or other durable goods that they had to pay in the next 5 to 10 years. 
                                                          
29
 Following Crook and Hochguertel (2006), if x < 0 then the following transformation has been applied: -ln(1-x). If 
x > 0 then the transformation is: ln (1+x).  
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Thirty-three percent of households were risk averse and 66.1 percent of households expected interest 
rates to be higher 5 years from then. Households had on average 4 credit cards. Household heads had 
been working for their current employer for approximately 7 years. Furthermore, 41.9 percent of 
households almost always or always paid off total balances owed on their credit cards each month, 
and 63.5 percent were timely on their loan payments and made the previous year’s loan or mortgage 
payments as scheduled or ahead of schedule.    
Table 3.3 shows the statistics for 2007. Only 80.6 percent of households were in debt and 
84.1 percent of households did not have any borrowing constraints. An average of 73.8 percent of 
households owned their principal residences. Only 2.3 percent of household heads were unemployed, 
70.4 percent were married, 9.6 percent were black and 54.2 percent of households had foreseeable 
large expenses that they had to pay in the future. In addition, 91.3 percent of households had 
checking accounts and 6.5 percent of households received welfare. The household heads had been 
working for their current employer for approximately 7 years, 41.8 percent of households almost 
always or always paid off total balances on their credit cards, and 62.2 percent were timely on their 
loan payments.  
In both 1998 and 2007, debt holders had higher income and permanent income. In addition, 
when debt holders are compared to households that do not hold debt, a smaller percentage of debt 
holders were unemployed, older and risk averse in their savings or investments. In addition, fewer 
debt holders received welfare, lived longer years within 25 miles of their current addresses, almost 
always or always paid off total balance owed on their credit cards, and did not have any type of loan 
or mortgage payments during the previous year. On the other hand, a higher percentage of debt 
holders owned homes. In both 1998 and 2007, households that held debt exceeded households 
without any debt by approximately 20 percent in their homeownership. In addition, greater 
percentages of debt holders also were more educated and married, had a larger family and 
foreseeable large expenses in the next 5 to 10 years, and were willing to borrow to finance vacation 
expenses, living expenses, purchase of luxury items, purchase of a car or educational expenses. A 
higher percentage of debt holders, by 15.2 percent in 1998 and 19.5 percent in 2007, also had 
checking accounts. Household heads that held debt had been working longer years, 3 to 4 years more, 
for their current employers. A higher percentage of debt holders were timely on their loan payments, 
by 71 to 76 percent.  
In both 1998 and 2007, unconstrained households had higher net worth and income, and 
more education. A higher percentage of unconstrained households, by around 29 or 30 percent more, 
owned homes. In addition, greater percentages of unconstrained households were also older and 
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married, expected interest rates to be about the same 5 years from now, and had a checking account. 
Unconstrained households had more credit cards, and had been working longer years for their current 
employers than constrained households. In terms of credit history, a higher percentage of 
unconstrained households almost always or always paid off total balance owed on their credit cards 
and were timely on their loan payments than constrained households. Lower percentages of 
unconstrained households were black, had large families and foreseeable large expenses in the next 5 
to 10 years, and were willing to borrow to finance vacation expenses, living expenses, or educational 
expenses. In addition, lower percentages of unconstrained households were risk averse in their 
savings or investments, expected interest rates to be higher 5 years from now, and received welfare.  
 
3.7 Results 
 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 display regression results for equations (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) that are 
discussed in section 3.4. In these regressions, the survey nature of the SCF data was adjusted for by 
the sampling weights and bootstrap was run with the replicate weights that are provided in the data. 
In particular, Table 3.4 displays the results for 1998 and Table 3.5 displays the results for 2007. 
Table 3.6 displays the gap measures. The regression results obtained from permanent income 
construction are displayed in Appendix E (Table E.1), but are not discussed here.  
 In Table 3.4, the findings corresponding to “Natural Log of Stock of Debt: Eq (3.3)” show 
that, in 1998, homeownership, income, and permanent income had a positive relation with the 
desired stock of debt. A 1 percent increase in family income would increase the desired stock of debt 
by 0.249 percent. Likewise, a 1 percent increase in permanent income would increase the desired 
stock by 0.952 percent. The natural logarithm of desired debt increased by 0.053 when household 
head got one year older when he is in the range of 44 to 54 years old. The desired stock of debt was 
lower for risk averse households. Likewise, in Table 3.5 the findings corresponding to “Natural Log 
of Stock of Debt: Eq (3.3)”, also support greater desired debt for homeowners and households with 
high income and permanent income, and support lower desired debt for households that are risk 
averse in their savings or investments. In addition, the desired stock of debt was greater for 
household heads that were married, that had more family members, and that were willing to borrow 
to finance educational expenses. In addition, the unemployed households demanded less debt, but 
younger households, households with foreseeable large expenses, and households that were willing 
to borrow to finance the purchase of a car demanded more debt, but only at the 10 percent 
significance levels.  
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The positive effect of homeownership, income, family size, and having foreseeable large 
expenses, and the negative effect of being unemployed and risk averse on desired debt are consistent 
with the findings of Duca and Rosenthal (1993), Crook (2001), and Crook and Hochguertel (2006). 
Consistent with the previous literature, the effect of permanent income on desired debt is found to be 
significant and positive (Cox and Jappelli 1993; Crook and Hochguertel 2006). Even though some of 
the previous literature has found desired debt to be negatively related with household heads’ age in 
the later stages of their lives and a positive relation with age for household heads that are in their 
early-20’s, this study finds a positive relation with age for household heads that are in age ranges of 
44 to 54 in addition to early-20’s (Cox and Jappelli 1993; Crook and Hochguertel 2006; Gropp et al. 
1997). This finding with respect to age ranges of 44 to 54 is not inconsistent with Crook (2001) who 
found a negative relation with age for household heads that are older than 54.  
 The findings displayed in Table 3.4, with respect to columns corresponding to “Debt 
Holders: Eq (3.4)”, show that in 1998, net worth had a negative relation with the likelihood of 
holding debt. For instance, if net worth increased from $5,000 to $15,000, the probability of holding 
debt declined by 3.08 percent.30 Households that owned homes were more likely to hold debt, by 
34.2 percent, than households that did not own homes. In addition, income, permanent income, and 
years of education also had a positive effect on the probability of holding debt. Unemployed and risk 
averse households were less likely to hold debt. However, households with large families and 
foreseeable large expenses that they had to pay in the next 5 to 10 years, and households that were 
willing to borrow to finance their vacation expenses and car purchases were more likely to hold debt. 
The findings displayed in Table 3.5, with respect to columns corresponding to “Debt Holders: Eq 
(3.4)”, are similar to the results displayed in Table 3.4. Different than Table 3.4 results, in 2007, 
household heads that were younger than 24 years old or aged between 34 and 45 were more likely to 
hold debt as they aged, but only at the 10% significance level. However, household heads’ education 
levels and households’ attitudes towards credit to finance vacation expenses did not have any effect 
on the probability of holding debt.   
With respect to the probability of being unconstrained, Eq (3.5), the findings displayed in 
Table 3.4 show that in 1998, household heads were more likely to be unconstrained as they aged, 
particularly after age 54. Households with large foreseeable expenses in the next 5 to 10 years and 
households that were willing to borrow to finance their living expenses and purchase of luxury items 
were less likely to be unconstrained. As households stayed longer in their current neighborhood, and 
                                                          
30
 [Ln($15,000) – Ln ($5,000)]*0.028 = 0.0308 
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had good credit history and almost always or always paid off their total balances in their credit cards 
and were timely on their loan payments, they were more likely to be unconstrained. The findings 
displayed in Table 3.5, with respect to columns corresponding to “Unconstrained: Eq (3.5)” show 
that in 2007, net worth had a negative effect on the probability of being unconstrained. Households 
that owned homes were 18 percent more likely to be unconstrained. In addition, households were 
more likely to be unconstrained as households had more permanent income and as they aged, 
particularly for the age group between 44 and 55 years old and after age 64. Households with black 
and male household heads and foreseeable large expenses in the next 5 to 10 years, that are willing to 
borrow to finance living and educational expenses, and that are risk averse in their savings or 
investments were less likely to be unconstrained. As households had good credit history; for instance, 
had many credit cards, did not receive any type of welfare, had job stability and had been working 
for the current job for a while, almost always or always paid off credit card balances, and were timely 
on their loan payments; they were more likely to be unconstrained. The positive effect of 
homeownership, age, number of credit cards, having lived longer in current address, and having a 
good credit history and the negative effect of being black, having foreseeable large expenses in the 
next 5 to 10 years, and having received welfare on probability of being unconstrained are consistent 
with the previous literature findings (Jappelli 1990; Cox and Jappelli 1993; Duca and Rosenthal 
1993; Crook 1996; Crook 2001).  
 Table 3.6 shows the averages for desired and actual stocks of debt. These averages are 
displayed for unconstrained and constrained households in 1998 and 2007. Since the unconstrained 
households can receive the full amount of debt that they demand, in Table 3.6 the desired and actual 
stocks of debt for unconstrained households are displayed as equal to each other. Table 3.6 also 
shows the probabilities of being unconstrained and constrained, and the last two columns of Table 
3.6 show average values for the gap percentages in 1998 and 2007.  
The findings displayed in Table 3.6 show that households, on overall, had higher desired debt 
levels and lower probabilities of being credit constrained in 2007 than in 1998. In addition, when the 
findings are computed for each subgroup of households, which is listed in Table 3.6, it is found that 
higher desired debt levels are observed in each of the subgroups. However, the decline in the 
probability of being credit constrained is observed in only some of the subgroups. Households with 
household heads that are 34 years old or are younger and household heads that are between 44 and 65 
years old had lower probabilities of being credit constrained in 2007 than in 1998. The decline in the 
probability of being credit constrained is also observed for households with income levels greater 
than $60,000.  
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The findings displayed in Table 3.6 show that the overall borrowing gap increased from 
38.91 percent in 1998 to 41.6 percent in 2007. However, the results show a declining gap for 
households with household heads that are 34 years old or younger or are between 54 and 65 years 
old. For instance, household heads that were 24 years old or younger, were able to borrow more and 
held 8.54 percent more of their desired debt in 2007. Likewise, household heads that were between 
54 and 65 years old were able to borrow more and held 5.79 percent more of their desired debt in 
2007. In addition, the gap levels also declined for households that had family income between 
$30,000 and $60,000 and for high income households that had income levels above $345,000. For 
instance, households with income levels between $30,000 and $60,000 held 5.13 percent more of 
their desired debt in 2007. The result with respect to high income households is consistent with the 
findings of the previous literature that high income households may also have benefited from relaxed 
lending standards (Foote et al. 2008; Keys et al. 2009).  
 
  3.8 Conclusions 
 
Following the 2007 subprime crisis, a great number of papers have looked into factors that 
may have contributed to this crisis. Most of these papers have used loan level data and identified 
relaxed lending standards as one of the contributors to the crisis. This paper adds to the existing 
literature on the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis and the relaxed lending standards. Using the Survey 
of Consumer Finances (SCF) data from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, this study aims to 
show evidence of changing characteristics of lending under easy credit conditions. As evidence, this 
study examines households’ debt levels and in particular, the gap between households’ desired and 
outstanding debt levels. The gap levels from 1998 are compared to the gap levels in 2007 and the 
following hypothesis is tested: The gap between desired and actual stock of debt was lower in 2007 
than 1998. The year 1998 reflects the period when subprime lending was popular but before relaxed 
lending standards and 2007 reflects the period after which relaxed lending standards had been in 
effect for some time. This paper is the first, among the previous literature on the 2007 subprime 
mortgage crisis, to analyze this gap to investigate the changing characteristics of lending under 
relaxed lending standards.  
The gap measure is constructed in three steps following Cox and Jappelli (1993) because the 
desired stock of debt is not directly observed. The first step is to estimate the desired stock of debt by 
using the outstanding debt levels given that the sample is limited to the unconstrained households 
that desire positive debt. This process is applied through three-equation-generalized-Tobit. The 
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second step is to compute the desired stock of debt for constrained households by using the estimated 
coefficients from the first step. The third step is to calculate the difference between the predicted debt 
and the observed debt levels. These steps are applied for each year, 1998 and 2007 and then, the gap 
levels in 2007 are compared to the gap levels in 1998.  
While conducting the analysis, the standard errors are bootstrapped, net worth is 
instrumented, and oversampling of high income households is corrected through the sampling 
weights that are provided with the SCF data. Furthermore, permanent income is estimated and the 
regressions control for the permanent income.  
The findings show greater desired debt levels and lower probabilities of being credit 
constrained. In addition, the findings show a declining gap in particular for households with income 
levels between $30,000 and $60,000 and for households with income levels above $345,000. The 
findings also display a declining gap for households with household heads that are 34 years old or 
younger and household heads between 54 and 65 years old.  
A decline in the gap levels indicates that constrained households borrowed more of their 
desired debt levels and this can signal greater loan opportunities for constrained households and an 
increase in risky loans. Thus, in the future, the regulators can take the decline in the gap levels as a 
warning mechanism for changing lending characteristics under relaxed lending standards. 
Specifically, Financial Stability Oversight Council can consider decline in the gap as a warning for 
systemic risk because following the 2007 crisis there was a collapse in the U.S. financial system. The 
Financial Stability Oversight Council can take preventive measures and make recommendations to 
the Federal Reserve Board before the U.S. financial stability is threatened. The financial regulators 
(including the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) should enforce regulations to protect 
consumers from the changing lending practices and make sure consumers are protected from any bad 
lending practices.  
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3.10 Tables 
  
Table 3.1. List of Variables and Definitions 
  
X1: Ln Desired Debt Level* or X2:Demand for Debt 
 
Definition 
Ln net worth * 
Net worth (constructed, see Appendix D) in 2007 dollars 
then transformed to natural log 
Homeownership 1 if owns a home 
Ln income * 
Family's total annual income from all sources (wages, 
interest income, dividends, capital gains, unemployment 
compensation, retirement income, etc.) in 2007 dollars then 
transformed to natural log 
Ln permanent income * 
Permanent income (constructed, see Appendix E) in 2007 
dollars then transformed to natural log 
Years of education Household head's years of education 
Current employment status 1 if household head is unemployed and looking for work 
Age Spline function for age 
Married 1 if household head is married 
Black 1 if household head is african-american 
Female 1 if household head is female 
Family size Number of people in the household 
Foreseeable large expenses 
1 if in the next 5 to 10 years, there are foreseeable large 
expenses (educational expenses, purchases of a new home or 
other durable goods, health care costs, etc.) that the 
household has to pay 
Whether household feels it is all right to 
borrow to finance  
vacation expenses 1 if yes, to finance expenses of a vacation trip 
living expenses 1 if yes, to cover living expenses when income is cut 
purchase of luxury items 
1 if yes, to finance the purchase of luxury items (fur coat, 
jewelry) 
purchase of a car 1 if yes, to finance the purchase of a car 
educational expenses 1 if yes, to finance educational expenses 
Risk averse 
1 if household head or spouse not willing to take any 
financial risk when they save or make investments 
Expectation about interest rates 5 years 
from now 
Household head's expectation about interest rates 5 years 
from now 1: if higher, 2: if lower, 3: if about the same 
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Table 3.1. List of Variables and Definitions (Continued) 
X3: Additional Variables (Has No Borrowing Constraint) 
 
Definition 
Number of credit cards Number of any type of credit cards 
Has checking account 1 if family has checking account 
Welfare 
1 if family received any income from ADC, AFDC, 
food stamps, or other forms of welfare 
Time at current address 
How many years has the family lived within 25 
miles of their current address 
Time at current job 
Number of years household head worked for the 
current employer 
Credit history 
 
Almost always/always pay off balance on credit 
cards 
1 if always / almost always household pays off total 
balance owed on credit cards each month 
No loan 
1 if household did not have any type of loan or 
mortgage payments during the last year 
Timely on loan payments 
1 if during the last year all loan or mortgage 
payments were made as scheduled or ahead of 
schedule 
  
  
Instrumenting Net Worth 
Spouse's years of education Spouse's years of education 
Whether received inheritance in the past 
1 if household head or spouse received an 
inheritance or been given substantial assets in a trust 
or in some other form 
Expected inheritance 
1 if household head or spouse expect to receive 
substantial inheritance or transfer of assets 
Ln expected inheritance * 
Value of expected inheritance or transfer of assets 
(in 2007 dollars) then transformed to natural log  
* if x > = 0 then ln (1+x) ; if x < 0 then -ln (1-x) 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for 1998                       
 
All Debt Holders 
Non-debt 
Holders 
Difference Unconstrained Constrained Difference 
 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Hold debt 0.786 0.009 1.000 0.000 na na na na 0.774 0.010 0.838 0.018 -0.063
***
 0.020 
Unconstrained 0.823 0.008 0.811 0.010 0.866 0.015 -0.055
***
 0.018 1.000 0.000 na na na na 
Ln total debt 8.233 0.098 10.481 0.043 0.000 0.000 10.481
***
 0.043 8.205 0.111 8.364 0.198 -0.159 0.227 
Ln net worth 10.684 0.127 10.627 0.153 10.895 0.181 -0.268 0.237 11.406 0.121 7.326 0.402 4.080
***
 0.420 
Homeownership 0.722 0.009 0.766 0.010 0.562 0.023 0.204
***
 0.025 0.775 0.009 0.477 0.026 0.298
***
 0.027 
Ln income 10.728 0.032 10.890 0.033 10.138 0.078 0.752
***
 0.085 10.818 0.032 10.311 0.096 0.507
***
 0.101 
Ln permanent 
income 
9.462 0.033 9.807 0.028 8.200 0.089 1.607
***
 0.093 9.362 0.039 9.930 0.040 -0.568
***
 0.056 
Years of 
education 
13.180 0.063 13.506 0.065 11.985 0.154 1.521
***
 0.168 13.266 0.070 12.777 0.134 0.489
***
 0.151 
Current 
employment 
status 
0.030 0.004 0.025 0.004 0.047 0.010 -0.022
**
 0.010 0.027 0.004 0.045 0.011 -0.018 0.011 
Age 47.056 0.352 44.258 0.335 57.308 0.902 -13.051
***
 0.962 48.867 0.393 38.627 0.619 10.241
***
 0.733 
Married 0.724 0.010 0.752 0.011 0.624 0.022 0.128
***
 0.025 0.742 0.010 0.641 0.024 0.101
***
 0.026 
Black 0.085 0.006 0.078 0.007 0.109 0.014 -0.031
**
 0.016 0.073 0.006 0.141 0.018 -0.069
***
 0.019 
Female 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
Family size 2.878 0.031 3.046 0.035 2.263 0.054 0.782
***
 0.064 2.808 0.032 3.203 0.086 -0.395
***
 0.092 
Foreseeable 
large expenses 
0.530 0.011 0.568 0.012 0.391 0.022 0.177
***
 0.025 0.498 0.012 0.676 0.024 -0.177
***
 0.027 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for 1998 (Continued)                      
 
All Debt Holders 
Non-debt 
Holders 
Difference Unconstrained Constrained Difference 
 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Attitudes towards credit to finance:           
Vacation expenses 0.137 0.007 0.154 0.009 0.074 0.011 0.080
***
 0.014 0.128 0.008 0.178 0.020 -0.050
**
 0.021 
Living expenses  0.423 0.011 0.438 0.012 0.370 0.022 0.068
***
 0.025 0.391 0.012 0.571 0.025 -0.180
***
 0.028 
Purchase of luxury items  0.058 0.005 0.067 0.006 0.025 0.007 0.042
***
 0.009 0.052 0.005 0.086 0.014 -0.035
**
 0.015 
Purchase of a car 0.815 0.008 0.861 0.009 0.648 0.022 0.212
***
 0.024 0.812 0.009 0.831 0.019 -0.019 0.021 
Educational expenses 0.812 0.009 0.846 0.009 0.688 0.022 0.158
***
 0.024 0.797 0.010 0.880 0.017 -0.083
***
 0.019 
Risk averse 0.330 0.010 0.283 0.011 0.499 0.023 -0.216
***
 0.026 0.319 0.011 0.380 0.025 -0.061
**
 0.027 
Expectation about interest rates 5 years from now:          
Higher 0.661 0.010 0.681 0.011 0.589 0.023 0.091
***
 0.025 0.650 0.011 0.714 0.023 -0.064
**
 0.026 
Lower 0.058 0.005 0.051 0.005 0.084 0.012 -0.033
**
 0.013 0.055 0.005 0.075 0.013 -0.020 0.014 
About the same 0.281 0.010 0.268 0.011 0.327 0.022 -0.058
**
 0.024 0.296 0.011 0.211 0.021 0.084
***
 0.024 
Number of credit cards 3.879 0.084 4.343 0.096 2.179 0.153 2.164
***
 0.180 4.067 0.092 3.004 0.201 1.063
***
 0.221 
Has checking account 0.893 0.007 0.926 0.006 0.774 0.019 0.152
***
 0.020 0.916 0.007 0.788 0.020 0.128
***
 0.021 
Welfare 0.042 0.004 0.033 0.004 0.075 0.012 -0.043
***
 0.012 0.029 0.004 0.102 0.015 -0.073
***
 0.015 
Time at current address 37.943 0.802 35.829 0.894 45.684 1.745 -9.855
***
 1.961 39.390 0.884 31.204 1.870 8.186
***
 2.069 
Time at current job 7.291 0.199 8.101 0.224 4.323 0.403 3.778
***
 0.461 7.714 0.225 5.325 0.404 2.389
***
 0.463 
Almost always/always 
pay off  
0.419 0.011 0.397 0.012 0.499 0.023 -0.102
***
 0.026 0.479 0.012 0.136 0.017 0.343
***
 0.021 
No loan 0.206 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.961 0.008 -0.961
***
 0.008 0.216 0.010 0.159 0.017 0.057
***
 0.020 
Timely on loan payments 0.635 0.010 0.799 0.010 0.035 0.007 0.763
***
 0.012 0.661 0.011 0.517 0.026 0.144
***
 0.028 
Number of observations 3,332           
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics for 2007                      
 
All Debt Holders 
Non-debt 
Holders 
Difference Unconstrained Constrained Difference 
 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Hold debt 0.806 0.008 1.000 0.000 na na na na 0.802 0.009 0.827 0.020 -0.025 0.022 
Unconstrained 0.841 0.008 0.837 0.009 0.858 0.016 -0.021 0.019 1.000 0.000 na na na na 
Ln total debt 8.746 0.096 10.853 0.044 0.000 0.000 10.853
***
 0.044 8.821 0.106 8.347 0.222 0.474
*
 0.246 
Ln net worth 10.993 0.123 11.002 0.144 10.955 0.205 0.048 0.251 11.649 0.120 7.523 0.399 4.127
***
 0.417 
Homeownership 0.738 0.009 0.778 0.009 0.571 0.023 0.207
***
 0.025 0.784 0.009 0.494 0.026 0.290
***
 0.028 
Ln income 10.904 0.022 11.024 0.024 10.408 0.045 0.616
***
 0.051 10.978 0.025 10.513 0.043 0.465
***
 0.049 
Ln permanent 
income 
10.055 0.021 10.238 0.018 9.295 0.058 0.943
***
 0.061 10.046 0.024 10.104 0.029 -0.058 0.037 
Years of 
education 
13.378 0.059 13.622 0.061 12.367 0.157 1.255
***
 0.168 13.556 0.064 12.440 0.137 1.116
***
 0.152 
Current 
employment 
status 
0.023 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.048 0.010 -0.031
***
 0.011 0.019 0.003 0.048 0.011 -0.030
**
 0.012 
Age 48.445 0.354 46.344 0.341 57.166 1.019 -10.822
***
 1.075 49.919 0.392 40.652 0.692 9.267
***
 0.795 
Married 0.704 0.010 0.737 0.010 0.566 0.024 0.170
***
 0.026 0.727 0.010 0.581 0.026 0.146
***
 0.028 
Black 0.096 0.006 0.095 0.007 0.101 0.014 -0.006 0.015 0.079 0.006 0.190 0.021 -0.112
***
 0.022 
Female 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.004 -0.002 0.005 
Family size 2.826 0.029 2.965 0.033 2.248 0.060 0.718
***
 0.068 2.774 0.031 3.099 0.085 -0.324
***
 0.090 
Foreseeable 
large expenses 
0.542 0.010 0.572 0.011 0.418 0.023 0.154
***
 0.026 0.522 0.011 0.647 0.025 -0.125
***
 0.028 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics for 2007 (Continued)                     
 
All Debt Holders 
Non-debt 
Holders 
Difference Unconstrained Constrained Difference 
 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean 
Std 
Err 
Mean  
Std 
Err 
Attitudes towards credit to finance: 
           
Vacation expenses 0.138 0.007 0.148 0.008 0.095 0.014 0.053
***
 0.016 0.132 0.008 0.171 0.020 -0.040
*
 0.021 
Living expenses  0.509 0.010 0.531 0.012 0.419 0.023 0.112
***
 0.026 0.479 0.011 0.671 0.025 -0.193
***
 0.027 
Purchase of luxury 
items  
0.051 0.005 0.056 0.005 0.029 0.008 0.027
***
 0.010 0.050 0.005 0.058 0.012 -0.009 0.013 
Purchase of a car 0.816 0.008 0.860 0.008 0.633 0.023 0.228
***
 0.024 0.814 0.009 0.825 0.020 -0.010 0.022 
Educational expenses 0.838 0.008 0.876 0.008 0.680 0.022 0.196
***
 0.024 0.826 0.009 0.899 0.016 -0.072
***
 0.018 
Risk averse 0.361 0.010 0.318 0.011 0.541 0.024 -0.223
***
 0.026 0.337 0.011 0.490 0.026 -0.153
***
 0.028 
Expectation about interest rates 5 years from now: 
        
Higher 0.656 0.010 0.657 0.011 0.653 0.023 0.005 0.025 0.644 0.011 0.723 0.024 -0.079
***
 0.026 
Lower 0.077 0.006 0.076 0.006 0.082 0.013 -0.006 0.015 0.078 0.006 0.073 0.014 0.004 0.015 
About the same 0.267 0.009 0.267 0.010 0.266 0.021 0.001 0.024 0.279 0.010 0.204 0.021 0.075
***
 0.024 
Number of credit cards 3.494 0.073 3.897 0.083 1.821 0.125 2.075
***
 0.150 3.773 0.080 2.019 0.160 1.753
***
 0.179 
Has checking account 0.913 0.006 0.951 0.005 0.756 0.020 0.195
***
 0.021 0.933 0.006 0.808 0.020 0.125
***
 0.021 
Welfare 0.065 0.005 0.053 0.005 0.119 0.015 -0.066
***
 0.016 0.040 0.004 0.197 0.021 -0.157
***
 0.021 
Time at current address 37.049 0.748 35.959 0.827 41.570 1.729 -5.611
***
 1.917 37.290 0.809 35.774 1.964 1.516 2.124 
Time at current job 7.196 0.188 7.783 0.211 4.760 0.386 3.023
***
 0.440 7.680 0.212 4.638 0.351 3.041
***
 0.410 
Almost always/always 
pay off  
0.418 0.010 0.405 0.011 0.469 0.024 -0.064
**
 0.026 0.472 0.011 0.131 0.018 0.341
***
 0.021 
No loan 0.184 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.946 0.009 -0.946
***
 0.009 0.186 0.009 0.171 0.020 0.016 0.022 
Timely on loan 
payments 
0.622 0.010 0.760 0.010 0.047 0.009 0.713
***
 0.013 0.652 0.011 0.464 0.026 0.188
***
 0.028 
Number of 
observations 
3,511         
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.4. Regression Results for 1998             
Natural Log of Stock of Debt: Eq (3.3) 
 
Debt Holders: Eq (3.4) 
 
Unconstrained: Eq (3.5) 
 
Coeff  
Bootstrap 
Std Err  
dy/dx 
Delta-
method 
Std Err 
 
dy/dx 
Delta-
method 
Std Err 
Ln net worth -0.090 0.252 
 
-0.028
**
 0.012 
 
0.012 0.010 
Homeownership 3.177
**
 1.550 
 
0.342
***
 0.049 
 
0.031 0.047 
Ln income 0.249
**
 0.112 
 
0.016
**
 0.007 
 
0.002 0.006 
Ln permanent income 0.952
***
 0.135 
 
0.077
**
 0.031 
 
0.050 0.031 
Years of education 0.074
*
 0.038 
 
0.009
***
 0.003 
 
-0.002 0.003 
Current employment status -0.475 0.688 
 
-0.112
***
 0.035 
 
0.023 0.030 
age ≤ 24 0.084 0.105 
 
0.008 0.012 
 
-0.007 0.012 
24 < age ≤ 34 0.031 0.052 
 
0.005 0.006 
 
0.001 0.004 
34 < age ≤ 44 0.025 0.020 
 
0.006 0.004 
 
0.001 0.003 
44 < age ≤ 54 0.053*** 0.020 
 
0.004 0.003 
 
0.001 0.003 
54 < age ≤ 64 0.004 0.109 
 
-0.009 0.005 
 
0.016
***
 0.005 
64 < age  0.027 0.093 
 
0.004 0.006 
 
0.012
**
 0.006 
Married 0.036 0.169 
 
0.025
*
 0.015 
 
-0.021 0.013 
Black -0.118 0.271 
 
-0.006 0.018 
 
-0.034 0.023 
Female -0.085 0.233 
 
-0.080 0.117 
 
-0.027 0.101 
Family size 0.069 0.103 
 
0.014
***
 0.006 
 
-0.009
*
 0.005 
Foreseeable large expenses -0.030 0.323 
 
0.036
***
 0.012 
 
-0.039
***
 0.013 
Attitudes towards credit to finance: 
       
Vacation expenses 0.338 0.311 
 
0.070
***
 0.017 
 
-0.003 0.017 
Living expenses  -0.004 0.262 
 
0.009 0.011 
 
-0.040
***
 0.013 
Purchase of luxury items  0.025 0.223 
 
0.010 0.022 
 
-0.053
**
 0.025 
Purchase of a car 0.299 0.408 
 
0.087
***
 0.018 
 
-0.003 0.016 
Educational expenses -0.061 0.098 
 
-0.025
*
 0.015 
 
-0.026
*
 0.015 
Risk averse -0.424
**
 0.192 
 
-0.034
**
 0.015 
 
-0.006 0.013 
Expectation about interest rates 5 years from now: 
    
Lower -0.330
*
 0.180 
 
-0.027 0.027 
 
-0.034 0.024 
About the same 0.046 0.111 
 
-0.011 0.014 
 
0.008 0.015 
Number of credit cards n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.000 0.002 
Has checking account n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.010 0.031 
Welfare n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
-0.013 0.028 
Time at current address 
n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 (3.465E-04)
**
 
1.645E-
04 
Time at current job n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.001 0.001 
Almost always/always pay 
off  
n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.107
***
 0.024 
No loan n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.058
*
 0.030 
Timely on loan payments n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.055
**
 0.022 
Constant -7.691
*
 4.306             
Inverse Mills (debt holders) 1.903 2.912 
      
Inverse Mills (unconstrained) 0.239 2.994 
      
Number of observations 2,155  
 
3,332  
 
3,332  
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
  
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
 athrho       0.501
*
 0.304   -0.228 0.305 
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
    Omitted category in expectation about interest rates 5 years from now is "higher".  
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Table 3.5. Regression Results for 2007               
Natural Log of Stock of Debt: Eq (3.3) 
 
Debt Holders: Eq (3.4) 
 
Unconstrained: Eq (3.5) 
 
Coeff  
Bootstrap 
Std Err  
dy/dx 
Delta-
method Std 
Err 
 
dy/dx 
Delta-
method 
Std Err 
Ln net worth -0.622 0.398 
 
-0.046
***
 0.009 
 
-0.026
**
 0.011 
Homeownership 8.944
**
 4.199 
 
0.404
***
 0.028 
 
0.180
***
 0.058 
Ln income 0.620
*
 0.328 
 
0.027
***
 0.009 
 
-0.002 0.010 
Ln permanent income 2.288
**
 0.983 
 
0.085
***
 0.021 
 
0.108
***
 0.019 
Years of education 0.015 0.028 
 
0.004 0.003 
 
0.000 0.003 
Current employment status -3.200
*
 1.904 
 
-0.184
***
 0.052 
 
-0.047 0.038 
age ≤ 24 0.714* 0.419 
 
0.030
*
 0.015 
 
0.008 0.012 
24 < age ≤ 34 -0.019 0.033 
 
3.11E-05 0.004 
 
0.001 0.003 
34 < age ≤ 44 0.101 0.069 
 
0.005
*
 0.003 
 
0.001 0.002 
44 < age ≤ 54 0.107 0.080 
 
0.004 0.003 
 
0.013
***
 0.003 
54 < age ≤ 64 0.011 0.017 
 
-0.001 0.003 
 
0.003 0.003 
64 < age  -0.021 0.023 
 
-0.002 0.003 
 
0.018
***
 0.003 
Married 1.007
**
 0.413 
 
0.047
***
 0.016 
 
-0.003 0.017 
Black -0.319 0.415 
 
-0.004 0.024 
 
-0.060
***
 0.022 
Female -0.231 0.742 
 
-0.046 0.074 
 
0.138
***
 0.047 
Family size 0.143
**
 0.063 
 
0.014
***
 0.005 
 
0.005 0.005 
Foreseeable large expenses 0.446
*
 0.248 
 
0.035
***
 0.012 
 
-0.029
**
 0.012 
Attitudes towards credit to finance: 
       
Vacation expenses 0.042 0.230 
 
0.000 0.018 
 
-0.021 0.017 
Living expenses  0.086 0.094 
 
0.012 0.011 
 
-0.037
***
 0.011 
Purchase of luxury items  -0.118 0.194 
 
0.005 0.026 
 
-0.026 0.027 
Purchase of a car 1.637
*
 0.885 
 
0.112
***
 0.017 
 
-0.005 0.016 
Educational expenses 0.322
**
 0.128 
 
0.018 0.015 
 
-0.053
***
 0.017 
Risk averse -1.005
**
 0.453 
 
-0.060
***
 0.013 
 
-0.036
***
 0.014 
Expectation about interest rates 5 years from now: 
      
Lower -0.066 0.185 
 
-0.003 0.019 
 
0.013 0.019 
About the same -0.026 0.094 
 
0.009 0.011 
 
0.005 0.014 
Number of credit cards n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.005
**
 0.002 
Has checking account n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.041 0.025 
Welfare n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
-0.181
***
 0.041 
Time at current address n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.000 0.000 
Time at current job n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.003
***
 0.001 
Almost always/always pay 
off  
n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.125
***
 0.020 
No loan n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.114
***
 0.025 
Timely on loan payments n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.076
***
 0.019 
Constant -44.699
*
 25.894   n/a n/a   n/a n/a 
Inverse Mills (debt holders) 8.495
*
 4.931 
      
Inverse Mills (unconstrained) 1.802 1.751 
      
Number of observations 2,350  
 
3,511  
 
3,511  
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
  
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
 athrho       0.916
***
 0.247   0.682
***
 0.256 
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
   Omitted category in expectation about interest rates 5 years from now is "higher".  
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Table 3.6. Gap Calculations 
  
  
 
      
 
1998 
 
2007 
 
    
 
Unconstrained Constrained 
 
Unconstrained Constrained 
 
GAP  
 
Desired 
debt = 
Actual debt 
Prob. 
Actual 
debt 
Desired 
debt 
Prob. 
 
Desired 
debt = 
Actual debt 
Prob. 
Actual 
debt 
Desired 
debt 
Prob. 
 
1998 2007 
All $3,661 0.8076 $4,291 $16,666 0.1924 
 
$6,778 0.8185 $4,218 $28,732 0.1815 
 
0.3891 0.4160 
Subgroups 
              
Age ≤ 24 $1,846 0.6663 $151 $4,640 0.3337 
 
$2,259 0.7253 $137 $4,907 0.2747 
 
0.6847 0.5993 
24 < age ≤ 34 $11,405 0.6692 $2,743 $15,007 0.3308 
 
$19,957 0.7325 $3,605 $24,619 0.2675 
 
0.4076 0.3716 
34 < age ≤ 44 $19,137 0.7695 $7,073 $18,965 0.2305 
 
$25,541 0.7360 $8,579 $43,816 0.2640 
 
0.1775 0.3348 
44 < age ≤ 54 $16,860 0.8072 $10,105 $27,620 0.1928 
 
$20,655 0.8180 $10,083 $55,577 0.1820 
 
0.1808 0.3138 
54 < age ≤ 64 $3,528 0.8863 $9,861 $19,953 0.1137 
 
$9,291 0.8908 $2,737 $22,098 0.1092 
 
0.2724 0.2145 
64 < age  $45 0.9650 $4,166 $7,303 0.0350 
 
$232 0.9476 $1,281 $26,439 0.0524 
 
0.8275 0.8413 
               
Income ≤ 30,000) $153 0.7493 $365 $6,204 0.2507 
 
$197 0.7380 $381 $11,013 0.2620 
 
0.8865 0.9236 
30,000 < income 
≤ 60,000 
$2,125 0.7876 $8,074 $20,283 0.2124 
 
$3,858 0.7779 $6,290 $23,560 0.2221 
 
0.5298 0.4785 
60,000 < income 
≤ 100,000 
$16,805 0.8529 $29,549 $34,962 0.1471 
 
$26,873 0.8784 $59,689 $153,275 0.1216 
 
0.0612 0.2983 
100,000 < income 
≤ 345,000 
$29,500 0.9156 $56,686 $58,605 0.0844 
 
$52,107 0.9545 $122,725 $139,901 0.0455 
 
0.0289 0.0333 
345,000 < income $22,022 0.9530 $17,353 $165,981 0.0470 
 
$26,557 0.9711 $6,359 $178,955 0.0289 
 
0.2438 0.1772 
Note: The dollar values are converted from the natural log values. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE FHLB ADVANCE USE LEVELS 
FOR SMALL BANKS: A TOBIT ANALYSIS   
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This paper is motivated by the 2008 financial crisis that followed after the 2007 subprime 
mortgage crisis. During the crisis, the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system was an important 
source in providing liquidity to its member financial institutions. Small banks, which are defined as 
commercial banks with total assets less than $500 million, are among the member financial 
institutions that borrow from the system. The objective of this study is to examine the characteristics 
of small banks that utilize the FHLB advances and the determinants of advance use levels after the 
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act, which made membership in and borrowing from the FHLB 
system easier, but before the 2008 financial crisis. For the analysis, the Call Report data from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Summary of Deposits data from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation are used.  
The FHLB system consists of 12 Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) which provide low 
cost funding to their member financial institutions (community banks, commercial banks, thrifts, 
credit unions, community development financial institutions, and insurance companies). The system 
has been the greatest source of funding for mortgage lending to communities. However, the use of 
the FHLB system has not been limited to support of housing for communities. The system also 
provides funding for agricultural, rural, and small business loans, and low-income community 
developments, and offers low-cost credit products, AAA-rated letters of credit, AAA-rated deposit 
products, asset-purchase programs, correspondent services, and attractive stock dividends to its 
member financial institutions. Financial institutions can borrow advances immediately, once they 
join the FHLB system.31 However, the amount that is granted depends on collateral amounts and 
types of collateral that the members pledge. The interest rates that the system offers to its member 
banks can be a fixed rate, adjustable rate, or combination of fixed and adjustable rates. In addition, 
the maturities for the granted advances can range from overnight to 30 years. 
                                                          
31
 Secured loans given to members are called “advances”.   
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The role of the FHLB system in funding financial institutions improved after the structural 
changes that occurred in the banking sector in the 1990s and the 1999 GLB Act. Due to structural 
changes that occurred in the banking sector in the 1990s, deposit levels for small banks declined, 
resulting in difficulty for them to secure the necessary funds to service customer loan demands and a 
need for alternative funding sources such as the system advances. In addition, with the 1999 GLB 
Act, the FHLB system became more accessible, specifically in an environment where small banks 
were experiencing declining deposit levels and needed alternative funding sources.   
What were the structural changes that led to the decline in deposit levels? First, technological 
advances in the financial sector increased access to online banking services, electronic transfer of 
funds, ATMs, and phone banking. These services encouraged some bank customers in rural areas to 
change from depositing in local banks to using larger banks or online services of larger banks (Frizell 
2002; Jeon 1999). Furthermore, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994, which allowed nationwide banking, resulted in increased competition for customers among 
national, regional and local banks.32 Increased availability of funds and financial innovation in 
financial markets, like money market funds, also heightened the competitiveness for deposit funds 
(Frizell 2002; Jeon 1999).  
Second, demographics changed in rural areas. The younger generation that was educated 
migrated out of rural communities to work in urban areas (Miller 1994). Retirees and deceased 
people in rural areas have set up trusts or left bequests to the younger family members that resulted in 
transfer of deposit funds to heirs, who mostly reside in cities and not in rural communities (Keeton 
1998). The third reason for the shift of deposits from rural communities may be the structural change 
in agriculture to fewer and larger farms (Frizell 2002). In other words, with farms owned and 
operated on a large scale instead of as a small family unit, there was little demand for services of 
small banks because many of the farm families moved away. 
 As a result of the increased competition from larger banks, the migration of the younger 
generation from rural areas, and the structural change in agriculture to fewer and larger farms, the 
number of customers and dollar volume of deposits available to small and local banks declined 
(Frizell 2002). The share of household assets held as bank deposits decreased from 30% in the 1980s 
to less than 15% in the 1990s (Puwalski and Kenner 1999).  In addition, the loan-to-deposit ratio for 
small banks during the 1990s increased. At the end of 1999, the aggregate loan-to-deposit ratio was 
74% compared to 61% at the end of 1992 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation web site). This 
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 Before the enactment of this law in 1994, banks could branch only within a given state; therefore, it was easier for 
rural banks to attract customers because they faced limited competition from out-of-state large banks. 
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series of events was problematic for small banks because deposits serve as primary sources for 
funding loans (Jayaratne and Morgan 1997). For instance, while small community banks would fund 
72% of their assets with core deposits at the end of 1998, large banks would finance only 43% of 
their assets with core deposits (Puwalski and Kenner 1999).33 Therefore, as the number and amount 
of deposits in small local banks decreased, the small banks found it more difficult to satisfy customer 
loan demands.  
 In order to secure the necessary funds to service customer loan demands, small banks 
switched to alternative funding sources such as the FHLB system advances. Especially after the 
enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999, membership in and borrowing from the 
FHLB system became easier. Specifically, the GLB Act of 1999 expanded advance purposes beyond 
residential home financing and provided funding for small business, agricultural, rural, and low-
income community development. Furthermore, collateral types that could be pledged against system 
advances were extended to include secured small business, small farm, and agribusiness loans. The 
broadened advance purposes and collateral types made access to system advances much easier. In 
addition, one of the membership eligibility requirements was that institutions should hold at least 
10% of their total assets in residential mortgage loans. With the GLB Act, this requirement was 
repealed for small banks with total assets less than $500 million. Thus, with the GLB Act, the FHLB 
system became more accessible to small banks which previously could not meet the 10% residential 
mortgage criteria.  
In turn, the increased access to the FHLB system benefited small banks, specifically in an 
environment where small banks were experiencing declining deposit levels and having difficulty 
funding customer loan demands. Small bank membership in the FHLB system relative to total FHLB 
membership increased from 65% in 2000 to 71% in 2003 (Federal Home Loan Bank website; Frizell 
2002).  Given the expanded access to the FHLB system, the pertinent question that arises is: what 
types of small banks use the FHLB advances and what are the determinants of advance use levels?  
During the 2008 financial crisis that took place after the 2007 sub-prime mortgage crisis, the 
FHLB system played a critical role in funding its member financial institutions and in improving 
their liquidity. The number of outstanding advances significantly increased in mid-2007, a 36.7% 
increase from the beginning of 2007 to the second half of 2007 (Ashcraft et al. 2009). According to 
John Von Seggern, the Council of Federal Home Loan Banks president and CEO, the FHLB system 
stayed financially strong during the sub-prime mortgage crisis and continued to fund its members and 
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 Core deposits are stable sources of loan funding. They are less sensitive to short term interest rate changes than 
CDs or money market accounts.   
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be a support for mortgage lending and community development (National Mortgage News 2009). 
Due to the critical role the FHLB advances played during the sub-prime crisis, it is worthwhile to 
focus on FHLB advances and the determinants of advance use decisions and levels of the use of 
advances.   
Using Call Report data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and Summary of Deposits 
data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, this 
study identifies the determinants of advance use decisions and levels of the use of advances by small 
banks. The 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 years correspond to the most recent years after the enactment 
of the 1999 GLB Act but prior to the 2008 financial crisis. This study is the first to look at 
determinants of advance use levels and to look at the periods after the GLB Act but before the 2008 
crisis. The level of use of advances is expressed as a ratio of dollar amount of the FHLB advances 
received relative to total eligible collateral.34  
Knowing the characteristics of the banks utilizing FHLB advances can inform regulators 
about the FHLB lending practices and risk profiles of the banks that use these advances. The goal of 
regulators is to provide safe and sound lending practices and make sure that there is not too much 
risk involved with the banks utilizing FHLB advances. Under high risk taking by these banks, they 
will be more likely to fail. In case of bank failures, FHLB advances have senior claim on the banks’ 
liquidated assets and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a junior claimant. This 
may result in the FDIC incurring large losses, which arise from the difference between its payouts to 
insured depositors of the banks and the net proceeds it receives after the FHLB system is paid from 
the total asset sale. Under high risk profiles for the banks utilizing FHLB advances, the regulators 
can enforce more stringent rules on these banks’ risk management and can set new capital 
requirements for the banks that utilize advances in order to reduce the bank failures and the losses by 
the FDIC. 
One benefit of increased access by small banks to the FHLB advances is that it improves the 
banks’ liquidity and enables the banks to have additional tools to remain viable in the current 
environment of increased competition from larger banks. With improved liquidity, small banks have 
enough funding to meet customer loan demands or are more likely to meet liabilities when they 
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 Eligible collateral = U.S. treasury securities + U.S. government agency obligations + mortgage-backed securities 
(issued or guaranteed by GNMA, FNMA, FHLMC) + loans secured by real estate (includes construction, land 
development and other land loans, farmland, 1 to 4 family residential properties, multifamily residential properties, 
and nonfarm nonresidential properties) + loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers + 
commercial and industrial loans + securities backed by commercial and industrial loans, and home equity lines + 
cash + balances due from depository institutions in the US + balances due from the Federal Reserve Bank (see 12 
U.S.C. 1430(a)(3)).   
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become due and are less likely to become insolvent. With FHLB funding, small banks can improve 
their lending capabilities. Increased lending capabilities of the small banks improve rural credit 
availability and enable the small banks to survive in competitive markets. The banks’ profitability 
improves because use of system advances provides low funding costs. High profit levels may result 
in better service quality to small businesses in the form of lower borrowing rates and higher deposit 
rates. Lower borrowing rates will likely entice small businesses to borrow more; thus, resulting in 
agricultural, rural, small business, and low-income community developments. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
 In the literature, a considerable number of studies have examined characteristics of banks that 
joined the FHLB system and used the system advances (Dolan 2000; Dolan and Collender 2001; 
Frizell 2002; Collender and Frizell 2002; Ducy and Iqbal 2003; Hall 2005; Frame et al. 2007). Some 
studies have focused on risk and return characteristics of banks and their significance in banks 
joining the system and attaining membership. Previous findings were that small banks with high 
interest rate risks, tight net interest margins, high marginal cost of funds, and high liquidity risks 
were more likely to join the system and become members (Dolan 2000; Dolan and Collender 2001; 
and Frizell 2002). Small banks with high credit risks were concluded to be less likely to become 
members because they were less likely to meet the minimum membership requirements (Dolan 2000; 
Dolan and Collender 2001; Frizell 2002; Collender and Frizell 2002).  
 Some studies have focused on risk and return characteristics of member banks and their 
significance in utilizing system advances. The use of advances was found to be concentrated in 
member banks with high liquidity risks, high loan levels and low deposit levels. Banks were utilizing 
system advances to fund their loans and as substitutes for deposits (Dolan 2000; Dolan and Collender 
2001; Frizell 2002; Collender and Frizell 2002; Ducy and Iqbal 2003; Hall 2005; Frame et al. 2007). 
In addition, the probability of the use of advances was higher for banks with high interest rate risks, 
tight net interest margins, high marginal costs of funds, and low returns on asset portfolios (Dolan 
2000; Dolan and Collender 2001; Frizell 2002; Collender and Frizell 2002). On the other hand, there 
have been some mixed results regarding the effect of credit risk on the use of advances. Some studies 
found that the use of advances was more likely for banks with high credit risks given that they were 
members in the system (Dolan 2000; Hall 2005). However, for member banks some studies were not 
able to find any relation to credit risk and the probability of utilizing system advances (Dolan and 
Collender 2001; Frizell 2002; Collender and Frizell 2002).  
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 Some studies examine bank performance and how their performance changed after joining 
the system and attaining access to advances (Frizell 2002; Ducy and Iqbal 2003; Stojanovic et al. 
2008). However, there is not much consistency among the studies. Based on Ducy and Iqbal’s (2003) 
study, after receiving the FHLB advances the member banks did not extend more loans and did not 
improve their profitability. Meanwhile, Frizell’s (2002) results showed that after becoming members 
and utilizing the system advances, banks improved their profitability as well as their liquidity and 
loan quality but had higher leverage positions and more exposure to interest rate risk. Contrary to 
Frizell’s (2002) findings, Stojanovic et al.’s (2008) findings were that not only leverage risk but also 
liquidity risk increased after attaining membership in the system and utilizing the advances. Exposure 
to interest rate risk declined after using the advances but there was little evidence of an effect of 
membership on interest rate risk. Additionally, Stojanovic et al.’s (2008) findings show a mixed 
signal regarding the effect of membership on credit risk and no increase in credit risk based on the 
effect of advance use. However, Frizell’s (2002) results show no increase in credit risk both after 
joining the system and after using the system advances.   
 The use of the FHLB advances has been raising concerns for the FDIC because in case banks 
fail, advances have priority over depositors and depositors will be at risk. There is also some concern 
that the FHLB system might extend credit to risky members since advances are guaranteed by the 
FDIC and have priority over the depositors. After the 2007 crisis, a possible relationship between the 
2007 sub-prime mortgage crisis and the FHLB system’s lending process has been investigated. 
Specifically, Cassell and Hoffmann (2009) did a preliminary analysis on whether the FHLB system 
played any role in the 2007 sub-prime mortgage crisis and if they did what type of role they played. 
Their main conclusion was that the FHLB system could not have contributed to the sub-prime crisis. 
Another finding they presented was that there was an increase in the given-out advances at the same 
time as the increase in default rates. However, they did not attribute this increase to relaxed collateral 
requirements because their findings showed evidence of strong monitoring of the pledged collateral.    
 The literature has put great emphasis on risk and return characteristics of banks and their 
effects on the banks’ decision to join the FHLB system and use the advances. There is no previous 
study that examined the determinants of advance use levels. This study fills this gap and adds to the 
literature by investigating the effect of bank characteristics on the level of the use of advances. 
Additionally, the focus of most previous studies has been the periods before the enactment of the 
1999 GLB Act (Dolan 2000; Dolan and Collender 2001; Frizell 2002; Collender and Frizell 2002; 
Ducy and Iqbal 2003). Different than the previous literature, this study evaluates the characteristics 
for the periods after the enactment of the 1999 GLB Act and before the 2008 financial crisis. 
95 
Furthermore, unlike Dolan and Collender (2001) and Frizell (2002), whose focus was specifically on 
agricultural banks, this paper concentrates on any small bank. After the enactment of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, it was the small banks that benefited from the broadened access to the 
FHLB system and this broadened access was not limited only to agricultural banks.  
 
4.3 Theory and Model  
 
 Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 describe the theory and the model.  
 
4.3.1 Theory 
 
 In order to secure necessary funds to service customer loan demands, banks can borrow 
advances from the FHLB system. In this context, the loans that banks make to customers constitute 
an asset to the bank, whereas the FHLB advances are liabilities of the bank. Assuming management 
of assets and liabilities are consistent with standard portfolio theory, the value of a bank’s portfolio is 
a function of mean and variance of return. Risk-averse, expected utility-maximizing bank managers 
choose an optimal bank portfolio which increases overall portfolio return while controlling for 
overall portfolio risk.35  
 Following Frizell (2002), a bank manager’s objective is to maximize portfolio value and 
solve for equation (4.1):  
Eq (4.1)   Max   E (Π) - (
2
b
) var (Π), 36 
subject to  
(1)   Π= i ai ri,    
(2)   i ai =1    
where Π is portfolio return, E (.) is mean/average, Var (.) is variance, b is risk factor, ai is portfolio 
proportion in asset i, ri is return of asset i, and i stands for assets ranging from 1 to n. 
 According to portfolio selection theory, if use of advances provides a bank with higher 
returns or lowers a bank’s risk exposure given some return level, then it becomes an attractive 
funding source. Since advances improve liquidity and interest rate risk management and provide low-
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 If an asset has a high return, it occupies a higher share in the portfolio. If an asset has a high risk, it occupies a 
lower share in the portfolio.  
36
 Mean refers to average return generated from holding an asset in a bank’s portfolio. Variance refers to deviation 
from this average return. Variance is also used as a measure of risk. Higher variance increases risk of an asset.   
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cost funding, banks with high loan demands, declining deposit levels, high interest rate risks or low 
expected earnings might find the FHLB advances more attractive (Jeon 1999). Based on Dolan 
(2000), Dolan and Collender (2001), and Frizell (2002) this study controls for depository and non-
depository fund levels, and risk and return characteristics.  
 
4.3.2 Model 
 
 The dependent variable, level of advances used, is censored at 0 and is assumed to reflect a 
two-part sequential decision: 1) whether small banks would like to borrow and utilize system 
advances or not and 2) given that small banks utilize system advances, how large is the level of the 
FHLB advances they use. The primary research objective is to identify the determinants of advance 
use decisions and advance use levels by small banks. 
 The sample includes member or nonmember banks which qualify for FHLB membership. 
Note that there is a sufficient supply of funds in the FHLB system to meet the entire funding 
demands from all of its members. So, the FHLB system’s funds are not binding in the process of 
giving out advances.37 As long as member banks meet the collateral requirements, they can receive 
the full amount of funds they request. Most of the banks in the sample used less than 40% of their 
collateral for advances.38 Thus, collateral is also not binding in the level of advances received by the 
banks. Under these conditions, the sample of banks is eligible to receive the entire funding they 
request if they decide to take out advances. Therefore, a zero value for the dependent variable signals 
that those small banks, whether members or not, are not interested in taking out advances and thus, 
do not use advances.  
 Since the small banks in this study receive the entire amount of funds they request from the 
FHLB system, the level of advances that the small banks use and request are the same and the 
dependent variable, level of advances used, is also the requested advance amounts. Thus, as the 
independent variables, this study uses variables which are thought to influence the level of advances 
that are requested by small banks. Since the same factors determine a small bank’s decision to use 
system advances and how much to utilize, a Tobit model is run on equation (4.2). The Tobit is run 
separately for years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
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 The banks can immediately receive the advances once they join the FHLB system. 
38
 Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show histograms for the ratio of loan-amount-received to eligible-collateral for two sample 
years (2006 and 2007). 
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Eq (4.2)     y* = γ0 +


8
1
i
i
γixi + γ9D1 + γ10D2 + γ11D3 + ε1,   
where ε1~ N (0, σ
2) and y* is a latent variable that is observed for values greater than zero and 
censored otherwise. The observed y is defined by the following equation (Greene, 2002).   
y =      y* if y* > 0 
             0 if y* ≤ 0 
The observed y is the dependent variable, level of advances requested and used, and is measured by 
the ratio of dollar amount of advances received relative to total eligible collateral.39 The variable xi  is 
the level of core deposits and non-depository funds, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, net interest 
margin, securities-to-total asset ratio, and credit risk. D1 equals 1 if the small bank is located in a 
rural area; D2 equals 1 if the bank is an agricultural bank; and D3 equals 1 if the bank is affiliated 
with a multi-bank holding company.40 Table 4.1 gives detailed explanations for each of the variables.  
 
4.4 Variables  
 
 The variables included in equation (4.2) are described in detail in sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 
4.4.3 along with their relation with the advance use decision and the level of the advances.  
 
4.4.1 Depository and non-depository funds 
 
 Depository funds, measured by the core deposits-to-total assets ratio, are major sources of 
loan funding.41As this ratio increases, banks can easily meet customer loan demands through deposits 
and will be less likely to demand the system advances. Therefore a negative relationship is expected 
between depository funds and the FHLB advance use decision and the level of advances that are 
utilized.  
 If depository funds are not enough to meet loan demands, banks can use non-depository 
funds as an alternative source of funding. In this study, non-depository funds are measured by the 
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 The FHLB advances received are for both short and long terms. 
40
 An agricultural bank is defined to have at least a 25% ratio of agricultural loans-to-total loans (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 2003).  
41
 It might be argued that the FHLB advances might affect total assets and thus, there may be an endogeneity issue. 
However, most banks use the FHLB advances to manage long term interest rate risk and the small banks that take 
advances are not expected to grant more of a loan to an applicant than the banks that do not take advances. Also, the 
findings by Ducy and Iqbal (2003) show that the member banks did not extend more loans after receiving the FHLB 
advances. Thus, the increases in assets due to the FHLB advances are negligible and no serious endogeneity is 
expected. Additionally, the construction of core deposits is shown in Table 4.1.  
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non-depository funds-to-total assets ratio. Non-depository funds include fed funds purchased, 
securities sold under agreements to repurchase, and other borrowings excluding the FHLB advances. 
A higher ratio would indicate availability of other funding opportunities and a lower demand for the 
system advances.  
 
4.4.2 Risk and return factors 
 
 Liquidity risk is a bank’s ability to meet its short-term financial obligations such as 
unexpected deposit withdrawals or funding loan demands. Liquidity risk is measured by the net 
loans-to-total deposits ratio. A high net loans-to-total deposits ratio may indicate that the bank 
doesn’t have enough funds to meet its loan demands. In such cases, the bank is more likely to use 
alternative funding sources such as the FHLB advances; thus, the expected coefficient sign of this 
variable is positive.  
 The FHLB advances can also be used to offset a bank’s interest rate risk, especially its long 
term interest rate risk.42 This study measures interest rate risk by the RGAP-to-total assets ratio.43 
Two measures are used to calculate RGAP.  The first measure is long term mismatches, which is the 
difference between the dollar value of long term assets and liabilities that have a remaining maturity 
or next reprising date of over 1 year. The second measure is short term mismatches, which is the 
difference between the dollar value of assets and liabilities that have a remaining maturity or next 
reprising date within 1 year or less. Different than in the literature, both long and short term 
mismatches are used to differentiate a bank’s long term interest rate risk from its short term interest 
rate risk. A large RGAP can imply more risk because a small change in interest rates may cause a 
great change in net interest income, resulting in a significant change in equity position. For the 
interest rate risk measure that is caused by long term asset and liability mismatches, a positive 
relation is expected with the advance use decision and the level of use because banks can finance 
long term loans with long term liabilities via the use of the long term FHLB advances. However, for 
the interest rate risk measure that is caused by short term asset and liability mismatches, the expected 
sign is ambiguous because other than the short term FHLB advances there are several other volatile 
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 Interest rate risk refers to the possibility of incurring large losses from adverse changes in interest rates (Lopez 
2003; Saunders and Cornett 2003). As interest rates change, bank assets and liabilities will change in value and 
interest inflows and outflows will change. The net changes will depend on the structure of the balance sheet in terms 
of interest rate sensitivity of assets and liabilities and their maturities or durations. 
43
 RGAP is the difference between the dollar value of rate sensitive assets and rate sensitive liabilities. Definitions of 
rate sensitive assets and liabilities are shown in detail in Table 4.1. If RGAP is positive, the value of rate sensitive 
assets are higher than rate sensitive liabilities and a decrease in interest rates will cause interest income to decrease 
more than interest expense and net interest income will decline and vice versa.  
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funding sources such as fed funds purchased, commercial paper, and large time deposits with short 
term maturities that small banks can use to finance their loans. 
 In addition, net interest margin measures the marginal cost of funds in a bank’s portfolio.44 In 
case net interest margin is small, it infers that the bank has a high marginal cost of funds. If the bank 
has a high marginal cost of funds, there is a greater demand for low cost funding sources such as the 
FHLB advances. 
 A high securities-to-total asset ratio indicates that a bank has large amounts of cheap 
deposits (Han, Park, and Pennacchi 2010)45. A bank with large amounts of cheap deposits will be in 
less need of FHLB advances. Thus, the expected coefficient sign for this variable is negative.   
 Credit risk, measured by the non-performing loans-to-total assets ratio, is the possibility of 
loss that banks may incur due to their creditors’ defaults on loans. Small banks with high amounts of 
non-performing loans may be constrained by the supply of credit or may receive loans with high 
interest rates attached to them. In that case, they may prefer alternative funding sources with cheaper 
rates such as the FHLB system. On the other hand, the FHLB system may limit the use of advances 
to small banks with more credit risk because system advances have priority over insured deposits in 
case of bank failures and this priority raises safety and soundness concerns by the FDIC. Thus, the 
expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is ambiguous.  
 
4.4.3 Bank demographics  
 
 Banks located in rural counties are, on average, smaller, less diversified, more concentrated, 
and less competitive than those located in metropolitan statistical areas (Woosley et al. 2000). Since 
banks located in rural markets cannot easily diversify away risks generated by their loan portfolios, 
they may have more risk compared to banks located in urban markets and supply of credit may be 
constrained. Due to this constraint, the banks in rural counties may be more likely to use system 
advances and the level of use of advances is expected to be higher for the banks in rural counties.  
 Due to seasonality issues in the agricultural industry, agricultural banks are faced with 
seasonal mismatches in customer loan demands and deposits. Given a constant level of customer loan 
                                                          
44
 The net interest margin calculation includes interest expenses from the FHLB advances that the bank is using. 
These interest expenses could not be excluded from the net interest margin calculation because the call report does 
not provide any information on the interest expenses from the FHLB advances. In order to confirm whether 
including interest expenses from the FHLB advances cause a large change in the results, the results are re-run 
without the “net interest margin” variable. The results do not vary much.  
45
 Securities are calculated based on Han, Park, and Pennacchi (2010) and the details of the calculations are 
presented in Table 4.1.  
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demand, reduced deposits in certain seasons might increase the need for the system advances. Thus, 
it is likely that agricultural banks will be more likely to use advances and will utilize greater advance 
amounts.  
  If a bank is affiliated with a Multi Bank Holding Company (MBHC), the bank might have 
alternative funding sources provided by the MBHC, thereby reducing the use of FHLB advances. On 
the other hand, if a bank is affiliated with an MBHC, any fixed costs of obtaining advances can be 
spread over the entire holding company (Frizell 2002). Therefore, banks affiliated with an MBHC 
may acquire system advances at much lower costs compared to banks unaffiliated with an MBHC, 
leading to an increase in the use of advances. Thus, the relationship between the use of advances, the 
level of the advances and affiliation with an MBHC is ambiguous.  
 
4.5 Data Source and Data Description 
 
 This paper uses a commercial bank dataset, the 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 Call Reports 
(Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income data) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
website. The Call Report data are available for all commercial banks regulated by the Federal 
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency. 
The call data are completed quarterly and are available for banks at their main office levels.  
 Other than the Call Reports, this paper uses the 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 Summary of 
Deposits (SOD) dataset from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) web site. The SOD 
dataset contains deposit, core based statistical areas-institution (CBSA), and bank holding company 
affiliations information for all the FDIC insured institutions at their branch and office levels.  
 In order to derive the 2007 dataset used in this study, the 2007 Call Report and the CBSA and 
multi-bank holding company information from the 2007 SOD data are combined.46 First, the 2007 
Call report data are computed on an annual basis by averaging balance sheet items across the four 
quarters of 2007 and taking annual income statement items as of the 4th quarter of 2007. Once the 
2007 call report is computed on an annual basis, the CBSA and the bank holding company 
information in the 2007 SOD data are combined with the 2007 annual call report data at each bank’s 
main office level. The same method is applied to derive the 2004, 2005, and 2006 datasets used in 
this study.  
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 For example, if all branches of a bank are in a rural area or belong to the same multi-bank holding company, then 
the same information is used for the main office of that bank. 
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4.5.1 Sample 
 
 In the call report data, it is not possible to distinguish banks that are members of the FHLB 
system from those banks that are not members. In this study, the sample is member or nonmember 
small banks that meet the minimum membership requirements and that are eligible to join the system 
and use advances.47 
 The minimum membership eligibility requirements are that financial institutions should be 
organized under federal or state laws, should be inspected by a state or federal regulatory agency, 
should originate or purchase long-term home mortgage loans with a maturity of five years or more, 
are financially well off such that advances can be safely made, have at least 10 percent of total assets 
in residential mortgage loans (except for small banks), and have a management and home-financing 
policy that is consistent with sound and economical home financing.  
 The particular banks used in this study are commercial banks that have total assets less than 
or equal to $500 million. Since the Call Report is for all commercial banks regulated by the Federal 
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the small banks used in this study meet the requirement that they should be organized under federal 
or state laws and inspected by a state or federal regulatory agency. In order to screen for small banks 
which make long-term mortgage loans, small banks that purchase or originate home mortgage loans 
with a maturity of less than 5 years are deleted. Following Frizell (2002), “financially safe and 
sound” small banks are screened by capital adequacy and asset quality criteria. Small banks whose 
total risk based capital is at least 8 percent of their risk weighted assets, whose tier 1 capital is at least 
4 percent of their risk weighted assets, and whose non-performing loans are less than 10 percent of 
their total loans, are selected as the sample of small banks.48 However, since the 10 percent 
residential mortgage loan criterion does not apply to small banks, no further analysis has been made 
to screen for this requirement. In conclusion, it can comfortably be inferred that the small banks 
picked for this study are qualified to become members of the FHLB system and use advances. 
 
                                                          
47
 Once an institution becomes a member, it stays as a member even if it performs poorly in the next quarters. 
However, the FHLB system will not give advances unless it meets the collateral requirements.  
48
 Nearly all of the small banks meet the “financially safe and sound” condition, so very few small banks are deleted. 
Therefore, no additional analysis will be made to examine how the results would differ if some of the components of 
“financially safe and sound” condition are relaxed. For instance, after constraining the small banks for long-term 
mortgage loan condition, for the 2006 sample there is only 1 observation that does not meet the total risk based 
capital ratio and tier 1 capital ratio criteria and there are only 12 observations that do not meet the asset quality ratio. 
Similarly, in the 2007 sample, 4 observations do not meet the total risk based capital ratio and tier 1 capital ratio 
criteria and there are only 21 observations that do not meet the asset quality ratio. 
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4.5.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
 Table 4.2 lists means and standard errors for the variables in the 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 
datasets. For each of the datasets, means and standard errors of variables are computed for two 
samples, the sample of small banks that used the FHLB advances and the sample of small banks that 
did not use advances. T-test results corresponding to significances of mean differences across the two 
samples are also included in Table 4.2. The t-test results show whether variable means significantly 
differed across the banks that did not utilize advances and the banks that utilized advances.  
 The descriptive statistics display a significant difference in characteristics of small banks that 
utilized system advances and small banks that did not utilize advances. In each year, banks that used 
the FHLB advances had significantly lower core deposits, by 4.11 to 5.68 percent compared to banks 
that did not use advances. On the other hand, banks that used advances had significantly greater non-
depository funds, by 0.62 to 0.78 percent. For instance, in 2004, the mean of non-depository funds-
to-total assets ratio was 1.46 percent with a standard error of 0.09 percent for banks that did not use 
system advances. For banks that used system advances, the mean was 2.20 percent with a standard 
error of 0.06 percent.      
 In each year, small banks that utilized advances had significantly greater liquidity risk. The 
net loans-to-total deposits ratio was 16.24 to 17.56 percent greater for banks that used system 
advances compared to banks that did not use advances. In each year, banks that used the FHLB 
advances had significantly greater interest rate risk arising from the long term asset and liability 
mismatches, by 6.19 percent to 6.95 percent. However, in 2004 and 2005, the t-test results do not 
support any significant difference between the sample of banks that utilized advances and the sample 
that did not utilize advances, in their interest rate risk which would arise due to short term asset and 
liability mismatches.  
 In addition, banks that used system advances had significantly lower net interest margin. 
Likewise, the securities-to-total asset ratio was significantly lower, by 9 to 10 percent, for banks that 
used system advances than banks that did not utilize system advances. For instance, in 2006, the 
securities-to-total asset ratio was 12.97 percent for banks that utilized system advances, while this 
ratio was 23.25 percent for banks that did not utilize system advances.  
 In general, the credit risk was significantly lower for banks that used system advances. For 
instance, in 2004, banks that utilized system advances had 0.70 percent of their total assets in non-
performing loans while this rate was 0.86 percent for banks that did not utilize system advances.  
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 Opposite of the expectation in section 4.4.3, in all years, the agricultural banks or the banks 
that were located in rural counties were less likely to use advances. On the other hand, banks that 
belonged to multi-bank holding companies were more likely to use system advances. For instance, in 
2004 among the banks that did not use system advances, only 19.27 percent of the sample was banks 
that belonged to multi-bank holding companies. Among the banks that used system advances, 24.08 
percent were banks that belonged to multi-bank holding companies. The descriptive statistics also 
show that the ratio of system advances utilized to eligible collateral was 13.35 percent in 2004, 12.39 
percent in 2005, 11.48 percent in 2006, and 12.82 percent in 2007. In summary, Table 4.2 shows that 
there are significant differences across banks that used advances and those that did not use advances.  
 
4.6 Results 
 
 Table 4.3 shows the marginal effects of Pr [0 ≤y], how the probability of the advance use 
decision (being uncensored) changes with respect to the regressors. Table 4.4 shows the marginal 
effects of the censored expected value E[y], how the observed dollar amount y changes with respect 
to the regressors, for observations (censored or uncensored) randomly drawn from the population.49 
The results are displayed for each year, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
 
4.6.1 Probability of the use of the FHLB advances 
 
 The regression results in Table 4.3 are in general consistent over the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 
and 2007. Increases in alternative funds, such as core deposits and non-depository funds, consistently 
lead to a decline in the probability of utilizing the system advances. For instance, for a 10 percent 
increase in the non-depository funds ratio, the banks were 10.154 percent less likely in 2004, 9.393 
percent less likely in 2005, 7.902 percent less likely in 2006, and 8.803 percent less likely in 2007 to 
use the system advances.  
 The results also reveal that the banks with greater liquidity risk were more likely to use the 
system advances. For instance, with a 10 percent increase in the net loans-to-total deposits ratio, the 
probability of the use of advances increased by 0.781 percent in 2004, 1.794 percent in 2005, 0.831 
percent in 2006, and 1.637 percent in 2007.  
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 In each year, the probability of use of advances was greater for the banks that had high 
interest rate risk caused by the long term mismatches. For a 10 percent increase in the interest rate 
risk, which was caused by long term mismatches, the increase in advance use probability was around 
4 to 5 percent from 2004 to 2007. This result may infer that the banks would finance long term loans 
with the use of long term FHLB advances. This finding is consistent with Frizell (2002). However, 
use of advances declined by 1.264 percent in 2004 and 0.858 percent in 2007 for a 10 percent 
increase in the interest rate risk caused by the short term mismatches. Meanwhile, the interest rate 
risk caused by the short term mismatches did not have any significant effect in the advance use 
probability in 2005 and 2006. 
 In each year, banks with costlier funds were more likely to use advances and benefit from 
advances’ low marginal costs. For instance, a 1 percent increase in interest margin would indicate a 1 
percent decline in the marginal cost of funds and an approximately 5 percent decline in the 
probability of use of advances for 2004 and 2005, 7 percent decline for 2006 and 6 percent decline 
for 2007. The decline in the probability of use of advances with an increase in the interest rate margin 
is consistent with the previous literature results (Dolan 2000; Dolan and Collender 2001; Frizell 
2002; Collender and Frizell 2002; Hall 2005). In addition, banks with greater proportions of 
securities-to-total asset ratio were less likely to request and utilize system advances. A 1 percent 
increase in the securities-to-total asset ratio would reduce the probability of the use of advances by 
0.533 percent in 2004, 0.490 percent in 2005, 0.719 percent in 2006, and 0.630 percent in 2007.  
 The significance of credit risk in advance use probability is ambiguous. The results except for 
2004 are in conformity with previous literature findings and credit risk was not significant in the 
advance use probability (Dolan and Collender 2001; Frizell 2002; Collender and Frizell 2002). 
However, consistent with the findings of Hall (2005) and Dolan (2000), the credit risk was 
significant in the advance use probability in 2004. The results display a negative relation with the 
credit risk and the probability of use of advances. This finding is consistent with the FDIC’s concerns 
about safety and soundness of banks using advances. The main concern of the FDIC is that system 
advances have priority over depository funds and depositors are at risk in case the banks fail. Due to 
these concerns, the small banks with high credit risk might have been provided with limited use of 
advances.  
 In addition, banks in rural counties were more likely to use system advances. Agricultural 
banks or banks that belong to multi-bank holding companies were not significant determinants of 
probability of use of advances.  
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 In summary, the regression results for each year display that core deposits, non-depository 
funds, net-loans, interest rate risk caused by long term asset and liability mismatches, net interest 
margin, securities-to-total asset ratio, and whether banks are located in rural counties are significant 
determinants of the decision to use advances.  
 
4.6.2 Level of the FHLB advances used 
 
  The results in Table 4.4 display that the level of the use of advances declined in each year 
with an increase in the funding sources, such as core deposits and non-depository funds. For instance, 
for a 1 percent increase in the core deposit-to-total asset ratio, advance levels declined by 0.400 
percent in 2004, 0.320 percent in 2005, 0.252 percent in 2006, and 0.290 percent in 2007. For a 1 
percent increase in the non-depository funds-to-total asset ratio, the decline was 0.300 percent in 
2004, 0.248 percent in 2005, 0.200 in 2006, and 0.321 in 2007. 
 The results also show that liquidity risk is significant in determining the advance use levels. 
For a 10 percent increase in the net loans-to-total deposits ratio, the level of advance uses increased 
by 0.231 percent in 2004, 0.474 percent in 2005, 0.210 percent in 2006, and 0.597 percent in 2007. In 
addition, interest rate risk arising from long term mismatches in assets and liabilities are significant 
across all years. For a 10 percent increase in the interest rate risk that was caused by the long term 
asset and liability mismatches, advance levels increased by around 1.280 percent to 1.531 percent. 
The significance of interest rate risk caused by short term asset and liability mismatches is 
ambiguous. 
 The results across all years show net interest margin as a significant determinant of the level 
of use of advances. An increase in net interest margin, thus a decline in cost of funds, causes a 
decline in the level of advance use. With cheaper cost of funds, the demand for system advances 
declines. Likewise, in all years, results display securities-to-total asset ratio as a significant 
determinant of the level of use of advances. As a bank has high amounts of cheap deposits to meet its 
loan demands, that bank would utilize low amounts of system advances. On the other hand, credit 
risk does not help to explain the level of advance use except for year 2004.      
 The results from Table 4.4 also reveal that the level of advance use was greater for banks that 
were located in rural counties. On the other hand, an agricultural bank did not differ significantly 
from a non-agricultural bank in the level of system advances that they utilized. Likewise, banks that 
belonged to multi-bank holding companies did not differ significantly from banks that did not belong 
to multi-bank holding companies in their level of the use of advances.   
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 In summary, core deposits, non-depository funds, liquidity risk, interest rate risk caused by 
long term asset and liability mismatches, net interest margin, securities-to-total asset ratio, and banks 
that are located in rural counties were consistently significant in 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 as 
determinants of the level of system advances utilized. 
 
4.7 Robustness 
 
 For robustness purposes, all datasets corresponding to years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 are 
combined and the determinants of advance use levels are estimated under a panel setting. This 
adjustment gave a total of 29,533 observations. In the data, the same banks are observed over time, 
with some banks being observed for the entire four years. On average, the same banks are observed 
over 3.6 years. There are in total 8,248 banks in the sample and the data are unbalanced panel data. 
The model is defined in equation (4.3).  
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ity
 is a latent variable that is observed for advance amounts greater than zero and censored 
otherwise, i refers to each bank, t refers to each year, and Xjit refers to the explanatory variables at 
time t for bank i. Explanatory variables are core deposit-to-total assets ratio, non-depository funds-to-
total assets ratio, net-loans-to-total deposits ratio, interest rate risk caused by long term asset and 
liability mismatches, interest rate risk caused by short term asset and liability mismatches, net 
interest margin, securities-to-total asset ratio, credit risk, whether the bank is located in a rural 
county, whether bank is an agricultural bank, and whether bank belongs to a multi-bank holding 
company.  
Due to the panel nature of the data, the observations are not independently distributed over 
time and there are additional factors that affect advance use level: those that vary over time and those 
that are constant over time (time invariant) but vary over the banks. Adding time dummies, dt, 
controls for the time varying factors and ai is the unobserved time invariant individual effect. In 
estimating equation (4.3), the likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the panel estimator is 
not different from the pooled estimator is rejected (Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000) and thus, a random 
effects estimator is applied.    
 The random effects Tobit results are displayed in Table 4.5 and these results are robust with 
the Tobit results presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The probability and level of use of advances was 
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significantly lower for the banks with greater core deposits and non-depository funds. For instance, 
for a 10 percent increase in the core deposit-to-total assets ratio, the ratio of the received advance 
amounts to the eligible collateral declined by 2.078 percent.  
 Banks with greater liquidity risk and interest rate risk caused by long term asset and liability 
mismatches, were more likely to use advances and utilized greater levels of advances. For a 10 
percent increase in net loan-to-total deposits, the level of advance use increased by 0.481 percent. For 
a 10 percent increase in the interest rate risk caused by long term mismatches, level of use of 
advances increased by 0.785 percent. The interest rate risk that was caused from mismatches between 
short term assets and liabilities had a significant but negative effect on the probability and level of 
use of advances.   
 Net interest margin was significant with a negative effect on the probability of advance use 
and the level of advances utilized. For a 10 percent increase in net interest margin, the level of 
advance use declined by 7.236 percent. Consistent with results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, securities-to-
total asset ratio was significant and had a negative effect on the probability and the level of use of 
advances. Banks that were located in rural counties utilized greater levels of advances compared to 
the banks that were not located in rural counties. Consistent with Tables 4.3 and 4.4, credit risk, 
whether bank is an agricultural bank or belongs to a multi-bank holding company are not significant 
determinants of probability of advance use or the level of use of advances.  
 
4.8 Conclusions 
 
This paper is motivated by the 2008 financial crisis that took place after the 2007 sub-prime 
mortgage crisis and the critical role the FHLB system played in funding its member financial 
institutions and in improving their liquidity. Using 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 Call Reports and 
Summary of Deposits data, this paper focuses on characteristics of small banks that utilize FHLB 
advances and the determinants of advance use levels. Different than the existing literature, this study 
looks at determinants of advance use levels and looks at the period after the enactment of the 1999 
GLB Act, which made membership in and borrowing from the FHLB system easier, but before the 
2008 financial crisis. 
 The dependent variable, ratio of dollar amount of the FHLB advances received relative to 
total eligible collateral, is censored at 0 and is assumed to reflect a two-part sequential decision: 1) 
whether small banks would like to borrow and utilize system advances or not and 2) given that small 
banks utilize system advances, how high is the level of the FHLB advances small banks use. Since 
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the same factors determine a small bank’s decision to use system advances and how much to utilize, 
a Tobit is run.  
The Tobit results support greater probability of the use of advances for small banks with 
lower core deposits and non-depository funds. The probability of utilizing advances was higher for 
small banks with greater liquidity risks and greater interest rate risks caused by long term asset and 
liability mismatches. However, probability of the use of advances was lower for small banks with 
high net interest margin or low marginal costs of funding and high securities-to-total asset ratio. 
Banks that are located in rural counties were more likely to use system advances. The significance of 
credit risk in advance use probability is ambiguous. In conformity with previous literature findings, 
credit risk was not significant in the advance use probability in 2005, 2006, and 2007 (Dolan and 
Collender 2001; Frizell 2002; Collender and Frizell 2002). However, consistent with the findings of 
Hall (2005) and Dolan (2000), the credit risk was significant in the advance use probability in 2004, 
but with a negative coefficient sign. 
Likewise, the level of use of advances increased with a decline in core deposits and non-
depository funds. The advance use level was greater for banks with high liquidity risks and high 
interest rate risks which were caused by mismatches in long term assets and liabilities. The banks 
with low net interest margins and low securities-to-total asset ratio utilized greater advance amounts. 
The banks that were located in rural counties utilized greater advance amounts than banks that were 
not located in rural counties. The results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are robust across the panel setting. 
Knowing the characteristics of the banks utilizing FHLB advances can inform regulators 
about the FHLB lending practices and risk profiles of the banks that use these advances. The goal of 
regulators is to provide safe and sound lending practices and make sure that there is not too much 
risk involved with the banks utilizing FHLB advances. Under high risk taking by these banks, they 
will be more likely to fail. In case of bank failures, FHLB advances have senior claim on the banks’ 
liquidated assets and the FDIC is a junior claimant. This may result in the FDIC incurring large 
losses, which arise from the difference between its payouts to insured depositors of the banks and the 
net proceeds it receives after the FHLB system is paid from the total asset sale. Under high risk 
profiles for the banks utilizing FHLB advances, the regulators can enforce more stringent rules on 
these banks’ risk management and can set new capital requirements for the banks that utilize 
advances in order to reduce the bank failures and the losses by the FDIC. 
A future extension of this paper may include a more detailed analysis of the banks’ risk 
characteristics. The changing risk characteristics of banks that utilized the advances can be examined 
to understand whether the advances may have contributed to greater risk taking by banks and 
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whether it might have contributed to the subprime crisis. 
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4.10 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 4.1. Histogram for the Ratio of Loan Amount Received to Eligible Collateral (dep2), 2006 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Histogram for the Ratio of Loan Amount Received to Eligible Collateral (dep2), 2007 
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Table 4.1. Definition of Variables and Expected Signs 
Variables   Measurements   
Expected signs in 
regards to FHLB 
advance use and the 
level of use 
     
Risk and return      
Funds  
 core deposit / total assets  (-)  
 non-depository funds / total assets  (-)  
Liquidity risk   net loans / total deposits  (+)  
Interest rate risk 
 
(rate sensitive assets with a remaining maturity or next reprising date over 1 year - rate sensitive 
liabilities with a remaining maturity or next reprising date over 1 year)) / total assets                                                                                     
 (+)  
 
(rate sensitive assets with remaining maturity or next reprising date within 1 year - rate sensitive 
liabilities with remaining maturity or next reprising date within 1 year) / total assets                                                                     
 (ambiguous)  
Net Interest Margin  net interest income / earning asset  (-)  
Securities  securities / total assets  (-) 
Credit risk  non-performing loans / total loan  (ambiguous)  
     
Bank demographics     
Whether located in rural area  dummy = 1 if bank is not located in a metropolitan area (do not have any CBSA code)  (+)  
An agricultural bank  dummy = 1 if (agricultural production and farm loans) / (net loans) >= 0.25  (+)  
Affiliated with MBHC   dummy = 1 if bank is affiliated with a MBHC (multi-bank holding company)   (ambiguous)  
  
Securities: sum of securities that are held to maturity or available for sale, fed funds sold in domestic offices, securities purchased 
 under agreements to resell, trading assets, and less pledged securities.   
Core deposits: demand deposits, time deposits under $100,000, savings including money market deposit accounts (MMDAs),  
other savings deposits, and negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW accounts) 
Non-depository funds: fed funds purchased, securities sold under agreement to repurchase, other borrowings excluding FHLB advances 
Rate sensitive assets: debt securities (securities issued by U.S. treasury, U.S. government agencies, and states and political subdivisions 
in the U.S., other non-mortgage debt securities, mortgage pass through securities, other mortgage backed securities), loans & leases  
excluding those in nonaccrual status 
Rate sensitive liabilities: brokered deposits < $100,000; brokered deposits >=$100,000; time deposits <$100,000;  
time deposits >= $100,000, other borrowings excluding FHLB advances 
Earning asset: loans & leases but not unearned interest income; US government, corporate, and municipal securities; securities 
purchased under agreements to sell;  time deposit accounts in other banks; fed funds sold to other banks; trading assets 
Non-performing loans= loans that are past due 90 days or more and still accruing, and loans that are in non-accrual status 
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
   2004 dataset  2005 dataset  2006 dataset 2007 dataset 
 Number  7653  7462  7286 7132 
      Mean Std. Err.   Mean Std.Err.   Mean Std.Err. Mean Std. Err.  
Core deposit/total assets 
Did not 
use 
 0.7314 (0.0022)  0.7184 (0.0024)  0.6952 (0.0027) 0.6828 (0.0026) 
 Used  0.6747 (0.0015)  0.6619 (0.0015)  0.6467 (0.0016) 0.6417 (0.0015) 
  Difference
a
    -0.0568
***
 (0.0026)   -0.0566
***
 (0.0028)   -0.0485
***
 (0.0031) -0.0411
***
 (0.0030) 
Non-depository 
funds/total assets 
Did not 
use 
 0.0146 (0.0009)  0.0154 (0.0010)  0.0152 (0.0010) 0.0135 (0.0009) 
 Used  0.0220 (0.0006)  0.0216 (0.0006)  0.0221 (0.0006) 0.0213 (0.0006) 
  Difference    0.0074
***
 (0.0011)   0.0062
***
 (0.0011)   0.0070
***
 (0.0012) 0.0078
***
 (0.0011) 
Net loans/total deposits 
Did not 
use 
 0.6564 (0.0046)  0.6712 (0.0046)  0.6925 (0.0065) 0.6892 (0.0048) 
 Used  0.8202 (0.0028)  0.8397 (0.0028)  0.8549 (0.0031) 0.8648 (0.0027) 
  Difference    0.1638
***
 (0.0054)   0.1685
***
 (0.0054)   0.1624
***
 (0.0073) 0.1756
***
 (0.0055) 
Interest rate risk (long 
term mismatches) 
Did not 
use 
 0.7255 (0.0032)  0.7143 (0.0035)  0.6682 (0.0036) 0.6447 (0.0035) 
 Used  0.7894 (0.0022)  0.7771 (0.0022)  0.7377 (0.0022) 0.7067 (0.0022) 
  Difference    0.0640
***
 (0.0039)   0.0627
***
 (0.0041)   0.0695
***
 (0.0042) 0.0619
***
 (0.0041) 
Interest rate risk (short 
term mismatches) 
Did not 
use 
 0.1356 (0.0021)  0.1469 (0.0060)  0.1376 (0.0023) 0.1324 (0.0022) 
 Used  0.1345 (0.0015)  0.1437 (0.0016)  0.1288 (0.0015) 0.1226 (0.0015) 
  Difference    -0.0010 (0.0026)   -0.0032 (0.0062)   -0.0088
***
 (0.0028) -0.0098
***
 (0.0027) 
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
    2004 dataset  2005 dataset  2006 dataset 2007 dataset 
      Mean Std. Err.   Mean Std.Err.   Mean Std.Err. Mean Std. Err.  
Net interest margin 
Did not 
use 
 0.0415 (0.0003)  0.0426 (0.0003)  0.0431 (0.0003) 0.0416 (0.0003) 
 Used  0.0408 (0.0001)  0.0414 (0.0001)  0.0406 (0.0001) 0.0390 (0.0001) 
  Difference    -0.0007
**
 (0.0003)   -0.0012
***
 (0.0004)   -0.0026
***
 (0.0004) -0.0026
***
 (0.0003) 
Securities 
Did not 
use 
 0.2482 (0.0030)  0.2378 (0.0031)  0.2325 (0.0032) 0.2317 (0.0031) 
 Used  0.1526 (0.0017)  0.1387 (0.0016)  0.1297 (0.0015) 0.1252 (0.0015) 
  Difference    -0.0957
***
 (0.0034)   -0.0990
***
 (0.0035)   -0.1028
***
 (0.0035) -0.1065
***
 (0.0035) 
Credit risk  
Did not 
use 
 0.0086 (0.0002)  0.0077 (0.0002)  0.0073 (0.0002) 0.0085 (0.0002) 
 Used  0.0070 (0.0001)  0.0062 (0.0001)  0.0064 (0.0001) 0.0087 (0.0002) 
  Difference    -0.0016
***
 (0.0003)   -0.0014
***
 (0.0003)   -0.0009
***
 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0003) 
Banks in rural 
county 
Did not 
use 
 0.3108 (0.0088)  0.3124 (0.0092)  0.3150 (0.0094) 0.3228 (0.0095) 
 Used  0.2588 (0.0063)  0.2564 (0.0062)  0.2550 (0.0063) 0.2458 (0.0063) 
  Difference    -0.0519
***
 (0.0108)   -0.0559
***
 (0.0111)   -0.0600
***
 (0.0113) -0.0770
***
 (0.0114) 
Bank is an 
agricultural bank 
Did not 
use 
 0.1322 (0.0064)  0.1305 (0.0067)  0.1328 (0.0069) 0.1319 (0.0069) 
 Used  0.0775 (0.0038)  0.0795 (0.0039)  0.0784 (0.0039) 0.0774 (0.0039) 
  Difference    -0.0546
***
 (0.0075)   -0.0510
***
 (0.0077)   -0.0544
***
 (0.0079) -0.0545
***
 (0.0079) 
Bank belongs to 
multi-bank holding 
company 
Did not 
use 
 0.1927 (0.0075)  0.1744 (0.0075)  0.1760 (0.0077) 0.1757 (0.0077) 
 Used  0.2408 (0.0061)  0.2356 (0.0060)  0.2241 (0.0060) 0.2215 (0.0061) 
  Difference    0.0481
***
 (0.0097)   0.0612
***
 (0.0097)   0.0481
***
 (0.0098) 0.0457
***
 (0.0098) 
FHLB advance 
received/total 
eligible collateral 
Did not 
use 
 0.0000 (0.0000)  0.0000 (0.0000)  0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
 Used  0.1335 (0.0026)  0.1239 (0.0021)  0.1148 (0.0020) 0.1282 (0.0037) 
  Difference    0.1335
***
 (0.0026)   0.1239
***
 (0.0021)   0.1148
***
 (0.0020) 0.1282
***
 (0.0037) 
a 
Difference refers to mean difference between small banks which do not use and do use advances.   
*** represents significance at 1%, ** represents significance at 5%, and * represents significance at 10%. 
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Table 4.3. Marginal Effects of Probability (y > 0) 
  
Year 2004  Year 2005  Year 2006  Year 2007 
dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx 
Core deposit/total assets -1.3523
***
  -1.2124
***
  -0.9966
***
  -0.7940
***
 
 (0.0422)  (0.0407)  (0.0400)  (0.0467) 
Non-depository funds/total assets -1.0154
***
  -0.9393
***
  -0.7902
***
  -0.8803
***
 
 (0.1092)  (0.1062)  (0.1045)  (0.1191) 
Net loans/total deposits 0.0781
***
  0.1794
***
  0.0831
***
  0.1637
***
 
 (0.0295)  (0.0290)  (0.0209)  (0.0327) 
Interest rate risk (long term mismatches) 0.4707
***
  0.4848
***
  0.5191
***
  0.4198
***
 
 (0.0288)  (0.0274)  (0.0282)  (0.0313) 
Interest rate risk (short term mismatches) -0.1264
***
  -0.0523  0.0096  -0.0858
*
 
 (0.0432)  (0.0366)  (0.0413)  (0.0458) 
Net interest margin -4.7515
***
  -5.0498
***
  -7.1896
***
  -5.5200
***
 
 (0.4652)  (0.4576)  (0.4945)  (0.5537) 
Securities -0.5327
***
  -0.4898
***
  -0.7189
***
  -0.6294
***
 
 (0.0462)  (0.0457)  (0.0414)  (0.0529) 
Credit risk  -1.1167
**
  -0.3202  -0.0516  -0.5332 
 (0.4439)  (0.4731)  (0.4924)  (0.4307) 
Bank is in a rural county 0.0334
***
  0.0429
***
  0.0491
***
  0.0243
**
 
 (0.0104)  (0.0101)  (0.0102)  (0.0114) 
Bank is an agricultural bank -0.0152  -0.0103  -0.0032  -0.0136 
 (0.0163)  (0.0157)  (0.0160)  (0.0175) 
Bank belongs to multi-bank holding 
company 
-0.0023  0.0129  0.0033  0.0063 
  (0.0105)   (0.0103)   (0.0106)   (0.0116) 
Note: *** represents significance at 1%, ** represents significance at 5%, and * represents significance at 10% 
The numbers in parenthesis are delta method standard errors 
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Table 4.4. Marginal Effects for Censored Expected Value E[y] 
  
Year 2004  Year 2005  Year 2006  Year 2007 
dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx 
Core deposit/total assets -0.4003
***
  -0.3202
***
  -0.2518
***
  -0.2895
***
 
 (0.0132)  (0.0112)  (0.0104)  (0.0175) 
Non-depository funds/total assets -0.3005
***
  -0.2481
***
  -0.1997
***
  -0.3210
***
 
 (0.0325)  (0.0282)  (0.0265)  (0.0437) 
Net loans/total deposits 0.0231
***
  0.0474
***
  0.0210
***
  0.0597
***
 
 (0.0087)  (0.0077)  (0.0053)  (0.0119) 
Interest rate risk (long term mismatches) 0.1393
***
  0.1280
***
  0.1312
***
  0.1531
***
 
 (0.0088)  (0.0074)  (0.0073)  (0.0117) 
Interest rate risk (short term mismatches) -0.0374
***
  -0.0138  0.0024  -0.0313
*
 
 (0.0128)  (0.0097)  (0.0104)  (0.0167) 
Net interest margin -1.4063
***
  -1.3337
***
  -1.8166
***
  -2.0128
***
 
 (0.1391)  (0.1220)  (0.1275)  (0.2047) 
Securities -0.1577
***
  -0.1293
***
  -0.1816
***
  -0.2295
***
 
 (0.0139)  (0.0123)  (0.0109)  (0.0198) 
Credit risk  -0.3305
**
  -0.0846  -0.0130  -0.1944 
 (0.1315)  (0.1250)  (0.1244)  (0.1571) 
Bank is in a rural county 0.0099
***
  0.0113
***
  0.0124
***
  0.0088
**
 
 (0.0031)  (0.0027)  (0.0026)  (0.0041) 
Bank is an agricultural bank -0.0045  -0.0027  -0.0008  -0.0049 
 (0.0048)  (0.0042)  (0.0040)  (0.0064) 
Bank belongs to multi-bank holding 
company 
-0.0007  0.0034  0.0008  0.0023 
  (0.0031)   (0.0027)   (0.0027)   (0.0042) 
Number of observations 7,653  7,462  7,286  7,132 
LR chi2(11) 1,844.70  2,064.41  1,960.83  1,201.64 
Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.6210   2.3915   5.0281   0.2491 
Note: *** represents significance at 1%, ** represents significance at 5%, and * represents significance at 10% 
The numbers in parenthesis are delta method standard errors 
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Table 4.5. Marginal Effects of Probability (y > 0)    
  dy/dx 
Delta Method 
Std Err. 
 
Core deposit/total assets -0.9764
***
 0.0225  
Non-depository funds/total assets -1.4255
***
 0.0604  
Net loans/total deposits 0.2262
***
 0.0141  
Interest rate risk (long term mismatches) 0.3691
***
 0.0160  
Interest rate risk (short term mismatches) -0.0317
**
 0.0162  
Net interest margin -3.4007
***
 0.2112  
Securities -0.3957
***
 0.0245  
Credit risk  0.2034 0.1658  
Bank is in a rural county 0.0273
***
 0.0088  
Bank is an agricultural bank -0.0077 0.0093  
Bank belongs to multi-bank holding company 0.0069 0.0062  
2005 -0.0230
***
 0.0026  
2006 -0.0492
***
 0.0029  
2007 -0.0359
***
 0.0031  
    
Marginal Effects for Censored Expected Value E[y]  
  dy/dx 
Delta Method 
Std Err. 
 
Core deposit/total assets -0.2078
***
 0.0049  
Non-depository funds/total assets -0.3033
***
 0.0131  
Net loans/total deposits 0.0481
***
 0.0030  
Interest rate risk (long term mismatches) 0.0785
***
 0.0035  
Interest rate risk (short term mismatches) -0.0067
**
 0.0034  
Net interest margin -0.7236
***
 0.0451  
Securities -0.0842
***
 0.0053  
Credit risk  0.0433 0.0353  
Bank is in a rural county 0.0058
***
 0.0019  
Bank is an agricultural bank -0.0016 0.0020  
Bank belongs to multi-bank holding company 0.0015 0.0013  
2005 -0.0049
***
 0.0006  
2006 -0.0105
***
 0.0006  
2007 -0.0076
***
 0.0007  
Number of observations 29,533   
Number of groups 8,248   
Observations per group: min 1   
Observations per group: avg 3.6   
Observations per group: max  4   
Wald chi2(14) 4,602.08   
Prob>chi2 0.0000   
Log likelihood 17,884.609    
Note: *** represents significance at 1%, ** represents significance at 5%, and * represents significance at 10% 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1 Summary and Principal Findings 
 
This dissertation is motivated by the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis and the 2008 financial 
crisis that followed afterwards. In the first two papers (chapters 2 and 3), the goal is to examine the 
changing characteristics of lending under easy credit conditions. In the third paper (chapter 4), the 
goal is to examine the FHLB system and the small banks that use the advances.  
As evidence of the changing characteristics of lending to subprime households under relaxed 
lending standards, chapter 2 tests three hypotheses for each of the three income groups that are 
created. Hypothesis (2.H1): In 2007, households with lower credit quality were able to get similar 
loan-to-value ratios and had similar home purchase behavior as households with higher credit 
quality; that is mortgage types and credit quality characteristics were less significant in 2007 than in 
1998 in explaining households’ home financing ratios, home purchase decisions, and the dollar 
amount households paid on their home purchases; hypothesis (2.H2): Home financing ratios and 
home purchase rates were greater in 2007 than in 1998; hypothesis (2.H3): Households paid more on 
their home purchases in 2007 than in 1998.  
The chapter 2 results, with respect to hypothesis (2.H1), suggest that in 2007, households 
with lower credit quality were able to get similar loan-to-value ratios, had similar home purchase 
probability, and purchased as expensive homes as households with higher credit quality, especially 
for households within the lowest income group IG1. In addition, for high income households, in 
2007, some of the credit characteristics did not explain the home purchase probability and the dollar 
amount households paid on home purchases as strongly as they did in 1998; that is, in 2007, the 
distinction between low credit quality and high credit quality households declined. These findings 
with respect to high income households are supportive of the previous studies, which have revealed 
that high income households also benefited from relaxed lending standards.  
The chapter 2 results, with respect to hypotheses (2.H2) and (2.H3), display no significant 
changes in the financing ratio or the dollar amount paid on home purchases from 1998 to 2007 in any 
of the income groups. But, the results reveal that households in income group IG1 were more likely to 
purchase homes in 2007 than in 1998.  
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As evidence of the changing lending characteristics, chapter 3 analyzes households’ debt 
levels and in particular, the gap between households’ desired and outstanding debt levels. The gap 
levels from 1998 are compared to the gap levels in 2007 and the following hypothesis is tested: The 
gap between desired and actual stock of debt was lower in 2007 than 1998. Chapter 3 results show 
greater desired debt levels and lower probabilities of being credit constrained. In addition, the 
findings show a declining gap in particular for households with income levels between $30,000 and 
$60,000 and for households with income levels above $345,000. The findings also display a 
declining gap for households with household heads that are 34 years old or younger and household 
heads between 54 and 65 years old. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the determinants of the advance use decision and the level of use of 
advances for the periods after the enactment of the 1999 GLB Act, which made membership in and 
borrowing from the FHLB system easier, but before the 2008 crisis. Chapter 4 results show that the 
advance use probability and level was greater for small banks with low core deposits and non-
depository funds, high liquidity risks, high interest rate risks that were caused by long term asset and 
liability mismatches, low net interest margins, and low securities-to-total asset ratios. Small banks 
that are located in rural counties were more likely to use system advances and utilized greater 
amounts of system advances than banks that are not located in rural counties.  
 
5.2 Implications 
 
The findings of chapters 2 and 3 indicate that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) programs which were aimed at increasing homeownership to lower income 
households led to bad lending practices and increased risky loans, and households were given more 
mortgage loans than they could repay or households that could not purchase homes were more likely 
to purchase or households purchased pricier homes than they could afford or constrained households 
had greater loan opportunities and borrowed more of their desired debt levels. The regulators can use 
these findings as a warning mechanism for regulations and lending practices that have gone badly. 
Under this case, it is critical to monitor how the regulations are applied, whether lending practices 
meet minimum standards, and whether there are any threats to financial stability. For instance, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council, which was established after the 2007 subprime crisis to 
identify and respond to systemic risks, should use the results from these findings as a warning to 
threats to the financial stability of the U.S. and should take preventive measures and make 
recommendations to the Federal Reserve Board before the financial system collapses. Additionally, 
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the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which was established after the 2007 subprime crisis, 
should enforce regulations to protect households from bad lending practices.  
The findings of chapter 4 can inform regulators about the FHLB lending practices and risk 
profiles of the banks that use these advances. The goal of regulators is to provide safe and sound 
lending practices and make sure that there is not too much risk involved with the banks utilizing 
FHLB advances. Under high risk taking by these banks, they will be more likely to fail. In case of 
bank failures, FHLB advances have senior claim on the banks’ liquidated assets and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a junior claimant. This may result in the FDIC incurring 
large losses, which arise from the difference between its payouts to insured depositors of the banks 
and the net proceeds it receives after the FHLB system is paid from the total asset sale. Under high 
risk profiles for the banks utilizing FHLB advances, the regulators can enforce more stringent rules 
on these banks’ risk management and can set new capital requirements for the banks that utilize 
advances in order to reduce the bank failures and the losses by the FDIC. 
 
5.3 Future Research 
 
As an extension to chapter 2, in future research, the financing ratio, home purchase 
probability, and dollar amount paid on home purchases can be estimated for 1998 and these 
estimated coefficient values can be used to predict the financing ratio, purchase probability, and the 
dollar amount paid on home purchases in 2007. Then, these predicted values in 2007 can be 
compared to the observed values in 2007 to investigate whether in 2007 households financed greater 
percentages of their home values, were more likely to purchase homes, and purchased more 
expensive homes. Similarly, the analysis can be extended to the years 2001 and 2004 and the analysis 
can help to understand when the relaxation in lending standards peaked.  
In additional future research with respect to chapter 2, this paper can be extended to include 
households’ credit scores. The effect of credit scores on financing ratios, home purchase rates, and 
dollar amount paid on home purchases and how these effects have changed over time can be 
examined. Since the SCF data does not provide credit score information on households, credit scores 
can be imputed by using an alternative dataset which contains credit scores on a nationally 
representative sample. Using the alternative dataset, a credit scoring model can be derived and this 
model can be used to compute credit scores for each household in the SCF data. 
As an extension to chapter 4, future work may include a more detailed analysis of the banks’ 
risk characteristics. The changing risk characteristics of banks that utilized the advances can be 
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examined to understand whether the advances may have contributed to greater risk taking by banks 
and whether it might have contributed to the subprime crisis. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
  
SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCE SAMPLE DETAILS 
 
 
Appendix A corresponds to chapter 2 and explains nature of the data. In order to conduct the 
AP sample design, NORC divided the entire US into geographic units and placed these units into 
strata based on degree of urbanization, population size and location. Based on these strata, large 
metropolitan areas were selected as PSUs (Primary Sampling Units) with probability one. Other 
smaller PSUs were selected at random from the remaining strata. Sub-areas within these selected 
PSUs were selected with probability proportional to a size measure from 1980 Census population 
figures. From these sub-areas, individual housing units were selected with probability that is 
inversely proportional to the number of housing units listed50.  
The list sample is a subset list from ITF which includes only the taxpayers who filed from the 
same addresses of PSUs, which were selected for the AP sample. Kennickell, et.al. (1996) and 
Kennickell (2001) give more detailed information on the sampling.  
In the list sample, there is a non-random nature of non-response because non-response rates 
are higher as respondents become wealthier. In order to adjust for this non-random nature of non-
response, households with higher wealth levels are sampled more intensively. However, even though 
this process adjusts for the non-random nature of non-response, it creates over-sampling of wealthy 
families (Kennickell 2001). Another drawback of the list sample is that it does not include poor 
households because poor households do not file tax returns. The SCF deals with this drawback by 
combining the list sample with the AP sample and applying weighting schemes (Kennickell 2000). In 
addition, the ITF data (from which the list sample is selected) includes federal tax returns filed in the 
year preceding the SCF survey. Furthermore, if multiple individuals from the same family file a tax 
return, the same household can be selected multiple times to the SCF dataset. The weighting scheme 
applied in the SCF dataset adjusts for all of these sample characteristics (Kennickell 1998). 
Kennickell, et.al. (1996) give detailed information on how weights are constructed.   
The missing data are imputed using the multiple imputation technique. The SCF uses 6 
iterations. The sixth iteration produces the five implicates published in the dataset. In the first 
                                                          
50
 For instance, if in sub-area 1 there are 100 housing units, in sub-area 2 there are 50 housing units, and in sub-area 
3 there are 80 housing units then housing units in sub-area 1 are chosen 2.3 times (230/100) while housing units in 
sub-area 2 are chosen 4.6 times (230/50) and housing units in sub-area 3 are chosen 2.8 times (230/80).  
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iteration, a fully imputed dataset is created and all the missing values are filled in. This filled in 
dataset from the first iteration is used as input data for the second iteration to create three new 
implicates. For the third iteration, the three implicates from the second iteration are stacked and used 
as input data to create five new implicates. This process continues for higher order iterations. 
Kennickell (1991) gives detailed information on multiple imputations. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
 
This appendix displays Tables B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4 and these tables correspond to Chapter 2.  
 
Table B.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Home Financing 
Ratio Model  
Home Purchase 
Decision Model  
Dollar Amount 
Spent on Home 
Purchase Model 
Dependent Variables Mean Std. Err.   Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
  Mean Std. Err. 
Loan-to-value ratio (%) 74.686 (0.983) 
 
n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
Purchased principal residence n/a n/a 
 
0.246 (0.012) 
 
n/a n/a 
Dollar amount spent on home 
purchase (in thousands) 
n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
230.823 (9.802) 
Credit Characteristics 
        
Household head employed 0.911 (0.013) 
 
0.810 (0.010) 
 
0.882 (0.019) 
Number of years worked for current 
employer 
6.959 (0.342) 
 
4.247 (0.164) 
 
5.687 (0.397) 
Family Income ($ in thousands) 102.890 (3.975) 
 
56.329 (1.616) 
 
97.246 (4.777) 
Net-worth ($ in thousands) 287.009 (22.965) 
 
100.437 (8.373) 
 
266.216 (28.029) 
Has positive net-worth 0.896 (0.015) 
 
0.735 (0.012) 
 
0.866 (0.020) 
College and Higher Degree 0.440 (0.023) 
 
0.324 (0.012) 
 
0.449 (0.028) 
Turn down for credit/didn't get as 
much credit as applied for 
0.307 (0.022) 
 
0.485 (0.013) 
 
0.358 (0.028) 
Has no credit card 0.138 (0.017) 
 
0.287 (0.012) 
 
0.134 (0.020) 
Unused percent of credit card limit 63.644 (1.819) 
 
42.740 (1.838) 
 
63.787 (2.195) 
Almost/always pay off balance on 
credit  cards 
0.404 (0.022) 
 
0.287 (0.012) 
 
0.436 (0.028) 
Behind/missed payments 0.126 (0.016) 
 
0.287 (0.012) 
 
0.127 (0.020) 
Mortgage Characteristics 
        
Main mortgage is federally 
guaranteed 
0.263 (0.021) 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.257 (0.025) 
Adjustable rate mortgage 0.158 (0.016)   n/a n/a   0.160 (0.020) 
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Table B.1. Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 
Home Financing 
Ratio Model  
Home Purchase 
Decision Model  
Dollar Amount 
Spent on Home 
Purchase Model 
Other Household Characteristics 
        
Household head non-minority  0.766 (0.021) 
 
0.701 (0.012) 
 
0.754 (0.026) 
Household head married  0.647 (0.022) 
 
0.388 (0.013) 
 
0.624 (0.028) 
Household head's age  41.772 (0.540) 
 
38.109 (0.357) 
 
39.587 (0.674) 
Chance of staying (%) n/a n/a 
 
55.132 (1.031) 
 
n/a n/a 
Mortg. amount  ($ in thousands) n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
172.471 (7.581) 
Level of financial risk willing to take 
        
Substantial risk 0.052 (0.010) 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.056 (0.013) 
Above average risk 0.285 (0.021) 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.282 (0.026) 
Average Risk 0.409 (0.023) 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.424 (0.028) 
No financial risk 0.255 (0.020) 
 
n/a n/a 
 
0.237 (0.024) 
Has no loan n/a n/a   0.107 (0.008)   0.010 (0.006) 
Number of observations 716     1694     451   
All dollar values are adjusted for 2007 dollar values.         
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Table B.2. Regression Results for Home Financing Ratio (%) 
  Coef. Std. Err.   
 
Credit Characteristics 
   
Household head employed 4.046 (3.161)  
Number of years worked for current employer -0.295
**
 (0.133)  
Ln of Family Income 1.395 (1.643)  
Ln of Net-worth -2.286
***
 (0.657)  
Has positive net-worth 4.084 (3.427)  
College and Higher Degree 3.633
*
 (1.963)  
Turn down for credit/didn't get as much credit as applied for 3.458 (2.117)  
Has no credit card -2.316 (3.638)  
Unused percent of credit card limit -0.022 (0.037)  
Almost/always pay off balance on credit cards -6.157
***
 (2.210)  
Behind/missed payments 0.088 (2.886)  
 
Mortgage Characteristics 
   
Main mortgage is federally guaranteed  5.797
***
 (1.990)  
Adjustable rate mortgage 1.930 (2.056)  
 
Other Household Characteristics 
   
Household head non-minority -4.350
*
 (2.279)  
Household head married  0.107 (1.951)  
Household head's age -0.386
***
 (0.092)  
Level of financial risk willing to take    
Above average risk 1.524 (3.312)  
Average Risk 2.984 (3.259)  
No financial risk -1.576 (3.659)  
IG1 2.981 (4.634)  
IG2 3.389 (3.375)  
Time dummy (2007) 0.202 (2.779)  
IG1* 2007 2.175 (4.376)  
IG2* 2007 1.791 (3.838)  
Constant 86.768
***
 (10.539)   
Number of observations 716  
R-squared 0.2725   
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Table B.3. Regression Results for Home Purchase Decision Model 
  
Regression 
Coefficient 
Linearized 
Std. Err. 
 
Credit Characteristics 
  
Household head employed 0.290 (0.320) 
Number of years worked for current employer -0.009 (0.016) 
Ln of Family Income -0.069 (0.219) 
Ln of Net-worth 0.307
***
 (0.073) 
Has positive net-worth -0.338 (0.307) 
College and Higher Degree 0.079 (0.200) 
Turn down for credit/didn't get as much credit as applied for 0.093 (0.195) 
Has no credit card -0.302 (0.301) 
Unused percent of credit card limit 0.003 (0.003) 
Almost/always pay off balance on credit cards 0.209 (0.225) 
Behind/missed payments -0.983
***
 (0.218) 
 
Other Household Characteristics 
  
Household head non-minority -0.063 (0.205) 
Household head married  0.904
***
 (0.180) 
Household head's age -0.007 (0.008) 
Chance of staying at the current address (%) 0.034
***
 (0.003) 
Has no loan -2.705
***
 (0.568) 
IG1 -1.852
***
 (0.551) 
IG2 -0.964
***
 (0.323) 
Time dummy (2007) -0.216 (0.260) 
IG1* 2007 0.982
**
 (0.490) 
IG2* 2007 0.395 (0.375) 
Constant -3.103
***
 (1.077) 
Number of observations 1,694 
Prob>F 0.0000 
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
Table B.4. Regression Results for Heckman MLE 
  
Dollar Amount Paid on 
Home Purchases 
  Selection Equation 
  Coef. 
Linearized 
Std. Err. 
 
Regression 
Coef. 
Linearized 
Std. Err. 
Credit Characteristics      
Household head employed -17.646 (14.564)  -0.581
**
 (0.271) 
Number of years worked for current employer -0.525 (0.614)  0.015 (0.017) 
Ln of Family Income 27.162
***
 (8.635)  -0.081 (0.148) 
Ln of Net-worth 20.231
***
 (3.146)  0.039 (0.075) 
Has positive net-worth -66.193
***
 (17.615)  0.039 (0.293) 
College and Higher Degree 4.177 (8.402)  -0.221 (0.194) 
Turn down for credit/didn't get as much credit as 
applied for 
-12.890 (9.573)  -0.003 (0.185) 
Has no credit card -29.789
*
 (17.840)  -0.211 (0.317) 
Unused percent of credit card limit -0.203 (0.221)  0.003 (0.002) 
Almost/always pay off balance on credit cards 16.452
*
 (9.719)  0.592
***
 (0.198) 
Behind/missed payments 8.294 (14.514)  0.055 (0.174) 
 
Mortgage Characteristics 
     
Main mortgage is federally guaranteed  -7.875 (7.593)  7.665
***
 (0.489) 
Adjustable rate mortgage -19.062
*
 (10.537)  -5.726
***
 (0.702) 
 
Other Household Characteristics 
     
Chance of staying (%) n/a n/a  0.010
***
 (0.004) 
Household head non-minority -3.085 (11.260)  0.136 (0.254) 
Household head married  24.196
***
 (8.290)  0.162 (0.198) 
Household head's age 0.846
**
 (0.360)  0.002 (0.008) 
Mortg. amount received to purchase principal 
residence ($ in thousands) 
1.173
***
 (0.041)  0.405
***
 (0.022) 
Level of financial risk willing to take      
Above average risk -13.908 (13.850)  0.718
*
 (0.392) 
Average Risk 9.181 (14.546)  0.675
*
 (0.395) 
No financial risk 14.251 (16.516)  0.403 (0.396) 
Has no loan 4.091 (29.568)  -0.302 (0.285) 
IG1 60.309
***
 (22.086)  0.053 (0.406) 
IG2 18.358 (15.879)  0.344 (0.361) 
Time dummy (2007) 25.866 (16.304)  0.259 (0.390) 
IG1* 2007 -26.018 (20.623)  -0.583 (0.438) 
IG2* 2007 -31.068 (19.090)  -1.725
***
 (0.564) 
Constant -148.903
***
 (51.615)  -3.050
***
 (0.892) 
Number of observations 1,687   
/athrho 0.547
***
 (0.085)    
/lnsigma 4.524
***
 (0.070)    
rho 0.498 (0.064)    
sigma 92.169 (6.477)    
lambda 45.902 (7.014)       
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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APPENDIX C  
 
 
MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM 
 
 
This appendix shows the solution for the maximization problem in chapter 3.  
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In order to check whether the critical point   
  is a maximum point or not,  (  ) is written as 
 (  )   (     )   where      (   )(     ) and   (   ) 
  (  )    
   (     )
  (  ) 
   (  )      
       (  )(     )
      . Thus, the critical point is a maximum point.  
Range that C1 can take is:  (           (   
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Denote          (   
  
   
) as  . 
Let P be the optimal solution for C1.  
If     , there is no boundary solution. Thus,   
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APPENDIX D  
 
 
DERIVATION OF “TOTAL LOAN” AND “NET WORTH”  
 
 
This appendix shows the variables that are used in deriving the “total loan” and “net worth” 
in chapter 3.  
 
“Total Loan” derivation 
 The dependent variable “total loan” is the outstanding debt level in credit or store cards, 
mortgage loans on principal residence, other loans received for the purchase of principal residence, 
home improvement loans, loans received for the purchase of investment real estate and vacation 
properties, lines of credit, vehicle loans, education loans, and other consumer loans. All the 
outstanding debt levels are expressed in 2007 dollars.  
 
“Net worth” derivation 
Net worth= Financial assets + non-financial assets – debt 
Financial assets include dollar value accumulated in pension accounts and IRA/Keogh 
accounts, savings/money market accounts, annuities, trusts, and managed investment accounts, 
checking accounts, certificates of deposit, mutual funds, savings bonds, bonds other than savings 
bonds, publicly traded stocks, and call money accounts / cash at stock brokerages, cash-value-
insurance. 
Non-financial assets include value of business interests, owned vehicles, equity in principal 
residence, real estate investments, vacation properties, and any other assets (artwork, precious metals, 
antiques, oil & gas leases, futures contracts, future proceeds from a lawsuit or estate etc.).  
Debt includes outstanding loans on pension plans from current job, margin loans at a stock 
brokerage, outstanding loans on cash value insurance policies, outstanding vehicle loans, outstanding 
loans or mortgages on investment real estate, vacation properties, and principal residence, any other 
outstanding loans used to purchase principal residence, outstanding loans on principal residence 
improvement, outstanding loans on credit/store card debts, lines of credit, any money owed to 
business, education loans, other consumer loans, and any other debt not recorded earlier. 
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APPENDIX E  
 
 
CONSTRUCTING PERMANENT INCOME 
 
 
This appendix explains in detail the construction of permanent income variable in chapter 3.  
 
Based on King and Dicks-Mireaux (1981), 
(E.1) iiii sACZY  )(log   
where iY  is the permanent income of individual i, iZ  is a vector of observable variables (education 
and occupation) for individual i,   is the associated coefficient for iZ , iA  is individual i’s age in the 
sample year and )( iAC  is a cohort effect, which reflects the fact that for a given Z younger 
generations are better off than older generations due to technological advances and capital 
accumulation,
 i
s  is an error term that measures individual i’s unobservable characteristics (skill, 
good fortune, etc..). Also, is  has a population mean of zero and a variance of 
2
s .  
(E.2) ititiit uAAhYE  )(loglog  
where itE  is the earnings for individual i at period t, A is a standard age with respect to which 
permanent income is defined,
 
)( AAh it   is the age earnings profile which is assumed to be constant 
across the population, and itu  is the unobservable transitory component of earnings.
 51 Moreover, itu  
is uncorrelated with is  and has a mean of zero and a variance of 
2
u .  
Combining equations (E.1) and (E.2) gives earnings equation (E.3). 
(E.3) itiitiit usAgZE  )(log   
where )()()( ititit ACAAhAg  and is approximated by a cubic function of age. Additionally, 
iti us   is the error term and has a mean of zero and a variance of 
22
us   .  
There are two ways to estimate permanent income. The first estimate is based on equation 
(E.1). Using equation (E.1) and omitting the unobservable individual effects is  in equation (E.1), the 
permanent income can be estimated as in equation (E.4). 
 
                                                          
51
 Age earnings profile is the mean earnings of workers at various ages.  
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(E.4) )(log iti
e
i ACZY    
The second estimate is based on equation (E.2). The permanent income is estimated as in 
equation (E.5), by using the age earnings profile and the information contained in the observation of 
current earnings. This second estimate includes the unobservable transitory component of earnings.   
(E.5) )(loglog AAhEY itit
e
i   
Following King and Dicks-Mireaux (1981), a more efficient estimate is obtained by taking a 
weighted average of (E.4) and (E.5). This procedure gives (E.6): 
(E.6) )}({)1()}({loglog itiitit
e
i ACZAAhEY    
Substituting (E.3) to (E.6) gives (E.7): 
(E.7) )()(log itiiti
e
i usACZY    
Based on Cox and Jappelli (1993), and King and Dicks-Mireaux (1981), permanent income is 
predicted separately for men and women in each year, 1998 and 2007. The category, men, includes 
household heads that are male or spouses of female household heads. The category, women, includes 
household heads that are female or spouses of male household heads.52 The steps below describe in 
detail the estimation of permanent income separately for men and women in 2007. The same steps 
are applied for 1998. While predicting permanent income, individuals with negative earnings are 
deleted from each of the samples.53  
As the first step, earnings equation (E.3) is estimated separately for each the following two 
samples: men with annual earnings greater than $8,000 and women with annual earnings greater than 
$8,000.54 Individuals with zero earnings or annual earnings less than or equal to $8,000 are excluded 
from the estimation.55 Any possible bias that may arise from excluding individuals with low or zero 
                                                          
52
 Household heads with a spouse from the same gender are excluded. In 2007 SCF (including all the five 
implicates), out of 17,560 male household heads, 50 of them have a spouse from the same gender. Out of 4,530 
female household heads, 15 of them have a spouse from the same gender.  
In 1998 SCF (including all the five implicates), out of 16,805 male household heads, 165 of them have a spouse 
from the same gender. Out of 4,720 female household heads, 115 of them have a spouse from the same gender.   
53
 Men sample, in 2007 SCF, has a total of 17,575 observations and 20 of those observations have negative earnings. 
Likewise, women sample has a total of 19,320 observations and 15 of those observations have negative earnings. In 
1998 SCF, men sample has a total of 16,670 observations and 10 of those observations have negative earnings. 
Women sample has a total of 18,355 observations and 5 of those observations have negative earnings. 
54
 King and Dicks-Mireaux (1981) use $2,000 as the earnings level. This earnings level corresponds to the 1976 
data. The $2,000 in 1976 is equivalent to $8,000 in 2007 and $6,000 in 1998. Therefore, this paper uses earnings 
level of $8,000 for the 2007 survey and $6,000 for the 1998 survey, while estimating earnings equations for 
individuals with earnings above a certain level.    
55
 Following King and Dicks-Mireaux (1981), earnings equation (E.3) assumes that individuals are in full time 
employment. Hence earnings equation is estimated for individuals with earnings levels greater than $6,000 ($8,000). 
For a detailed argument for excluding individuals with low earnings, please refer to King and Dicks-Mireaux (1981) 
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earning levels is corrected by Heckman MLE. In the first stage, a selection equation is estimated for 
the full sample to predict individuals with annual earnings greater than $8,000. The selection 
equation controls for determinants of zero or low earnings. The equation of interest is earnings 
equation (E.3).  
Selection Equation 
Dependent Variable 
 
1 if annual earnings greater than $6,000 in the 1998 survey 
or $8,000 in the 2007 survey , 0 if less than or equal to 
$6,000 ($8,000) or equal to zero. 
Variables 
 
Definitions 
Marital status 
 
1 if married 
Education 
 
1 if elementary or less education 
Age<22 
 
1 if age less than 22 years old 
Age>65 
 
1 if age greater than 65 years old 
Non-worker 
 
1 if not currently employed / not self-employed or waiting 
to start work 
Part time worker 
 
1 if current job is part time 
Financial assets 
 
Financial assets for the family (self-constructed, see 
Appendix D) 
Number of children under age 18 
 
Number of children under 18 that live in the housing unit 
   Earnings Equation 
Dependent Variable 
 
Natural log of annual earnings 
Variables 
 
Definitions 
Age  
 
Age 
Agesq 
 
Age squared 
Age-cubed 
 
Age cubed 
Education 
 
1 if none or elementary school 
  
2 if middle school or some high school 
  
3 if high school graduate 
  
4 if some college 
  
5 college graduate 
  
6 if graduate or professional school  
Occupation 
 
0: not doing any work for pay 
  
1: manager & professional 
  
2: technical, sales & administrative 
  
3: services 
  
4: production, craft & repair 
  
5: operators & laborers 
  
6: farming, forestry & fishery 
Race 
 
1 if household head is black 
Marital Status   1 if married 
Note: While calculating annual earnings, it is assumed that there are 52 weeks in a year  
and for hourly workers it is assumed that they work 40 hours a week 
 
As the second step, permanent income is predicted separately for the following samples; men 
with annual earnings greater than $8,000 ($8,000 < iE ), men with annual earnings less than or equal 
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to $8,000 ($0 ≤ iE  ≤ $8,000), women with annual earnings greater than $8,000 ($8,000 < iE ), and 
women with annual earnings less than or equal to $8,000 ($0 ≤ iE  ≤ $8,000).  
In order to predict permanent income for men with annual earnings greater than $8,000, 
equation (E.7) is estimated. While estimating equation (E.7), the same vector of explanatory 
variables (Z), estimated   coefficient values, and estimated residuals from step 1, earnings equation 
(E.3), are used. Standard age is taken as 45 and the cohort effect is taken as 0.75 percent. For 
instance, )( iAC = (Age-45)*(0.0075). The   value is assumed to be 0.5.  
However, for men with $0 ≤ iE  ≤ $8,000, permanent income is predicted by equation (E.4), 
but by using the same vector of explanatory variables (Z) and the estimated   coefficient values 
from earnings equation (E.3) in step 1. The cohort effect is still taken as 0.75 percent and standard 
age is taken as 45.  
An initial permanent income is estimated for women with $0 ≤ iE  ≤ $8,000 or $8,000 < iE  
by applying the same procedures as in males. Different than the procedure for males, a final 
permanent income is estimated by using the initial permanent income estimate and adjusting it for the 
possibility of non-participation in the labor force by women and using the estimated probabilities of 
having low or no earnings.   
)000,8$0($)000,8$(  iwi
e
i
w
i EprobEEprobYY  
e
iY  is initial permanent income estimate for women, iE  is annual earnings in the sample year, and 
wE  is mean earnings of women with annual earnings less than or equal to $8,000 ($0 ≤ iE  ≤ $8,000). 
The probabilities of earnings being above and below $8,000 are computed for each woman in the 
sample from the probit regression estimated in the first stage of the Heckman model.  
The permanent income for households is constructed by summing the computed permanent 
incomes for household head and the spouse.  
The regression results for permanent income are displayed in Table E.1. 
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Table E.1. Regression Results for Permanent Income Estimation   
 
          
 
Probability of having earnings greater than $6,000   
 
Probability of having earnings greater than $8,000   
 
1998 
 
2007 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Coeff 
Linearized 
Std Err  
Coeff 
Linearized 
Std Err  
Coeff 
Linearized 
Std Err  
Coeff 
Linearized 
Std Err 
Marital status -0.328
***
 0.091 
 
-0.109 0.102 
 
-0.175
*
 0.091 
 
0.027 0.099 
Education -0.422
***
 0.102 
 
-0.486
*
 0.266 
 
-0.500
***
 0.170 
 
-0.083 0.371 
age < 22 0.386 0.324 
 
0.067 0.219 
 
0.358 0.350 
 
-0.294 0.304 
age > 65 -0.639
***
 0.155 
 
-0.801
***
 0.139 
 
-0.694
***
 0.126 
 
-0.493
***
 0.139 
Non-worker -3.108
***
 0.094 
 
-2.761
***
 0.102 
 
-3.259
***
 0.093 
 
-2.994
***
 0.100 
Part time worker -0.140 0.168 
 
0.146 0.243 
 
-0.357
**
 0.172 
 
0.278 0.280 
Financial assets -2.06E-08 1.97E-08 
 
(7.08E-08)
***
 1.80E-08 
 
-7.07E-09 1.01E-08 
 
(2.39E-08)
**
 9.96E-09 
Number of children 
under age 18 
-0.055 0.039 
 
0.126
***
 0.045 
 
-0.030 0.033 
 
0.033 0.047 
Constant 1.896
***
 0.088 
 
1.744
***
 0.095 
 
1.946
***
 0.091 
 
1.747
***
 0.090 
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Table E.1. Regression Results for Permanent Income Estimation (Continued)              
 
Natural Log of annual Earnings 
 
1998 
 
2007 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
Age 0.081
***
 0.023 
 
0.116
***
 0.027 
 
0.082
***
 0.029 
 
0.080
***
 0.025 
Agesq -0.001
***
 0.001 
 
-0.002
***
 0.001 
 
-0.001
*
 0.001 
 
-0.001
*
 0.001 
Age-cubed (6.92E-06)
*
 3.75E-06 
 
(8.51E-06)
*
 4.51E-06 
 
4.80E-06 4.96E-06 
 
3.71E-06 3.87E-06 
Education:  
           
Middle or some high school 0.044 0.092 
 
0.173
*
 0.090 
 
0.034 0.107 
 
0.209
***
 0.068 
High school graduate 0.182
**
 0.081 
 
0.301
***
 0.085 
 
0.196
*
 0.100 
 
0.462
***
 0.059 
Some college 0.296
***
 0.082 
 
0.414
***
 0.085 
 
0.389
***
 0.102 
 
0.522
***
 0.063 
College graduate 0.422
***
 0.087 
 
0.561
***
 0.092 
 
0.618
***
 0.103 
 
0.840
***
 0.068 
Graduate or professional 
school 
0.645
***
 0.090 
 
0.768
***
 0.098 
 
0.903
***
 0.110 
 
0.986
***
 0.077 
Occupation: 
           
Manager & professional 0.467
***
 0.116 
 
0.384
***
 0.118 
 
0.294
**
 0.127 
 
0.660
***
 0.087 
Technical, sales & 
administrative 
0.223
*
 0.115 
 
0.174 0.118 
 
0.168 0.128 
 
0.342
***
 0.088 
Services -0.005 0.118 
 
-0.156 0.118 
 
-0.055 0.130 
 
0.186
**
 0.088 
Production, craft & repair 0.346
***
 0.128 
 
0.093 0.113 
 
0.109 0.152 
 
0.308
***
 0.083 
Operators & laborers 0.132 0.121 
 
0.019 0.113 
 
-0.019 0.138 
 
0.242
***
 0.086 
Race 0.009 0.044 
 
-0.156
***
 0.043 
 
-0.062 0.040 
 
-0.163
***
 0.048 
Marital Status -0.050 0.030 
 
0.131
***
 0.030 
 
-0.028 0.029 
 
0.142
***
 0.031 
Constant 8.085
***
 0.338   7.691
***
 0.388 
 
8.240
***
 0.410   8.024
***
 0.361 
athrho  -0.177
***
 0.061 
 
-0.374
***
 0.056 
 
-0.253
***
 0.067 
 
-0.274
***
 0.057 
lnsigma  -0.654
***
 0.031 
 
-0.501
***
 0.022 
 
-0.597
***
 0.020 
 
-0.462
***
 0.019 
rho  -0.175 0.059 
 
-0.357 0.049 
 
-0.248 0.063 
 
-0.267 0.053 
sigma  0.520 0.016 
 
0.606 0.013 
 
0.550 0.011 
 
0.630 0.012 
lambda  -0.091 0.031 
 
-0.216 0.031 
 
-0.136 0.035 
 
-0.168 0.034 
Number of observations 3,660 
  
3,326 
  
3,838 
  
3,498 
 
Prob > F 0.0000     0.0000   
 
0.0000     0.0000   
***, **, * refers to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
       
Omitted category in education is "none or elementary school". Omitted category in occupation is "farming, forestry & fishery".  
